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Abstract 
In this thesis I examine how disorientation, immersion and entertainment have come to 
characterize our understanding and experience of social space and consider the way 
representation - traditionally reserved for the visual, literary and aural disciplines of 
painting and poetry - has developed into ideological and experiential phenomena. 
However, rather than a single line or logical flow running between contemporary social 
space and the ideological imperatives of global capital, I argue that differentiated modes 
of spatial illusion exist in a turbulent and contradictory system of relations. 
Consequentially, this thesis explores the critical status of illusion. Taking spaces of retail 
and leisure as the focus of my inquiry I ask if the highly fabricated structures of shopping 
and entertainment provide some insight into new developments in global economy. More 
specifically, the relation between the 'experiential placemaking' of urban design and the 
6experience economy' is analysed through their relation to discordant modes of illusion. 
Instead of extending the old categories of truth and illusion, I assess the histories, 
movements and interactions of highly constructed spatialities to ask if we can begin to 
think more openly and positively about the role of illusion in social space. 
It is through my work with video, installation, and projections that I consider the effect of 
global economy on social space. By editing and projecting geographically distant spaces 
and activities into a single narrative I analyse the fictional realities that shape our 
experience of shopping, travel and leisure. Throughout the text the relation between the 
global and the particular is interpreted as a critical relation between 'representational' and 
'transcendental' spatialities. With this empirical analysis I investigate (i) how well known 
tropes of illusion - traditionally thought of as 'mimetic representation', 'phantasmagoric 
effects' and 'religious transcendentalism' - have mutated into a spatial form; (ii) what 
relation these highly constructed modes of disorientation, immersion and spectacle have 
on both one another and our relationship with space; and (iii) the potential for thinking 
and experiencing the production of fictional realities as a critical portal into the otherwise 
hidden workings of global capital. 
2 
Contents 
6 List of abbreviations 
Introduction 
7 Summary 
10 Context and Question 
13 Space and Illusion 
15 Chapter Outline 
19 Illustrations 
1. Representation 
22 Thinking Representation 
24 The Bonaventure Hotel (Los Angeles) 
32 Totality 
35 Plato: Mimetic Representation 
40 Marx: Ideological Representation 
46 Althusser: Reading Capital 
49 Ideological Representation 
54 Jameson: Postmodern Space 
59 Cognitive Mapping 
65 Illustrations 
2. Phantasmagoria 
67 From Fetishism to Phantasmagoria 
69 Arcades (Paris) 
74 Exorcism 
75 Commodity Fetishism 
80 Commodity Fetishism: Religion and Alienation 
84 Commodity Fetishism: False Reflections 
3 
87 
91 
99 
102 
106 
Phantasmagoria 
Benjamin: The Synchronic Relations of Phantasmagoric Space 
Figuring Illusion 
Living Relations Between the Dead 
Illustrations 
3. Placemaking 
III Experiential Placemaking 
113 Commodity, Space, Automation 
116 Selfridges: London and Birmingham 
119 Re-inscription 
122 Experience Economy 
124 Entertainment Space 
129 Scripted Space and Experiential Placemaking 
133 Differentiated Space 
135 Space and Economy 
139 Illustrations 
4. De-transubstantiation 
147 Summary 
150 De-transubstantiation 
154 The Venetian (Las Vegas) 
159 Simulation and Simulacra 
161 The Critical Status of Illusion in Social Space 
167 Illustrations 
5. Conclusion 
169 Research Findings 
171 Context 
173 Practice and Theory 
4 
Bibliography 
177 Books, Catalogues, Magazines and Journals 
Illustrations 
186 Sources and dates 
Documentation 
189 Practice 
191 Grand Canal 
193 Shaft 
196 Reeperbahn 
200 Richmond to Woolwich 
202 Objects and Projections 
212 Exhibitions and Publications 
5 
Abbreviations 
Where a publication is repeatedly referred to in the text I use the abbreviations listed 
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Introduction 
Summary 
The Rainbow Room is situated on the 65 th floor of the Rockefeller Building. On entering 
the room visitors can view New York through the twenty-four large windows. 1 In 
addition to the window view, the adjoining mirrors - which are inserted into each of the 
window recesses - both double and reverse the New York skyline. Consequently, window 
image and reflected mirror image merge into a disjointed and delirious cityscape. 2 In this 
space of entertaim-nent and spectacle the Platonic distinctions that divide appearance and 
reality dissolve into a paradoxical totality. Unlike the anamorphic, extreme perspective or 
trompe-l'oeil wall and ceiling paintings of the past, 3 the context of the site is the content 
of the image. In other words, this mode of spatial illusion is not set in opposition to a 
perceived reality or experienced as a separate sphere of activity. The distorted mirror 
images that circle the room not only reflect the city outside but speak of the multiplicity 
of experiential effects that exists throughout urban space. In this site of disorientation and 
entertainment the relation between space and illusion stands as a direct challenge to the 
normative but highly constructed systems that determine the way space is comprehended. 
The relation between space and illusion forms the general parameters of my thesis. In 
both my writing and practice I have been concerned with articulating a critical discourse 
for spaces of retail and leisure, which, like the Rainbow Room, function as a site of social 
and economic activity. In order to do this I have had to contest a long-standing resistance 
to illusion and its increasing colonization of social and cultural space. Furthermore, I 
' The Story of the Rockefeller Centre describes how 'Viewing New York through the twenty-four large 
windows of the Rainbow Room, or watching a floor show in the Rainbow Rooms sparkling splendour, 
visitors taste the ultimate in twentieth century entertainment' (Brochure, New York: Rockefeller Centre, 
Inc, 1932). 
2 In Delirious New York, Rem Koolhaas considers the influence of Coney Island on the architectural 
vernacular of Manhattan. With the entry of the fantasyscape of Coney Island into the business capital of 
Manhattan, Koolhaas suggests New York exists as a paradoxical site of pragmatism and fantasy. I return to 
Koolhaas' characterisation of this relation in Chapter Three. 
3 Examples of these more traditional approaches to illusion and space include the seventeenth century 
ceiling paintings of the Jesuit priest Andrea Pozzo. Pozzo's ceiling painting in 'Saint Ignazio' (Rome) - 
which employs extreme perspective to create an image and effect of the heavens opening up (also discussed 
in relation to Jerde Partnership International in Chapter 3) and Baldassare Peruzzi's Sala della Perspective 
(Villa Farnesina, Rome). 
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have argued for a broader methodological approach to thinking illusion and the role it 
plays in spaces of exchange and recreation. To do this I have taken what might be 
described as a 'relational' approach to the complex network of illusions that exist in the 
social spaces of retail, leisure and beyond. That is, I have looked to the interrelation 
between different modes of spatial illusion (some visible appearances that are designed 
into space and others which are invisible ideological representations), to consider how we 
might best engage, socially, culturally and critically, with the constructed effects and 
immaterial forces that act on the spaces and activities associated with contemporary 
praxis. 
The relation, then, is not one of oppositions - inside/outside, reality/appearance, etc. - or 
one of equivalents. The notion of relation will, first, be closer to thinking about how 
illusion is never fully visible, that it is always both here and elsewhere. In standing in for 
something that is elsewhere, in being a supplement or figure for meaning, there is always 
a relation. However, this relation will not be configured or thought through a vertical axis 
- where the surface appearance covers over a hidden essence. Instead, I take the relation 
to exist horizontally allowing for combinations between systems and networks. In this 
way I will explore the relation between appearances. It is this multiplicity: 
appearance/illusion/representation - this fusion of appearances in built space - that I will 
argue involves a critical status. 
Throughout the following chapters I take 'illusion' to reflect this complex and dynamic 
relation. While it is often understood as a counter to the 'real' and the 'true', I treat 
illusion as a vessel or carrier of meaning that allows us to analyze the physical, 
ideological and social forces at work in space. In this way the four chapters take up 
different but interrelated features of this totality and extend my analysis into theories of 
representation, ideology, religion, economy, architecture and sociology. The chapter 
headings - Representation, Phantasmagoria, Placemaking and De-transubstantiation - all 
involve some aspect of illusion yet move in different directions to disrupt the possibility 
of any overarching categorization. In short, I take illusion to exist as a multiplicity of 
forces and relations. Furthermore, I take its fluid and expansive nature to move between 
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the physical and the ideological, between theories of global economy and the experiential 
effects of retail architecture and urban placemaking. In the final chapter this juxtaposition 
of scales, positions and spaces is taken as a critical and analytical tool of interpretation. 
While 'social space' encompasses a wide range of meanings and interpretations (home, 
work, community, etc. ), I use it to describe those spaces that Michael Hardt and Antonio 
Negri have associated with profitability, as they argue, 'profit can be generated only 
through contact, engagement, interchange, and commerce' (E, 190). Social space is the 
traditional centre for economic exchange and economic exchange involves social 
interaction. 4 Given the indivisibility of the social and the economic, I turn to sites of 
retail, leisure and entertainment as key areas of social activity. In this way I take the 
relation between illusion and social space to consider the critical possibilities of 
experiential design in relation to wider global systems. This multiplicity of forces and 
effects is taken to constitute the social spaces of contemporary praxis. 
The movement between local and global networks of exchange and social interaction has 
also infonned my choice of sites. In each chapter I move between specific examples (the 
Bonaventure Hotel, the Arcades, Selfridges, the Venetian, etc. ), while at the same time 
considering the wider ideological and economic forces that determine how those spaces 
are experienced. Following Jameson's analysis of the Bonaventure Hotel (Chapter One) 
and Benjamin's account of the Arcades (Chapter 2), 1 consider how spaces of retail, 
leisure and entertainment have been represented and theorised through critical texts. In 
the following chapters I select examples that extend the logic of those spaces to consider; 
(i) developments in immersive and experiential design; (ii), the relation between space 
and economy and; (iii) the critical status of illusion in social space. In each case the 
4 Marcel Mauss' anthropological study of gift giving in different primitive and archaic cultures explores 
how exchange exists at the centre of social relations. Mauss enters the concept of the total social 
phenomenon in anthropological theory: the concept of a multidimensional phenomenon which is at the 
same time economical, juridical, moral, religious and mythological. Mauss' study is taken up by Jacques 
Derrida, Jean Baudrillard and others, and demonstrates, from an anthropological perspective, the fusion of 
economic exchange with social networks. Marcel Mauss, The Gift: The Form and Reason for Exchange in 
Archaic Societies, London: Routledge, 1990. 
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individual site provides a platform for analysis and a direct link to the mutations and 
developments of global capitalism. 
Context and Question 
The issue that runs throughout the following chapters involves the question of how we 
might look beyond a pessimistic fatalism on the one hand, and a utopian idealism on the 
other. With this problem in mind I consider how the influential theories of Karl Marx, 
Guy Debord, Fredric Jameson and Jean Baudrillard are bound together by a metaphysical 
and idealized notion of the 'real'. Consequently, illusion, appearance and representation 
are always determined through a register that not only divides essence and appearance 
but privileges the authentic ideal over the mediated copy. When considered in this way - 
in opposition to the real - illusion is judged according to its failure to resemble a 
predetermined model and therefore demonised as an immoral and corrupt category of 
phenomena. 
This negative reading of illusion underlies Guy Debord's The Society of the Spectacle. 
Drawing on Marx's theory of Commodity Fetishism, Debord describes how: 
.. It is thus the earthbound aspects of 
life that have become most impenetrable and 
rarefied. The absolute denial of life in the shape of fallacious paradise, is no longer 
projected onto the heavens, but finds its place instead within material life itself The 
spectacle is hence a technological version of the exiling of human powers in a world 
beyond. (S, 18) 
Like Marx, Debord argues that the transcendental/ideological illusions that were once 
confined to the space of religious belief, now occupy the field of economic exchange. 
With the development of new technologies, however, the rarefied commodity has 
mutated into all areas of lived experience: 
Here we have the principle of commodity fetishism, the domination of society by things 
whose qualities 'are at the same time perceptible and imperceptible by the senses. ' This 
principle is absolutely fulfilled in the spectacle, where the perceptible world is replaced 
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by a set of images that are superior to that world yet at the same time impose themselves 
as eminently perceptible. (S, 26) 
With the proliferation of consumer goods and media images, representation has become 
autonomous. In this world of ftee floating signs the ideological imperatives of late 
capitalism work to create a false image of difference. That is, difference is not the 
product of 'meaningful oppositions', but the result of 'false representations'. 
Consequently, illusion becomes meaningless, not simply because it is seen to occupy a 
lower category of meaning, but because we are left with no access to the 'real'. Or as 
Debord puts it: 'In a world that really has been turned on its head, truth is a moment of 
falsehood' (S, 14). 
Postmodern theory has been influential in identifying the disappearance of a category of 
experience identified with the 'real'. Jean Baudrillard's writings on simulacra are typical 
of this approach to theorising the 'hyperreality' of contemporary experience. In 
Simulacra and Simulation Baudrillard explains that: 
It (hyperreality) is not about a parallel universe, a double universe, or even a possible 
universe - neither possible or impossible, neither real nor unreal: hyperreal - it is a 
universe of simulation which is something else altogether. (SS, 125) 
If illusion is thought to be the unreal of the real, simulation is an excess of the same. This 
world of simulation, however, remains inextricably linked to an old world of 'real' and 
meaningful difference: 
It is the real that has become our utopia - but a utopia that is no longer in the realm of the 
possible, that can only be dreamt of as one would dream of a lost object. (SS, 123) 
The opposition between the hyperreal and a (lost) reality follows the same moral logic 
that distinguish the authentic from the inauthentic. Just as Plato judges the model over the 
copy, Baudrillard privileges a meaningful past over our present state of simulation. In 
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place of real change and meaningful difference the hyperreal. simulates change to hide the 
fact that the real has disappeared: 
The process will, rather, be the opposite: it will be to put decentred situations, methods of 
simulation in place to contrive to give them the feeling of the real, of the banal, of lived 
experience, to reinvent the real as fiction, precisely because it has disappeared from our 
life. (SS, 124) 
Baudrillard contrasts a past reality with our current state of mediation and simulation. He 
emphasizes this divide in order to suggest the disappearance of the real. Any generative 
or productive relation between differentiated orders of simulation are generalised into a 
single category (simulacra). With both Debord's critique of the 'spectacle' and 
Baudrillard's notion of the 'hyperreal', the 'real' comes to possess an idealised and 
metaphysical status. 
In addition to documenting the developments of simulacra and other illusory phenomena, 
Baudrillard's analysis also offers an important insight into some of the problems and 
difficulties facing any project that seeks to engage with illusion and space. Not least, the 
issue of appearing passive and therefore complicit with the very system that culture is 
expected to resist. Douglas Kellner's detailed and lengthy attacks on Baudrillard illustrate 
this problem clearly. We are told by Kellner that: 
Baudrillard is the latest example of critical writing which criticises everything, but rarely 
affirms anything of much danger to the status quo. Ultimately Baudrillard is both safe 
and harmless. A court jester in the society he mocks, he safely simulates criticism, 
advertises his wares and proceeds to enjoy the follies of the consumer and media society. 
' 
Where Baudrillard articulates the demise of all meaningful existence, Kellner looks to the 
possibility of 'resistance' and 'struggle'; with Baudrillard and Kellner we encounter the 
extreme ends of fatalism and idealism. We will see, however, how these positions emerge 
5 Douglas Kellner, Jean Baudrillard. - From Marxism to Postmodernism and Beyond, Cambridge UK: 
Policy Press, 199 1, p. 216 
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from the same epistemology; with both fatalism and idealism we find the possibilities for 
illusion reduced to a category of absence and void. 
Space and Illusion 
The issue of claiming some criticality for the complex relations between space and 
illusion begins, then, with a problem of method. In Chapter One I ask how we are to 
comprehend representation. What type of thinking, and perhaps more generally, what 
type of activity is appropriate for the task of engaging with the disorientating and 
spectacular appearances of contemporary social space? 
There is little doubt that the ideological representations - that remain hidden but 
nevertheless determines the way we think and live - operate on a global scale and are all 
encompassing. As Fredric Jameson puts it: 
... this latest mutation in space (postmodern hyperspace) has finally succeeded in 
transcending the capacities of the individual body to locate itself, to organise its 
immediate surroundings perceptually, and cognitively map its position in a mappable 
external world. (PM, 44) 
We may think of these new developments as 'the spectacle', 'the hyperreal', 
'postmodernism' or any other term that attempts to articulate the colonisation of lived 
experience by ideology. While such an analysis of postmodern subjectivity successfully 
points to the sublimation of the individual within contemporary space, it fails to consider 
the more turbulent interferences that operate in the differentiated field of space and 
illusion. 
Turning back to the Rainbow Room we can see that illusion is not experienced as a 
religious or magical effect that the visitor can easily enter or exit, but rather encountered 
as an all encompassing phenomenon in which the city outside is as much illusion as the 
mediated mirror image inside. The fusion of mirror image and window image allows the 
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city to be experienced as a mediated copy. But this experience of space and illusion does 
not simply suggest the disappearance of the 'real'; it is not simply a case of fantasy, 
spectacle and entertainment replacing the space of meaningful social activity. This 
relation goes to communicate something about the multiple and contradictory modes of 
phenomena that have come to shape social and cultural space. The effect of doubling and 
reversing the Manhattan skyline, of interspersing window view with mirror image speaks 
simultaneously of cohesion and difference. That is, if the Rainbow Room speaks of the 
fusion of traditional distinctions (Koolhaas), it also, at the same time, articulates the 
relation between differences. Not only is it a question of the precise nature of the illusions 
involved, it is a question of their relation. Instead of the true and the false, the Rainbow 
Room is both a site of illusion and a space of differentiation. This relation of differences 
does not emerge from a category that either simulates difference (Baudrillard) or forces 
difference through opposition (Marx/Debord/Kellner). In contrast, the relation emerges 
from a larger body ofphenomena that generates difference through a series of turbulent 
and critical interrelations. 
For Alain Badiou, appearance exists in synthesis with being. Instead of 'being in itself, 
we find that it is a question of 'being there'. That is, appearance and being are always 
bound to a situation. They are joined by a series of relations. 
We need a theory of difference according to appearance, over and above the fact that this 
difference may be phenomenologically obvious. This is what we will call transcendental: 
the entire apparatus which must be presupposed in order to be able to think difference 
within appearance. 6 
The relation between space and illusion offers some insight into what Badiou describes as 
'difference according to appearance'. As we have seen with the Rainbow Room, it is not 
simply a case of a fusion of categories. The question now is how we begin to identify a 
differentiation of modalities. That is, the question of how we look beyond a totalising 
6 Alain Badiou, Theoretical Writings, Ray Brassier and Albeto Toscano (eds and trans), London: 
Continuum, 2004, p. 182. 
14 
ideological structure that is taken to stand in opposition to a metaphysical and idealised 
reality but remains constructed on a ground of metaphysical idealism. 
In non-places: introduction to an anthropology of supermodernity, Marc Auge 
establishes a distinction between an 'anthropological place' that is 'organically social' 
and 'non-place' that creates 'solitary contractuality'. 7 Auge suggests that, unlike the 
anthropological place, 'certain places exist only through the words that evoke them, in 
this sense they are non-places, or rather, imaginary places: banal utopias, cliched. 8 In 
contrast to this position, I will turn to spaces that rely on contingency and representation 
to argue that the 'cliched' copy actively changes those sites that are anchored to the 
'places' associated with an 'anthropological reality'. Within this exchange, the copy can 
be seen to (re)inscribe the model. Or, as Jacques Derrida puts it, 'that which seems to 
represent, to figure, is also that which opens up the wider space of a discourse on 
figuration. ' 9 In thinking about the differentiation of appearance I will consider the critical 
possibilities for space and illusion. In this way I will argue that the relation between space 
and illusion is not simply reducible to 'the non-places of supermodernity', rather than a 
passive vessel for ideological imperatives, the sites of entertainment and retail will be 
argued to disrupt the transcendental apparatus of the ideological. In this way, I will not 
be suggesting yet another withdrawal from the 'real' - of 'place/history' - but 
considering the fluidity and movement involved in an ongoing series of spatial 
inscriptions. In short, I will be arguing that the relation between the visible illusions of 
'experiential placemaking' and the 'transcendental apparatus of the ideological' offers a 
critical insight into the working mechanism of global capitalism. 
Chapter Outline 
In Chapter One I move from thinking representation as a visual figuration - what I shall 
term 'mimetic representation' - to the later notion of a governing image of social praxis - 
7 Marc Auge, non-places: introduction to an anthropology ofsupermodernity, John Howe (trans), London: 
Verso, 1995, p. 95. 
8 non-places, p. 95. 
' Jacques Derrida, Margins ofPhilosophy, Alan Bass (trans), Chicago: The Harvester Press, 1982, p. 216. 
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'ideological representation'. This analysis begins an ongoing consideration of how 
differentiated modes of illusion have come to occupy social spaces of retail, leisure and 
entertainment. Crucial to this chapter is an interrogation of the foundational logic, or 
more specifically, the inscribed Platonism of later theorizations of representation, that 
continues to generate an anxiety and suspicion around social space. 
This analysis fonns the underlying critical drive of the following chapters and forces the 
question: if Plato"s attack on representation remains inscribed within an understanding of 
contemporary social space, is it now necessary to consider the possibilities of new and 
advanced modes of representation (simulation, disorientation and hyperreality) with a 
logic that can comprehend the technological mutation of the imaginary into everyday 
praxis? 
In order to further interrogate this question, I consider how Walter Benjamin expands 
Marx's theorization of phantasmagoria into a critique of nineteenth-century consumer 
space. In Chapter Two I move between Marx's theory of 'Commodity Fetishism' 
(Capitao and Benjamin's notion of 'phantasmagoria' (the Arcades). Here I explore the 
mutation of the commodity into social space and analyse how new modes of illusion have 
become increasingly associated with urban phenomena. However, instead of 
demystifying the perceived phantoms of objects and spaces of exchange, I argue that 
Benjamin, like Marx before him, lends form and meaning to a new category of 
experience. 
My inquiry into both Marx and Benjamin's reading of phantasmagoria focuses on the 
changing status of illusion in social space. With these expanded theorisations I identify 
where illusion is most manifest and how it acts on experience. However, with both Marx 
and Benjamin we are asked to think of the site of illusion as living relations between the 
dead. 10 Consequently, I ask if Benjamin's image of the deluded masses, who are 
'observed' (through the window of history) sleep-walking through shopping arcades, 
" An image that is played out in the film Dawn of the Dead (Dir, George A. Romero, 1978), when zombies 
congregate within an American shopping mall. 
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remains a useful figuration for grasping the meaning and status of illusion within social 
space. 
Having questioned the foundational logic inscribed in the dominant critiques of 
representation in Chapter One, and by establishing the theorisation of illusion in social 
space through the work of Benjamin in Chapter Two, I turn to more recent examples and 
critiques of space and illusion. In Chapter Three I include my own experiences of spaces 
of retail and leisure to consider the mutations, affects and consequences of new modes of 
spatial illusion. This methodological shift develops the argument from the previous 
chapters and aims to broaden the scope of my research and elaborate on the key concerns 
of my practice. It also provides new material for continued critique. 
In addition, Chapter Three focuses on the relation between 'experiential placemaking"' 
in urban design and what Joseph Pine has termed 'the experience economy'. 12 Following 
Benjamin's synchronic relation ofphantasmagoric space, I consider how today's spaces 
of retail also encompass the mutations, coexistences and temporalities of a global 
economic market. However, in contrast to Benjamin, I will be considering these 
spatialities as they exist in the present. 
With an analysis of Venice, Italy and The Venetian Hotel Casino, Las Vegas in Chapter 
Four, I explore the relation between two modes of illusion; or more specifically, I ask 
how the transcendental mode transubstantiation, is made visible by the representational 
mode experiential placemaking. While these illusions operate within the same system 
they function very differently. Where transubstantiation takes effect without altering the 
physical appearance of a thing, experiential placemaking moves on the surface and 
visibly changes the appearance of its location. Where the forces of transubstantiation are 
essentially ideological and, in part, external to physical space, the structure and 
mechanism of experiential placemaking is located in the fabric of the spatial event. 
" This term is used by Jon Jerde to describe his approach to urban design. 
12 Joseph Pine and James H. Gilmore. The Experience Economy: Work is Theatre and every Business is a 
Stage, Massachusetts: Harvard Business School Press, 1999. 
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In this chapter I also focus on the question of how these coexistent modes of spatial 
illusion reveal themselves in built space. With this in mind, I argue that the highly 
constructed representations of urban placemaking present an important challenge to the 
inscribed relation between the original and the copy and, in so doing, perform a certain 
de-transubstantiation. This final analysis tests the relation between differentiated modes 
of illusion and produces findings that allow for a consideration of the critical status of 
illusion and social space. Instead of a single line or logical flow travelling between space 
and capital, I take my analysis to argue that the highly fabricated experiences that are 
increasingly produced in social space interrupt and negate larger global systems. 
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Rainbow Room, New York, 1993 
1.1 - The window recesses are clad with mirrors so that the view of the city is equal parts 
window image and mirror image Manhattan. 
Center. 
1.3 - Dining tables are arranged around the circular dance 
floor that slowly revolves. 
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1.2 - The Rockefeller 
Extreme Perspective and Trompe-l'oeil Wall Painting 
20 
2.1 - Andrea Pozzo, Allegory of the Missionary Work of the Jesuit Order (1691-94), Church 
of San Ignacio, Rome. 
2.2 - Baldassare 
Peruzzi, Salla delle Prospettive, fresco, c-1 515, Villa Farnesina, Rome. 
Representation 
Chapter I 
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Thinking Representation 
The question of how representation might be thought responds to the challenge it puts to 
an inscribed Platonism. That is, can we continue to think of representation as a mediating, 
illusory and even subversive distortion of the real when reality no longer exists in its 
traditional form? In this chapter I will explore the relation between representation and an 
assumed notion of reality. I will consider how the traditional division between the origin 
(reality) and the copy (representation) remains inscribed in cultural, social and political 
analysis to deten-nine a reading of subjective experience that bears little relation to the 
practices of contemporary cultural and social space. With this problem in mind I will 
consider how the traditional divide between appearance and essence continues to 
underpin the way cultural and political representation is thought. 
The critical focus of this chapter will be directed towards Fredric Jameson's analysis of 
the Westin Bonaventure Hotel. Having considered Plato's attack on mimetic 
representations and Marx's critique of ideological representation, I will ask if Jameson's 
theorisation of postmodern space has fallen victim to the traditional determinations of an 
inscribed Platonism. 
The consequence of this analysis forms the underlying critical drive of the following 
chapters. That is, if Plato's attack on representation remains inscribed in an understanding 
of contemporary cultural and social space, is it now necessary to consider the possibilities 
of new and advanced modes of representation (simulation, disorientation and 
hyperreality) with a logic that can comprehend the technological mutation of the 
imaginary into everyday praxis? My investment in this question is not intended as a mere 
reversal of the old categories of appearance and essence nor considered as a counter to a 
'past history of dichotomous thinking'; 13 the question instead aims to reveal the 
13 The problem of binary oppositions is a key issue for my thesis. In this chapter I explore how thinking 
representation has been governed by traditional categories of thought. But as Elizabeth Grosz points out, 
moving away from 'dichotomous thinking' is no easy task, 'it may in fact prove impossible to definitively 
rid ourselves of binary-categorizations, given that our language, all of our concepts, and the intellectual 
frameworks that we use to think them are derived from a past history of dichotomous thinking that we have 
inherited' (Elizabeth Grosz, Architecture from the Outside, Essays on Virtual and Real Space, 
Massachusetts: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2002, p. 30). With regard to thinking representation, 
I do not intend to merely reverse these categories of thought or, perhaps more predictably, attempt to 
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determining assumptions that lie behind the critical discourses that inform and shape the 
debates around contemporary social space. More generally and perhaps more 
importantly, the question acts as a starting point to considering the turbulent, generative 
and critical relations that exist between differentiated modes of spatial representation. 
replace them with a more complex or contradictory model. My intention for Chapter One is to simply 
highlight the way that a 'past history of dichotomous thinking' continues to determine how representation 
is thought philosophically, politically and culturally. 
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The Bonaventure Hotel (Los Angeles) 
Fredric Jameson's well known analysis of John Portman's Westin Bonaventure Hotel 
focuses on the 'placelessness' of both the building and postmodern space in general. For 
Jameson, the Bonaventure serves as a representation of a much larger global system. As 
the title of his book clearly indicates, Postmodernism or the Cultural logic of late 
Capitalism, postmodern space is thought as a cultural representation of new and 
advanced mode of late capitalism. As I will explore more fully, Jameson argues that the 
Bonaventure is somehow out to get us. Beneath the spectacular surface of this 'fully- 
blown postmodern building' lies something more sinister. The question of how we 
position ourselves in space that has been colonised by mutations in late capitalism lies at 
the centre of Jameson's analysis. However, as Jameson is fully aware, this involves 
understanding how we are caught in a network of representations. Although Jameson 
does not seek to extricate us from representation, the representational mode that he finds 
most appropriate to our existence (as free thinking subjects) resides somewhere beyond, 
in an 'as yet unimaginable new mode' (PM, 54). 
Jameson's anxiety about postmodem space and the forces at work therein is played out in 
Wolfgang Petersen's 1993 film, In the Line of Fire. 14 Here, the Bonaventure features as 
the location for the final showdown between the assassin (John Malkovich) and the hero 
(Clint Eastwood). The problem for Eastwood, who is desperately trying to save the 
President from assassination, is that Malkovich is a master of disguise - playing out a 
number of different characters to deceive those around him into believing he is something 
that he is not. The Bonaventure, with its reflective glass skin, hidden entryways and 
spectacular interior, becomes a spatial manifestation of the film's deadly trickster. 
Moreover, the disorientating spaces that are joined by lifts and escalators reinforce the 
sense of uncertainty that characterises Eastwood's failure to visibly identify the illusive 
assassin. in the film we are transported through the building so that one moment we are 
14 The Bonaventure Hotel features as a scenic backdrop to a number of Hollywood movies. In Katherine 
Bigelow's Strange Days (1995) and James Cameron's True Lies (1994), the Bonaventure is similarly 
associated with disorientation, illusion and alienation. The other film involving political assassination is 
Nick of Time, dir. John Badham, 1995. 
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in the busy entrance hall and the next in the cocktail lounge looking over LA. With this 
sense of spatial confusion we become increasingly anxious - not least because the 
disorientation and bustle of the hotel's interior appears to benefit the assassin. However, 
in the final showdown there is no escape, trapped in the glass lift, the unmasked assassin 
is forced to choose imprisonment or death. 
The relation between the disguised assassin (In the Line of Fire) and Jameson's analysis 
of the Bonaventure sets the scene for understanding how representation and illusion are 
thought in postmodern theory. The idea that social space is out to get us, or put 
differently, that beneath the disguise of everyday praxis lies our fate (as free-thinking 
subjects) goes to illustrate a more general approach to illusion (that has a long and 
influential history). Through this chapter I will turn to the key figures that have 
problematised representation. However, rather than following a linear theoretical 
narrative, I intend to introduce Jameson at the beginning of this chapter. In this way, we 
are jumping in at the deep end where we find ourselves 'submerged', 'disorientated' and 
unable to map our position in relation to a larger framework. For Jameson, this is 
precisely the problem at stake: 
We are submerged in its (postmodern space) henceforth filled and suffused volumes to 
the point where our new postmodern bodies are bereft of spatial coordinates and 
practically (let alone theoretically) incapable of distantiation. (PM, 48) 
The question for Jameson is directly connected to the relation between space and illusion; 
that is, how are we going to play the role of Clint Eastwood and successfully unmask the 
disguised assassin or, as Jameson puts it: 
How are we to begin to grasp our positioning as individuals and collective subjects and 
regain a capacity to act and struggle which is at present neutralized by our spatial as well 
as our social confusion. (PM, 54) 
The problem with Jameson's analysis - and the issue that I will take up through this and 
the following chapters - concerns the assumption that there exists a figure who will 
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unmask the false appearances of social space and consequently save us from certain 
death. 
Jameson begins his analysis of the Bonaventure Hotel with the entryways, which do not 
stand out, but appear as 'lateral and rather backward affairs' (PM, 39). Jameson suggests 
that the inconspicuous nature of any entrance to the building is imposed 'by some new 
category of closure which governs the inner space of the hotel' (PM, 40) and argues that 
John Portman's building aspires to being 'a total space, a complete world, a kind of 
miniature city' (PM, 40). This total environment goes to generate what Jameson 
considers to be a new collective practice or 'hypercrowd'. The ambition of this 
postmodern space is not to act as a part, but instead to function as a substitute for the city 
that surrounds it. 
The Bonaventure is understood to perform both as space and as spatial representation. 
That is, Jameson argues that the hotel involves a highly visual and contemplative 
experience of architecture. The absence of the traditional physical properties of 
architectural space is considered by Jameson to have been replaced with a representation 
or sign of those older realities. In this way The Bonaventure 'stands in' as a 
representation of the rest of the city; it does this through a number of spatial tricks: small 
entryways, the inclusion of retail premises within the hotel, the mechanical transportation 
of the visitor by way of escalators and lifts (so that the space is observed rather than 
physically negotiated), the 'real' atmosphere of a crowd is replaced by a new hypercrowd 
and, perhaps most importantly, the mirrored glass on the outside of the building which 
distracts from the physical proportions of the external structure and reflects the city as 
image. 15 With all these spatial effects Jameson argues that postmodern space 'has finally 
succeeded in transcending the capacities of the individual body to locate itself, to 
organise its immediate surroundings perceptually, and cognitively to map its position in a 
mappable external world' (PM, 44). 
15 The relation between corporate glass towers and mirrors is discussed by Jeff Wall in relation to Dan 
Graham's project, Alteration to a Suburban House (1978). Like Jameson, Wall argues that: 'the 
combination of disorientating, mirroric invisibility with monumentalism which is rigid, systematic, and 
empty of satisfying symbols of power and authority, makes the glass tower a disturbing phenomena' (Jeff 
Wall, Dan Graham's Kammerspiel, Toronto: Art Metropole, 1991, p. 42). 
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In contrast to the buildings of Le Corbusier and the International Style, which claimed a 
new utopian space of the modem, the Bonaventure Hotel conceals itself within a 
reflective glass skin that, rather than standing out as a monument of modernity, simply 
returns a distorted image of the buildings that surround it: 
In a similar way, the glass skin achieves a peculiar and placeless dissociation of the 
Bonaventure from its neighbourhood: it's not even an exterior, inasmuch as when you 
seek to look at the hotel's outer walls you cannot see the hotel itself but only the distorted 
images of everything that surrounds it. (PM, 43) 
The immateriality of this 'placeless' hotel is for Jameson not just a question of a 
representational image of space; it is also a clear indication of the infiltration of a new 
multinational capitalism. It is in this way that Jameson thinks postmodernism and late 
capitalism as a totality: 'everything in the previous discussion suggests that what we have 
been calling postmodernism is inseparable from, and unthinkable without the hypothesis 
of some fundamental mutation of the sphere of culture in the world of late capitalism, 
which includes the momentous modification of its social function' (PM, 48). The 
Bonaventure is a metonym for late capitalism and, like that larger economic system, the 
hotel stretches across the globe in one great network. In this space of postmodern 
architecture, capitalism is not neutralized but reproduced in a concentrated and 
miniaturized form. 16 For Jameson, the surface representations of the Bonaventure are an 
outward expression of a larger global network. While this is not a disguise in the 
traditional sense of the word (In the Line of Fire), we find that Jameson's analysis 
understands architectural space as a representational cover through which the forces of 
capital assert their control. 
Representation is, in this instance, influenced by Louis Althusser's redefinition of the 
ideological as a 'representation' of the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real 
16 George Hartly, The Abyss of Representation Marxism and the Postmodern Sublime, London: Duke 
University Press, 2003, p. 219 
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conditions of existence' (LP, 162). 17 For both Althusser and Jameson we are always in 
ideology. In Fables of Aggression: Wyndham Lewis, the Modernist as Fascist, Jameson 
writes: 
The narrative apparatus which informs ideological representations is thus not mere 'false 
consciousness', but an authentic way of grappling with a Real that must always transcend 
it, a Real into which the subject seeks to insert itself through praxis, all the while, 
painfully learning the lesson of its own ideological closure and of history's resistance to 
the fantasy-structures in which it is itself locked. 18 
In this new postmodern society one level of representation (culture) can provide some 
insight into a much larger but otherwise invisible representation (ideology). This 
synthesis of different modes of spatial representation forms the theoretical basis of 
Jameson's critique. Postmodern space, with its spectacular forms and disorientating 
affects, is also the site of global capitalism, or in Jameson's terms, postmodern space is 
the latest mutation of multinational capitalism into space itself However, the relationship 
between these different modes of representation - one cultural and one ideological - has 
overtaken the ability of the subject to locate itself in space as 'we do not yet possess the 
equipment to match this new hyperspace' (PM, 44). In this way Jameson believes that the 
representational networks that exist in space no longer make sense to us. Moreover, it 
represents 'an alarming disjunction point between the body and its built envirom-nent' 
(PM, 44). 
The representational reality of this new cultural condition is of some concern to Jameson. 
Not only do the new products of postmodern space lack the critical distance that is 
apparently necessary for the subject to 'act and struggle' (PM, 54) there is also an 
ideological colonizing of cultural space that simply serves the needs of a new and 
advanced phase of capitalism. Jameson demonstrates his unease with postmodern space 
" Jameson cites Althusser's reading of ideology (in Lenin and Philosophy) as a primary text in 
Postmodernism or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism. He writes: 'Althusser's formulation remobilizes 
an older and henceforth classical Marxian distinction between science and ideology that is not without 
value for us even today' (PM, 53). 
18 Fredric Jameson, Fables ofAggression. - Wyndham Lewis, the Modernist as Fascist, Berkerly: University 
of California Press, 1979, p. 13. 
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with an analysis of the lifts and escalators that dominate the Bonaventure's interior. The 
way people are transported through the interior stands in for the physical trajectories of 
the body. Once at the top, the city outside is experienced as an image to contemplate. In 
addition to separating itself from the surrounding city (in an attempt to somehow replace 
it), the Bonaventure uses machines as substitutes for the physical movement of the body: 
'Here the narrative stroll has been underscored, symbolized, reified, and replaced by the 
transportation machines which becomes the allegorical signifier of that older promenade 
we are no longer allowed to conduct on our own' (PM, 42). Jameson no longer takes the 
position of the flaneur but becomes a passenger or 'hyperflaneur' who is guided through 
space by people carriers. The fact that the visitor is passively transported about the 
building means that the spatial choices available are no longer determined by the 
individual but instead controlled by new architectural mechanisms. The movement of the 
lifts and escalators contains the body in order that the visitor's passage from one space to 
another can be fixed and determined. This narrative disorientates our sense of space and 
prepares us for a much larger totality. 
The excitement and spectacle of the Bonaventure's lifts also feature as the cathartic 
backdrop to Petersen's thriller, In the Line of Fire. In the closing stages of the film the 
glass lift is both a means of escape and, ultimately, a space of imprisom-nent. 
1' It is 
precisely this paradoxical status that drives Jameson's analysis of postmodern space: the 
Bonaventure liberates the body from physically negotiating a passage through the large 
interior while at the same time determining the way space is navigated. For Jameson, the 
experience of being elevated to the top of the hotel while looking over the city offers little 
compensation for what he argues to be the 'ideological colonisation of cultural spacel - 
which confuses and ultimately controls the way that space is experienced. 
Jameson suggests that these 'movement machines' account for much of the excitement 
and spectacle in the hotel interior. The entertainment that the lifts and escalators produce 
19 In True Lies (1993), Arnold Schwarzenegger pursues a deadly killer up the glass lifts of the Bonaventure 
Hotel. On this occasion Schwarzenegger travels up in the lift on a horse while the villain is trying to escape 
in the lift next door. They reach the top of the building and run across the roof In this 
instance the killer 
escapes, but, like the rest of the 
film, the scene is highly fictionalised. This sense of disorientation and 
entrapment is further 
developed by John Badman in his film, Nick of Time (1995). 
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- which appear to Jameson like 'Japanese lanterns' or 'gondolas' - turn the working 
mechanism of the building into a site of fantasy. They are seen to offer their own 
'dynamic path' which the visitor is required to complete. Yet, for Jameson, the 
Bonaventure is not to be confused with the fantasy spaces of Disneyland: 'I am anxious 
that Portman's space not be perceived as something either exceptional or seemingly 
marginalised and leisure specialised in the order of Disneyland' (PM, 44). Although the 
Bonaventure is highly scripted Jameson is at pains to explain that it is not obviously 
fictionalised, constructed or 'exceptional' but something akin to the spaces encountered 
in daily life. However, as George Hartley has persuasively argued, the Bonaventure 
cannot be separated from the fictionalised landscape of Disneyland as it enters into a 
structural relationship with the theme park experience; not only does it compete with 
scripted entertainment space it completes that narrative by turning it into an extension of 
urban experience: 
The Bonaventure functions as an extension of this futuristic fantasy of American progress 
while it converts the mapped and directed space of Disneyland into a saturated and 
disorientating space of the Bonaventure Hotel. 20 
Rather than being distinct from the scripted spaces of entertainment and leisure we see 
how the everyday space of the Bonaventure (as Jameson would have it) continues the 
highly fabricated spatial narratives involved in Disney space. While Jameson is correct in 
claiming the Bonaventure to be neither 'exceptional' or 'marginalised', we find that the 
spatial narratives at work in the hotel's interior have a close connection with the highly 
constructed designs of Disney space. As I will explore, the constructed, fabricated and 
scripted spaces associated with the effects of entertainment space are increasingly 
becoming the norm. 
Jameson critique is influenced, in part, by a reading of Marcuse's essay: 'The Affinnative 
Character of Culture', which describes the 'semiautonomy' of the cultural realm . 
21 This 
20 George Hartley, The Abyss ofRepresentation: Marxism and the Postmodern Sublime, p. 223. 
21 Herbert Marcuse, 'The Affirmative Character of Culture' (1937), Negations: Essays in Critical Theory, 
Jeremy J. Shapiro (trans), Boston: Beacon, 1968, pp. 88-133. 
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colder' reading of culture looks at the way culture throws back a mirror image of the 
practical world in forms that vary from 'flattering resemblance' to 'critical satire'. 
Jameson's concern is that cultural representation can no longer achieve any distance from 
its subject: 'What we must now ask ourselves is whether it is not precisely this 
semiautonomy of the cultural sphere that has been destroyed by the logic of late 
capitalism' (PM, 48). Jameson's critique of postmodem spatial disorientation and 
immersion similarly concerns our lack of critical distance. That is, the disappearance of 
any distance from the immediate environment is assumed to render the individual 
powerless. In order to regain control Jameson believes that there needs to be a sphere of 
experience that possesses some autonomy from the dominant order, a mode of activity 
that was traditionally thought to reside in the avant-gardism of the cultural realm. 
What the burden of our proceeding demonstration suggests is that distance in general 
(including critical distance in particular) has very precisely been abolished in the new 
space of postmodernism. We are submerged in a henceforth filled and suffused volumes 
to the point where our new postmodern bodies are bereft of special coordinates and 
practically (let alone theoretically) incapable of distantiation. (PM, 48-49) 
The problem for Jameson then, is one of spatial immersion. In the new spaces of 
multinational capitalism we are no. longer able to navigate the spaces that we inhabit. 
This uncertainty is understood by Jameson to negate any possibility of resistance or 
change. In other words, the 'architecture' of postmodern space is understood to be in 
disguise, under the surface appearance the Bonaventure supports and extends the 
ideological forces of late capitalism. 
However, Jameson's unmasking of the Bonaventure does not liberate us from the 
confines of ideological determinations - he does not play the part of Clint Eastwood. 
Unlike Peterson's film, it is not a question of breaking the illusion and saving the day. 
Rather than discovering the truth behind the mask we are presented with something 
closer to an image of a Russian doll. Through Jameson's analysis the many modalities of 
31 
representation and space are unpacked and considered. But instead of interrogating their 
relation Jameson forces a new hierarchy. The task, as Jameson sees it, involves 
designating and singling out the most appropriate mode of representation. As I will argue 
later, Jameson's judgment of representational modes returns us to the anti 
representational logic which sets the authentic and the true in opposition to the 'false 
appearances' of everyday life. In this way Jameson's critique of postmodern space 
reflects many of the concerns that Plato voices in his attack on painting and poetry. For 
while representation is enjoyable and entertaining, it is understood to pose a threat to 
what is real and true. Although any possibility of distinguishing reality from 
representation is now (and perhaps always has been) only imaginable, we find that the 
judgments which underpin Jameson's critique to be inscribed by a Platonic mode of 
thought. 
Totality 
For Jameson, the question of the totality is central to comprehending postmodern space. 
Hegel's notion of Vorstellung, in which 'recognition', 'imagination' and 'memory' are 
synthesised into a single mode of representation, 22 is considered to help us identify the 
movements, interrelations and complexities involved in the relation between the mind 
and the world. This Hegelian concept is developed by Jameson - via the work of Marx 
and Althusser - into a theory of postmodern totality. I will explore Jameson's 
understanding and application of totality later, at this point, however, it is important to 
comprehend representation in its widest sense. That is, with Vorstellung, we see a 
plurality of representational modes interrelating. However, as Hartley points out, we 
should be careful when thinking the translation of Vorstellung into representation as we 
find, with the German word Darstellung, another form of representation. 23 This brings us 
to the important difference between presentation (Darstellung) and representation 
22 Hegel's account of the Vorstellung occurs in the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences, Vol III, 
1830. Hegel's Vorstellung is Translated as 'the immediate stage between intuition (Anschauung), the 
sensory apprehension of individual external objects, and conceptual thought. It involves three main phases, 
RECOGNITION, IMAGINATION and MEMORY. ' Michael Inwood, A Hegel Dictionary, Mass: 
Blackwell, 1992,257. 
23 'Darstellung' signifies in German, among other things, 'Theatrical Representation'. The Abyss of 
Representation, p. 94. 
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(Vortellung): 
The question of representation, then, does not apply to the quasi-concept of Darstellung. 
The phrase 'theatrical representation', then, is a misnomer here since the script to be 
represented or reproduced in the action of drama exists nowhere outside (or in another 
position behind) the action itself. 24 
In Darstellung there is nothing behind, the narrative is 'presented' to the audience and 
not represented by them. When thinking about Vorstellung it is important to engage with 
what lies behind the object. In other words, the moment of drawing upon interrialised 
images, of connecting images to what is common to them and of raising them to the 
universal describes, in brief, the totality that Jameson incorporates into his analysis of 
space. William Dowling puts this clearly when he writes: 
To think the totality is thus to see in a sudden flash of insight that an adequate notion of 
society includes even the notion of an external universe, that society must always 
function as a whole that includes all things, the perimeter beyond which nothing else can 
exiSt. 
25 
When framing these concepts within spatial terms, Henri Lefebvre's distinction between 
'representational space' and 'representations of space' provides some insight into 
understanding how space is inhabited by a multiplicity of representational modes. 
Lefebvre describes how: 
... the producers of space 
have always acted in accordance with a representation, while the 
users passively experienced whatever was imposed upon them inasmuch as it was more 
or less thoroughly inserted into, or justified by their representational space. 26 
Lefebvre suggests representational space to be 'directional, situational or relational 
24 The Abyss ofRepresentation, p. 94 
25 William C Dowling, Jameson, Althusser, Marx: an introduction to the political unconscious, London: 
Methuen, 1984, p. 43. 
26 Henri Lefebvre, The Production of Space, Donald Nicholson-Smith (trans), Oxford: Blackwell, 199 1, p. 
43. 
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because it is essentially quantities, fluid and dynamic. 27 The producers of representations 
of spaces, on the other hand, interpret and describe space, 'their intervention occurs by 
way of construction - in other words, by way of architecture, conceived of not as a 
building of a particular structure, palace or monument, but rather as a project embedded 
in a spatial context. ' 28 If representational space is 'perceived' social space - the space of 
inhabitants and users - then representations of space are 'conceived' - the space of 
planners, urbanists, technocratic subdividers and social engineers. However, as Lefebvre 
points out, there is no clear divide between these spatialities as they are an interconnected 
part of the production of space. 
Although mimetic representation and ideological representation can be seen to follow 
some of the differences and relations that Lefebvre describes, I intend to look to earlier 
models of thought as a guide to understanding the way the relationship between space 
and illusion has come to be theorised. Turning first to Plato and then to Marx, I will take 
up the key objections to mimetic and ideological representation. With Jameson, I will 
then consider how both Plato's attack on the arts and Marx's critique of capital are fused 
into a representational totality (Vorstellung). Moving from Plato to Marx and then back to 
Jameson, I will argue that, through Marx, Plato's attack on mimetic representation is 
inscribed into Jameson's chosen representational figure: cognitive mapping. The common 
suspicion of representation - whether mimetic, ideological or both - will be seen to be 
directly related to the anxiety attached to the blurring of categories and a questioning of 
the distinctions that separate 'reality' and 'appearance'. 
Perhaps more important, however, is the relation between 'mimetic representation' 
(Plato) and 'ideological representation' (Marx). With Jameson, we are to think of these 
representational modalities within a single totality. In postmodern space ideological 
representation (global capitalism) has come to occupy the way built space appears to 
perception (the representations of the body by movement machines or the reflection of 
the city in mirrored glass windows). For Jameson, the Bonaventure is merely a symptom 
27 The Production ofSpace, p. 42. 
28 The Production ofSpace, p. 42 
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of a far greater global system, which not only engages 'recollection', 'imagination' and 
cmemory' (vorstellung), it disorientates and disempowers those human faculties. In 
momentarily unravelling differentiated modes of spatial representation (mimetic and 
ideological), I will be asking if the representations involved in contemporary space are, as 
Jameson believes, simply a 'logical' mutation of multinational capitalism. 
Plato: Mimetic Representation 
For Plato, the problem of representation comes into being when it fails to be true to its 
'ideal form'. Plato's concern with the arts (representation) is based on their proximity to 
the 'real original' (by simulating a thing one catches something of the reality; one 
imitates the thing one is interested in, and one gradually becomes the thing one 
imitates) . 
29 In The Republic, Plato takes 'mimesis' to describe imitation in the arts. As 
Richard Lewis Nettleship explains, 'the use of the word 'imitation' in this wide sense was 
familiar to the Greeks, and its import was to put the function of the poet alongside that of 
other artists. 'Representation' is the best word for mimesis in this sense. ' 30 Plato's 
intention is to drive some distinction between 'representation' and 'truth', as the good 
citizen is always in danger of imitating (in life) the world of appearances (art) and not the 
world of truth (knowledge). 
At the beginning of his Theory ofArt (book X of the Republic) Plato asks: 'Is it (painting) 
designed to represent the facts of the real world or appearances? Does it represent truth or 
appearance? ' (R, 348). With this rhetorical questioning, Plato deduces that truth and 
appearance are a considerable distance apart and that the painter is able to make an image 
of every product there is in the world because his contact with things is 'slight' and 
restricted to the way things appear. 
Consider what a painter does, for instance: we're saying that he doesn't have a clue about 
29 The notion that we become the thing that we imitate is explored by Roger Caillois in his study of insect 
life, 4Mimicry and Legendary Psychasthenia'. Here Caillois describes how certain stick insects become so 
adept at mimicking the shape and colour of a leaf that they tragically misrecognise one another as food. 
John Sheply (trans). October, no, 31 (winter 1984), pp. 17-32. 
30 Richard Lewis Nettleship, Lectures on The Republic ofPlato, London: Macmillan, 195 1, p. 10 1. 
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shoemaking or joinery, but he'll still paint pictures of artisans working at these and all 
other areas of expertise, and if he's good at painting he might paint a joiner, have people 
look at it from far away, and deceive them - if they are children or stupid adults - by 
making it look as though the joiner were real. (R, 148-149) 
Plato's concern with the painter is directly linked to the hierarchical opposition between 
knowledge and perception; that is, Plato argues that the senses can be easily fooled or 
deceived but reason (measuring and calculations) remains consistent and true whatever 
the conditions: 'the part of the mind whose views run counter to the measurements must 
be different from the part whose views fall in with the measurements' (R, 355). The 
mind, in Plato's view, is divided into higher and lower dimensions. What appeals to the 
lower part are 'superficial appearances'. The higher part, on the other hand, occupies 
itself with abstract knowledge (unchanging and immutable truths). Representation, as we 
have seen with the Bonaventure Hotel, has the capacity to deceive the spectator, the 
mimetic products of poets and painters pass on a falsehood which goes to corrupt the 
minds of those ignorant enough to confuse reality with appearance, they fatten up the 
lower part of the mind and corrupt a true understanding of reality. 
The opposition between appearance and reality is discussed by Plato with the example of 
a stick seen through water: 'the same objects look both bent and straight depending on 
whether we look at them when they're in water or out of it' (R, 355). With this example 
Plato suggests that 'our minds obviously contain the potential for every single kind of 
confusion' (R, 355). The appearances of the perceptual world are seen by Plato to 
confuse the mind in the same way that the representations of the poet and the painter 
distort a single understanding of the world. The way things are perceived and the way 
things are understood through knowledge are again in conflict and because Plato believes 
that 'it is impossible for a single thing to hold contradictory beliefs at the same time about 
the same object' (R, 355), there can only be a single understanding about any given thing. 
Although we perceive the stick to be bent when it is seen through water, we 
simultaneously know it to be straight. For Plato, the choice is simply between appearance 
and truth, between the way things appear and the way things are. With this opposition 
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Plato argues that our knowledge of the straight stick is of a higher value than our 
perception (which tells us that the stick is bent). For Plato it is a question of repressing 
the (lower) part of the mind that would have us believe that the stick is bent. 
This singularity is also taken to regulate the space of work. As Jacques Ranciere points 
out: 'he (the mimetician) does two things, whereas the principle of well organised 
community is that each person only does the one thing that they were destined to by their 
nature. ' 31 This multiplicity of representation disrupts the appointment of space and the 
allocation of time: 
The exclusion of the mimetician, from the Platonic point of view, goes hand in hand with 
the formation of a community where work is in 'its' place. 
The mimetician not only splits things in two but 'brings to light the distribution of 
occupations that upholds the appointment of domains and activities'. 32 For Ranciere, 
Plato's attack on mimetic representation constitutes a clear understanding of the politics 
of aesthetics. That is, artists are banished from society precisely because representation 
disrupts the hierarchies and appointments made by the Republic. Moreover, the problem 
with the representations of the artists is that they break down the distinction between 
'those that think and those that are doomed to material tasks'. 33 For Plato, this problem is 
understood somewhat differently: 
All that I've been saying has been intended to bring us to the point where we can agree 
that not only does painting - or rather representation in general - produce a product which 
is far from truth, but it also forms a close, warm affectionate relationship with a part of us 
which is, in its turn, far from intelligence. And nothing healthy or authentic can emerge 
from this relationship. (R, 356) 
Plato explains the problem of representation by making the distinction between three 
31 Jacques Ranciere, The Politics ofAesthetics, The Distribution of the Sensible, Gabriel Rockhill (trans), 
London: continuum, 2004, p. 42. 
32 The Politics ofAesthetics, p. 43 
33 The Politics ofAesthetics, p. 44 
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types of bed. First, there is the divine model made by God, then there is the copy, 
faithfully made by the craftsman who specialises in reproducing the products of his 
labour in the image of the divine original. The third incarnation, and it is with this 'type' 
that Plato develops his argument against representation, appearance and illusion, is twice 
removed from the original and is placed at the bottom end of Plato's register. In contrast, 
God the progenitor and his original bed are at the top and the joiner, the manufacturer of 
beds is somewhere in the middle. The painter, who is twice removed from the original, is 
held as lowest producer of beds: 'I think the most suitable thing to call him (the painter) 
would be a representer of others creations' (R, 348). Plato's account of beds involves a 
strict hierarchy. With every move away from the original that has been produced by 
divine craftsmanship the bed becomes further removed from reality and truth: 
Whether you look at a bed from the side or straight on or whatever, it is just as much a 
bed as it ever was, isn't it? I mean, it doesn't actually alter it at all: it just appears to be 
different, doesn't it? And the same goes for anything else you mention.. So I want you to 
consider carefully which of these two alternative painting is designed for in any and 
every instance. Is it designed to represent the facts of the real world or appearances? Does 
it represent appearance or truth?... It follows that representation and truth are a 
considerable distance apart, and a representer is capable of making every product there is 
only because his contact with it is slight and restricted to how they look. (R, 348) 
For Plato, the distance between representation and truth is considerable because 
representation is based upon mere appearance. The way the world appears to perception 
is no indication of its reality. But there is also a more sinister aspect to representation. 
Plato believes that the painter and the poet present a threat to a collective understanding 
of reality. If a painting of a bed is good- there arises the potential for confusion; there 
arises the possible mistaking of appearance for truth. The painting is not only a copy, it is 
a corrupting copy. For Plato, the problem with representation is that representation not 
only creates an incomplete and partial image of the world; it passes on a distorted image 
of everything that it attempts to replicate. 
Plato's attack on representation is argued on epistemological grounds. The real can only 
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be accessed through knowledge, it is in abstract thought that we find truth. It is important 
to note that representation is not simply of a lower order or value to other categories; 
representation distorts the truth and plays on the emotions to create an image ofbeing 
that bears little relation to reality (which in this case is metaphysical). 34 Any move away 
from the given order of knowledge is perceived as a moral transgression. In this way the 
copy functions as a threat to what is understood to stand as reality and truth because, for 
Plato, there can only ever be a single or absolute image of truth. To represent the world in 
verse or in images is t erefore a subversive act. 
Plato's attack establishes a long-term belief in the corrupt nature of representation. 
Although Plato's formulation of 'reality' has little currency today, we will see how 
representation continues to be determined with this same logic. With the work of Marx, 
we will see how the ideological creates an incomplete and partial image of the world 
standing as a mediating falsehood and, most importantly, functions as a mode of 
representation that is far removed ftom truth. 
What, then, does this continued suspicion of representation rest on? As Ranciere points 
out, the politics that exist between the actors and audiences, between active and passive 
participants in a community are disrupted through the representation of that very same 
configuration: 'From Plato's point of view, the stage, which is simultaneously a locus of 
public activity and the exhibition-space for fantasies, disturbs the clear portioning of 
identities'. 35 The relation between mimetic representation and ideological representation 
are joined by the political act of multiplication. Like mimetic representation, ideological 
representation forces a splitting (between the subject and the image that the subject 
receives). The question of how we engage with this surplus form will be crucial to 
thinking about the critical potential of representation. 
34 Plato is here referring to the tragic poets of his day such as Homer, who were extremely popular with the 
general public. 
35 The Politics ofAesthetics, p. 13. 
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Marx: Ideological Representation 
With Marx, representation, appearance and illusion are seen as a 'constructed' force of 
political repression. This approach to thinking representation marks an important 
development in the way immaterial phenomena are theorised. In this section I will 
explore the opposition between what Marx considers to be the material reality of human 
activity and, on the other hand, the false consciousness of ideology. Most importantly, I 
will look to the move from thinking representation as a mimetic, visual or perceptual 
phenomena (Plato) to Marx's formulation of representation as an ideological construct. In 
other words, I will widen the frame to consider how representation is understood to 
condition all areas of social activity. 
Although Marx intended his theories to function as a 'materialist' critique of what he 
regarded as the metaphysical idealism of classical philosophy, 36 his attack on capitalism 
continues Plato's concern with the corrupt distortions of representation. The 
secularisation of society has, however, witnessed fundamental developments in the way 
reality is conceived both scientifically and philosophically. From a Materialist or secular 
point of view, Plato's notion that the highest category of reality and truth rests with God 
in an abstract, singular and unique 'form' no longer stands as a viable argument. On this 
basis it might be argued that representation (which has been determined in opposition to 
Plato's metaphysical reality) would also require a new theorisation. 
The location of Marx's reality may no longer be metaphysical37 (turning instead to the 
material realities of human action), but the task of searching out a hidden essence still 
36 In 'The German Ideology Marx and Engels explore the relationship between human thought and human 
actions. 'Idealist philosophy' comes under attack for serving the interests of a ruling 
ideology, for passing 
on a set of (ideological) principles, like those of Christianity, which 
dictate a certain manner of living to the 
individual. Marx and Engels argue that 'Life is not determined by consciousness but consciousness by 
life' 
(GI, 48) and that men should not be enslaved by their own minds. 
37 Under the subheading: 'First Premises of Materialist Method', Marx and Engels write: 'The premises 
from which we begin are not arbitrary ones, not dogmas, but real premises 
from which abstraction can only 
be made in the imagination. They are the real 
individuals, their activity and the material conditions under 
which they live, both those which they 
find already existing and those produced by their activity. These 
premises can thus be verified 
in a purely empirical way' (GI, 42). 
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remains. Once again we are told that the way things appear is no indication of their real 
meaning, or in Marx's case, the way things appear under the forces of capitalism is no 
indication of the human labour that has gone into their making. Marx's belief in the 
material relation between people and the objects of their labour is positioned in 
opposition to all that is deemed to exist as a surface appearance (ideology). 
For Marx, the real or true meaning of things does not derive from a Platonic idealism 
(abstract thought), but from a materialism (labour and production). Marx's materialism 
has nothing to do with physical matter but instead belongs to an idea of a 'real life 
process'. Marx believes that it is human action that transforms society and it is therefore a 
history of social activity that allows for an insight into the reality of being. In other 
words, Marx questions the primacy of moral, philosophical and religious doctrines to 
argue that the life of the mind is an epiphenomenon of the conditions of production. 
When Marx writes about a 'transformative materialist history', he is describing the 
generative primacy of the labour process in the development of human history. This is 
placed in direct contrast to the primacy of ideas in abstract philosophical reflection. 
Marx's conception of the centrality of human praxis in the production and reproduction 
of social life asserts that new means of production go to reflect the conditions of being, 
which in philosophy is represented through abstract thought. In short, Marx's materialism 
looks to the 'relations between men' as a way of expressing an 'idea' of (what 
constitutes) the real or essential qualities of existence: 
Men can be distinguished from animals by consciousness, by religion or anything else 
you like. They themselves begin to distinguish themselves from animals as soon as they 
begin to produce their means of subsistence, a step which is conditioned by their physical 
organisation. By producing their means of subsistence men are directly producing their 
actual material life. (GI, 42) 
By making tools and specialising in a given activity (labour) Marx believes that men 
produce a material reality that makes them a treal' part of the world, or as he puts it, men 
produce for themselves their 'actual material life'. 
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In this way, Marx's concept of materialism is abstracted into a history of actions. 
Although Marx argues that his theories are born from 'the real activity of men', it would 
appear that those actions are represented through history. In other words, Marx locates 
the real outside of ideological distortion (of daily experience); the real exists as a 
sequence of past events that can only return when capitalism is overthrown. The problem 
for Marx is that the present, which exists under the forces of capitalism, does not offer a 
real image of social activity; it is rather an ideological construction that alienates men 
from the products of their own labour. 
Alienation is understood by Marx to, be the necessary condition for the continuation of 
the capitalist ideology. When social relations are obscured by a governing doctrine 
(ideology), the possibility of social change or struggle ceases to exist. This mode of 
alienation is argued by Marx to involve a degree of misrecognition. With regard to the 
religious ideology or governing moral doctrines of metaphysical idealism, Marx suggests 
that men become subjugated by what originated as a product of the human brain 
(Christianity). In this way alienation occurs through a process of dispossession. That is, 
intellectual systems and material products that arise from human thought and activity are 
reflected back to the individual as autonomous forces of subjugation. In Capital, Marx 
argues that when objects of labour are perceived as autonomous objects of value 
(commodity fetishism), 'men' become alienated by the product of their own hands. 
Moreover, the material relations that once gave men their identity as social and active 
beings are negated. In other words, the ability of humans to transform their surroundings 
to suit their needs has reversed so that they are now transformed to serve the needs of the 
capitalist ideology. In this way Marx does not consider his contemporary social reality to 
be altogether real but instead an 'ideological representation' of the real, 'We call 
communism the real movement that abolishes the present state of things. ' (GI, 57) 
Marx argues that consciousness must re-establish its relationship with real life-processes. 
Ideology represents the autonomy of consciousness and it is from this sphere of abstract 
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thought that an unreal fantastic world has emerged. 38 Marx therefore reminds us: 
The phantoms formed in the human brain are also, necessarily, sublimates of their 
material life-process, which is empirically verifiable and bound to material premises. 
Morality, religion, metaphysics, all the rest of ideology and their corresponding forms of 
consciousness, thus no longer retain the semblance of independence... Life is not 
determined by consciousness, but consciousness by life. (GI, 47) 
Like Plato, Marx positions reality outside the distortions of what is seen and experienced 
in everyday life. Although Marx is at pains to show how his theories are born out of the 
world and not from abstract thought, there remains the problem of the ideological 
distortion of the real. Marx believes that under capitalism everything is experienced as a 
mediated inversion of real life processes: 
Consciousness can never be anything else than conscious existence, and the existence of 
men is their actual life-process: If in all ideology men and their circumstances appear 
upside-down as in a camera obscura, this phenomenon arises just as much from their 
historical life-process as the inversion of objects on the retina does from their physical 
life process (GI, 47). 
Sarah Kofrnan has explained the contradictions in which the figure of the camera 
obscura exposes Marx as only showing the derivative status of ideology but not its 
autonomy. The notion of the world appearing upside down through the lens of ideology 
'implies nostalgia for clear, transparent and luminous knowledge. '39As I will explore 
further in Chapter Two, Marx's figuring of the camera obscura clearly demonstrates his 
underlying belief in an outside natural light existing beyond the dark chamber of 
ideological distortion. 
For Marx, this inverted world of phantasmic illusion is not a poor imitation of the real 
original (Plato) but a false appearance that masks the absence of real human activity. In 
38 1 consider Ludwig Feuerbach's philosophy of religious faith, which similarly asserts the alienating 
effects of Christianity, in Chapter Two. 
39 Sarah Kofman, Camera obscura de Videologie, Paris: Galilee, 1973, p. 33 
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this way Marx positions reality, truth and all that is essential to a productive state of 
being outside that which is subject to ideological distortion (everyday life). The Platonic 
gap between what we perceive and what we know is again brought into play. Marx's 
materialism positions the real in the world, but like idealist philosophy, what is truthful, 
meaningful and real is not available to perception. Whether through painting, poetry or 
ideology the world is found to be experienced through the inverted distortions of 
representation. What has been argued to constitute a certain idealism in Marx's theory is, 
then, the inscribed belief that reality and truth exist outside of representation. 
In order to further argue that Marx's theories are idealist, I will first clarify how they 
express a very different idealism to that of Plato's. Where one derives from human 
activity, the other is born out of 'abstract thought'; where one is material, the other is 
metaphysical. In both cases, however, reality is located outside or beyond a perceived 
present. With Plato, reality resides in a pure and rational knowledge of the world; this 
metaphysical reality guides the easily deceived senses with a logic that is unchanging. In 
contrast, Marx finds reality located within human action: 'We set out as real, active men' 
(GI, 47), yet, as we have already seen, this material reality has become obscured and 
abstracted. We have also seen that Marx's reality is located within a historical 
materialism, a history of human action. This is not to say that Marx believes that reality 
does not exist in social activity; the problem instead is that ideological representation 
distorts the material relations that makes those activities available to perception. 
Although Plato and Marx share the view that 'appearance' distorts and perverts truth, we 
should remember that this commonality is divided by a different understanding of how 
appearance acts on perception. With Marx it is a case of the false appearances of ideology 
acting on the mind, while for Plato it is the senses that mistake appearance for truth. In 
this respect, we might turn to Marx as a reversal of Platonism, as it is the mind, and not 
the senses, that are understood to be most vulnerable to the misperceptions brought about 
by ideological representation. 
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Unlike Plato, Marx takes a dialectical approach to thinking. As we have seen, classical 
logic denies that contradictions exist in reality, and where they are seen to exist in 
thought, they have to be expunged in order to arrive at the truth. Dialectical philosophers, 
on the other hand, claim that contradictions exist in reality and that the most appropriate 
way to understand the movement of that reality is to study the development of those 
contradictions. The question is no longer a simple choice between truth and illusion; the 
question for Marx is how the illusion exists as a reality, or more specifically, how the 
reality of material activity continues to exist under the forces of capitalism. For Plato, 
there is no possibility of contradiction in the world, and where it is 'perceived' to exist it 
must be dissolved in favour of a single truth. What concerns Marx is the degree of 
contradiction that exists under the forces of capitalism; human action (material reality) is 
understood to be perceived through what he considers to be the false distortions of 
ideological representation. In this way material reality is understood by Marx to be both 
present and absent, to exist both in the world and outside (our experience) of it. 
On the face of it Plato's formal logic and the dialectical approach of Marx appear to be 
incommensurable and dialogue between the two systems appears impossible. Although 
dialectical, Marx's method is, however, a means to an end. That is, with class struggle 
and revolution Marx believes that the illusions and representations of the capitalist 
ideology will be destroyed: 'In reality and for the practical materialist, i. e. the communist, 
it is a question of revolutionising the existing world, of practically attacking and changing 
existing things. ' (GI, 62) 
What Marx proposes is quite simply to explode the contradiction in order that a single 
category of practical activity (historical materialism) might emerge in its own right: 
Communism is for us not a state of affairs which is to be established, an ideal to which 
reality will have to adjust itself We call communism the real movement which abolishes 
the present state of things. The conditions of this movement result from the premises now 
in existence. (GI, 57) 
Until that moment of change or action arrives, we will continue to exist in a state of false 
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consciousness. Representation is therefore thought by Marx to stand as a force of 
repression and alienation, a mediatory phenomenon that must be abolished from the 
present state of things. In Marx's society human action (the real life process) goes to 
replace representation and material activity goes to define the individual as a real active 
being. With this logic, Marx substitutes reality and representation with materialism and 
ideology to again argue for the abolition of representation in all areas of society. 
Althusser: Reading Capital 
In Reading Capital, Louis Althusser analyses what he describes as Marx's 'fundamental 
theoretical concepts' (RC, 183). That is, Althusser sets out the theoretical path taken by 
Marx in his theory of political economy. In this analysis Althusser shows Marx's theory 
to have broken with the concept of a 'linear causality' which had previously been applied 
to a theonsation of economic theory (RC, 184). Marx's break from the previous mode of 
analysis had resulted from the need for a new analytical concept, or as Althusser puts it: 
A different concept is required in order to account for the new form of causality required 
by the new definition of the object of Political Economy, by its 'complexity', i. e., by its 
peculiar determination: the determination by a structure. (RC, 184) 
Rather than the idealist empiricist position which reads the (economic) structure in direct 
relation to its elements, we encounter in Marx's analysis a detour that seeks to 
scientifically interpret - and therefore demystify - the phantasmagoric al mutation of 
human realities of production (materialism) into immaterial relations within the market. 
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Because the market can no longer be simply interpreted as an outer expression of its 
internal structure, Marx looks to an analytical concept that can account for the apparent 
invisibility of the internal economic structure (production and labour), a theoretical 
concept that can rationalise the disjunction between an outer appearance and internal 
essence. 
" In Chapter Two I explore Marx's notion of phantasmagoria (Die Phantasmagorische) and consider its 
reconceptualisation in 
Walter Benjamin's Arcades. 
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In Marx, this distinction (exteriority or interiority are posed as distinct from their effects) 
often takes the classical form of the distinction between inside and outside, between the 
cintimate essence' of things and their phenomenal 'surface', between the 'intimate 
relations', the 'intimate links' of things and the external relations and links of the same 
things. And it is well known that this opposition, which derives in principle from the 
classical distinction between essence and phenomena, i. e., from a distinction which 
situates in being itseýf, in reality itseýf the inner site of its concept, and therefore opposes 
it to the 'surface' of concrete appearance; which therefore transposes as a difference of 
level or of components in the real object itseýf, a distinction which does not belong to the 
real object since it is a matter of distinction which separates the concept or knowledge of 
the real from that real as an existing object... (RC, 189) 
In his analysis Althusser describes how Marx's break from a previous theorisation of 
economic theory involves a (re)instatement (in a new domain) of the requirements which 
have long been imposed on those sciences which have achieved autonomy (classical 
philosophy): '(if) an object cannot be defined by its immediate visible or sensuous 
appearance, it is necessary to make a detour via its concept in order to grasp it' (RC, 
184). Just as Plato turns to measurements and calculations to avoid the 'easily deceived' 
senses, Marx makes a detour around the immediate visible or sensuous appearance of the 
world. The logic of this rational concept is also expressed by Althusser as follows: 
The knowledge of a real object is not reached by immediate contact with the 'concrete' 
but by the production of the concept of that object (in the sense of an object of 
knowledge) as the absolute condition of its theoretical possibility. (RC, 184) 
Marx takes this theoretical detour to avoid the sensuous appearances of political 
economy, to 'observe' what he considers to be the 'false consciousness' of ideology. We 
have seen that the distance between representation and truth is a key concern for Marx 
who shares Plato's belief that the way things appear to perception is far removed from 
reality. What is clear from Althusser's analysis is that Marx's search for the 'truth' behind 
political economy almost inevitably follows a 'classical' mode of enquiry: 
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Marx often slipped into the really almost inevitable use of the classical opposition 
between essence and phenomena, adopting its ambiguities by force rather than merit, and 
transposing the epistemological difference between the knowledge of reality and the 
reality itself into reality in the form of the inside and the outside, of the real, often real 
movement and the apparent movement of the intimate essence and its concrete, 
phenomenal determinations, perceived and manipulated by subjects. (RC, 190) 
The rational, classical or traditional nature of Marx's methodology is most clearly 
reflected in his notion of ideology which, as Althusser points out, takes the form of a 
mode of representation: 'ideology is the system of ideas and representations which 
dominate the mind of a man or a social group' (LP, 158). However, as Marx argues in 
The German Ideology, the [mis]representations of an autonomous ideological structure 
are countered by the 'real life process': 
We set out from real active men, and on the basis of their real life process we 
demonstrate the development of the ideological reflexes and echoes of this life- 
process.... Morality, religion, metaphysics, all the rest of ideology and their 
corresponding forms of consciousness, thus no longer retain the semblance of 
independence. They have no history, no development; but men, developing their material 
production and their material intercourse, alter, along with their real existence, their 
thinking and the products of their thinking. (GI, 47) 
In the above passage, Marx questions the fixity of ideology by asking how can a real life 
experience be represented without the possibility of movement or development. The 
ideological image of the real life process is seen through the camera obscura of morality, 
religion and metaphysics. These [mis]representations bear little resemblance to the 
material reality of active men yet they go to shape the consciousness of men through 
phantasmagoric means (GI, 47). Ideology is, in this instance, the sum total of 
ideas 
relating first and foremost to social life, opinions on philosophy, religion and political 
and economic programmes. As we have already seen, Marx describes 
how these ideas 
come to condition and control the everyday practices of the individual while remaining 
hidden as a determining and alienating force of repression. Ideology, in this sense, 
is a 
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false consciousness or an obfuscated mental process in which men do not understand the 
forces that actually govern their thinking. German ideology is in Marx's view a 
representation that has gained autonomy and control over the human mind, presenting an 
image of real life that does not correspond to the material developments of human 
existence. This mode of representation does not serve the interests of the people but 
instead benefits the hegemonic desires of the ruling minority. The question of thinking 
representation is, with Marx, concerned with the ideological. Although ideology has 
come to determine social activity it remains a false consciousness that transgresses the 
material realities of human activity. 
Ideological Representation 
In Lenin and Philosophy, Althusser asserts that Marx understands ideology as 'pure 
illusion' (LP, 159), as an 'altogether' imaginary representation of social activity which is 
held up as the real: 
Ideology is conceived as a pure illusion, a pure dream, i. e as nothingness. All its reality is 
external to it. Ideology is thus thought as an imaginary construction whose status is 
exactly like the theoretical status of the dream among writers before Freud. For these 
writers, the dream was the purely imaginary, i. e. null, result of day's residues, presented 
in an arbitrary arrangement and order, sometimes even inverted, in other words, in 
disorder. For them, the dream was the imaginary, it was empty, null and stuck together 
(bricole), once the eyes had closed, from the residues of the only full and positive reality, 
the reality of the day. This is exactly the status of philosophy and ideology in The 
German Ideology. (LP, 159) 
Althusser's reference to the pre-Freudian idea of a dream (that which situates the 
imaginary outside of the reality of the waking life), is intended to show the impossibility 
of thinking the political, religious and social structures of ideological representations in 
opposition to the real. Just as Freud revealed how the unconscious has real implications 
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on all areas of lived experience and demonstrates itself through the dream 41 Althusser 
argues that ideology can not be understood purely objectively: 'there is no practice except 
by and in an ideology' (LP, 170). For this reason the ideological is not simply understood 
as an inverted representation of our natural life process since it is always an active part of 
it. Moreover, Marx's ideological figure of the inverting lens of the camera obscura no 
longer stands as a possible or viable construct for representing ideology. The dark 
chamber - in which representations of a natural world appear upside down - is 
reconceptualised by Althusser. No longer is it a one-to-one correspondence between 
reality on one side and its representation on the other. Instead, Althusser argues that it is a 
question of ideology representing the relationship between individuals in their real 
conditions of existence. As Terry Eagleton has pointed out, Althusser strikes a lethal 
blow at the notion that ideology consists simply of a collection of distorting 
representations of reality and empirically false propositions, 'Ideology for Althusser 
alludes in the main to our affective, unconscious relation with the world, to the ways in 
which we are pre-reflectively bound up in social reality. 42 This view of ideology signals 
an important break from Marx who, as we have seen, idealises the 'real life process' as a 
site of reality and truth. In contrast to Marx, Althusser argues for a totalising image of 
representation in suggesting that the imaginary to be joined to the real. In Althusser's 
formulation, representation exists as part of a real life process. Ideology is not just a 
distortion or false reflection but an indispensable medium for the production of human 
subjects. Like Freud, Althusser suggests the impossibility of separating the real from the 
imaginary when he famously asserts: 'ideology is a 'representation' of the imaginary 
relationship of individuals to their real conditions of existence' (LP, 162). 43 That is, we 
act on beliefs that are imagined representations of the world and those material actions 
define us as active individuals. In other words, 'representation represents the subject as a 
41 Sigmund Freud, The Interpretation of Dreams, James Strachey (trans), Angela Richards, (ed. ), London: 
Penguin, 199 1. 
42 Terry Eagleton, Ideology, London: Verso, 199 1, p. 18. 
43 As Stephen Helming notes, the word representation is placed in quotation marks, 'as if to secure it by 
one more degree from any possibility of nalive conftision of signified with signifier. ' Stephen Helmling, The 
Success and Failure of Fredric Jameson. - Writing, the Sublime, and the Dialectic of Critique, New York: 
State University of New York Press, 2001, p. 56. 
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1 44 representing subject . 
To reiterate, Althusser argues that the 'imaginary representation' of the real world are at 
the centre of every ideology and it is the imaginary nature of this relation which underlies 
all the imaginary distortion that we can observe. The 'material existence' of ideology is 
understood by Althusser to be a contingent consequence of the imaginary. That is, if an 
individual believes in God, Duty or Justice, etc., he/she participates in certain regular 
practices (goes to church, submits unconditionally to the rule of law, etc. ). As a 
consequence of these beliefs, the individual adopts a certain attitude towards those ideas 
that make it difficult to hold other beliefs (as this would be either inconsistent, cynical or 
perverse). In other words, 'the ideas of a human subject appear in his actions which go to 
define him as an individual' (LP, 167-168). Althusser argues that the ideological 
representation of any belief system must constitute the absolute and concrete reality of 
the individual within it, as it is the imaginary ideological image that goes to define the 
material practices and rituals of an individual or social group. 
Involved in this shift is the influential work of Jacques Lacan whose writings provide 
Althusser with a way of thinking ideological representation as a necessary condition of 
lived experience. Drawing on Lacan's theorising of the 'symbolic', 'imaginary' and the 
'real', Althusser develops a new image of ideological representation. Ideology is now 
seen to adapt individuals to their social functions by providing them with an imaginary 
model of the whole. It is not only a case of the child misrecognising himself1herself as 
'whole 45 in order to function in the structures of daily life; Althusser argues that the 
same logic applies to a collective 'misrecognition' of ideological representation; what 
appears to be the nonnative is in fact a constructed fiction. Yet it is precisely this type of 
44 The Abyss of Representation, p. 8. 
45 For Lacan, the developing child comes to perceive itself as a 'Gestalt', that is to say, as a fixed and 
constant exteriority. This mimetic self perception is seen by Lacan to exist as a 'mirage', a symbolic 
representation that is in stark contrast to the turbulent movements that 'the subject feels are animating 
him'. 
Lacan continues, 'The mirror stage is a drama whose internal thrust is precipitated from insufficiency to 
anticipate - and which manufactures 
for the subject, caught up in the lure of special identification, the 
succession of phantasies that extends ftom a fragmented body-image to 
form a totality that I shall call 
orthopaedic - and, lastly, to the assumption of the armour of an alienating 
identity, which will mark with its 
rigid structure the subject's entire mental 
development. ' Jaques Lacan, Ecrits, London: Tavistock 
Publications, 1977, p. 4. 
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[mis] representation (the imaginary) that allows the subject to function as a social being. 
As Eagleton describes, this reconceptualisation involves a new understanding of our 
subjective relation to ideological structures: 
Althusser tries to shift us from a cognitive to an effective theory of ideology - which is 
not necessarily to deny that ideology contains certain cognitive elements, or to reduce it 
to the merely subjective. It is certainly subjective in the sense of being subject-centred: its 
utterances are to be deciphered as expressive of a speaker's attitude to lived relations to 
the world. 46 
In short, Althusser's conception of ideological representation is a totalising formulation. 
It goes to establish a dialectic between mimetic representation - which 're-presents' an 
image of the subject in society's structures - and the representation of society's structure 
and mechanism - which 'represents' the subject through a mental image of his/her 
relation to society. This ideological totality moves beyond many of the sharp distinctions 
that characterise Marx's thinking. Society's reliance on both mimetic and ideological 
modes of representation is acknowledged by Althusser (perhaps by subjecting Marx to a 
psychoanalytic theory of symbolic representation). Most importantly, however, ideology 
is no longer considered as 'pure illusion' but theorised as a real phenomenon of daily life. 
Althusser's role in considering the critical status of illusion in social space marks an 
important step in this investigation. No longer is it a case of thinking society's structures 
as a relation between inside and outside or between false consciousness and the natural 
light of the real. With Althusser, we move beyond the position of the outside observer 
(Plato and Marx) to consider how representation can be thought from within. That is, 
rather than stepping outside the illusions produced by mimetic and ideological 
representation we are forced to understand ourselves caught within those 
illusions. 
Moreover, the causality of economic mechanisms in which the appearances of everyday 
life are understood as a direct consequence of a hidden ideological essence which, as 
I 
explore in Chapter Two in relation to Marx's theory of commodity 
fetishism, is rethought 
46, deology, p. 19 
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in a new conceptual framework. As William C. Dowling suggests, Althusser is faced with 
the problem of examining the functional relations among society's elements without 
seeing them as an expression of a hidden essence: 
So it is not in an essence hidden behind or beneath the surface of things that Althusser 
will seek explanation of social reality, but in the relations among elements of the 
superstructure as conceived in classical Marxism. Moreover, Althusser's notion of 
structural causality will derive from a curious fact about structure itself. that a structure is 
always more than the sum of its parts. That is, once added up the elements of a structure 
and the relations among them we find ourselves confronting a totality that can be seen as 
such only as it includes something else, and this something else is nothing other than the 
structure itself. 47 
With this 'relation among elements' we can begin to think of the relation between 
differentiated modes of illusion. That is, rather than being placed in opposition to the 
real, the relation between different modes of representation are comprehended as a 
structural causality in which, as Dowling puts it, the parts of a structure and the relations 
among them constitute something 'else'. With Althusser we see how this totality 
becomes recognised as society at large, as ideology as a whole. Representation is one of 
many elements which do not derivefrom a hidden essence or metaphysical cause but 
maintain some autonomyfrom a single governingforce while, at the same time, existing 
in a structure of relations. 
The influence of Althusser on Jameson's theorisation of postmodern space has already 
been well documented. 48 Moreover, Jameson describes how Althusser's redefinition of 
the ideological supports a new understanding of space when he writes: 
The Althusserian concept now allows us to rethink these specialized geographical and 
cartographic issues in terms of a social space - in terms for example of social class and 
47 Dowling, William C. Jameson, Althusser, Marx: an introduction to the political unconscious, London: 
Methuen, 1984, p. 66. 
48 In addition to Dowling's work (cited above) Steven Helmling 
(The Success and Failure of Fredric 
Jameson) and George Hartley (The Abyss of Representation) explore the relationship 
between Althusser 
and Jameson in some 
depth. 
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national or international context, in tenns of the ways in which we all necessarily also 
cognitively map our individual social relationship to local national and international class 
realities. (PM, 52) 
With Althusser and Jameson we see how the mimetic and the ideological are not only 
bridged through ideological networks (Althusser), but how 'social space' involves an 
experience of local, national and global systems (Jameson). 
The issue at stake, however, remains with the strong relation between Jameson and Marx. 
This is not simply an issue of Jameson's Marxism but a question of how this theoretical 
influence carries with it an inscribed Platonism. 
Jameson: Postmodern Space 
On the surface of things it would appear that Jameson's analysis of representation is in 
stark contrast to the theories of Plato and Marx. Jameson seemingly rejects the Platonic 
assertion that the way things appear bears little relation to their proper meaning. 
Moreover, it would seem that Jameson is arguing with an entirely different logic: 'What 
we must now affirm is that it is precisely this whole extraordinary demoralizing and 
depressing original new global space which is the 'moment of truth' of postmodernism' 
(PM, 49). 
The representations of the cultural realm are for Jameson a clear expression of our current 
reality under late capitalism. Like Althusser, Jameson theorises society's structures in a 
(spatial) totality. The invisible structures that Marx thought to generate a false 
consciousness of actual material activity are for Jameson available 'within' the distorting 
mediations of representation. This shift in approach is explained by Jameson as an 
outward expression of capitalism's great mutation from a society of production 
(modernism) to a society of reproduction (postmodernism). But to argue that 
representation is now the site of (some) truth by no means rids it of the suspicion and 
anxiety that we have seen to characterise Plato and Marx. In short, Jameson's dialectical 
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analysis of representation does not offer a lasting alternative to the outmoded divisions 
that continue to determine representation as a false and alienating counter to the real. 
Although Jameson acknowledges the dominance of representation throughout 
contemporary experience, there remains an underlying desire to replace it with a 'higher' 
representational forrn of 'global cognitive mapping' (PM, 54), a form that, as I will later 
consider, allows us to regain some control over the spaces that we occupy. 49The problem 
for Jameson is not so much the fusion of the representation with reality but the fact that 
the real has come to exist as a mode of representation. 50 This blurring of distinctions is 
taken to signal the disappearance of our ability to locate ourselves both cognitively and 
spatially. Jameson believes that the current representation of all things through global 
information and multinational computer networks has caused the disappearance of history 
and suggests that our perception of the world seen through images has led to a 'historical 
amnesia'. That is, the images that are available to perception are removed from any 
historical meaning. Global communication and media networks instead give 
representation to a series of perpetual presents. The (visual) information that is produced 
by those networks is detached from any historical or social context. With this new phase 
of postmodern reproduction, representation has been removed from any single point of 
origin. The copy is now impossible because all traces of history have disappeared. What 
was once a supplement to the real has now freed itself to become the primary designator 
of all that exists (simulacra). In short, Jameson suggests that late capitalism's 
development from mechanisms of production to new and advanced modes of 
reproduction has eroded any sense of historical meaning. Without any knowledge of the 
past our society has become fragmented and now exists in a state of disorientation and 
49 This is Jameson's argument paraphrased. In the last section of this chapter I consider the proposed 
representational form (cognitive mapping) in more detail. 
50 The 'real' is understood by Jameson to be produced by the historical and socioeconomic conditions of 
postmodern space. This, then, involves not only spatial, but media representations of every kind: 'The 
argument for authenticity in these otherwise patently ideological productions depends on the prior 
proposition that what we have been calling postmodern (or multinational) space is not merely a cultural 
ideology or fantasy but has genuine historical (and socioeconomic) reality as the third great original 
expansion of capitalism around the globe... ' (PM, 49). However, it is the immediate, disorientating and 
immersive nature of postmodern space and the representations therein that negate the 'genuine' and 
6authentic' realities of social space. Consequently, Jameson argues that a new mode of representation is 
needed (cognitive mapping). 
55 
vertigo. Jameson believes that this development is particularly evident in postmodem 
architecture where the old means of orientation have been deliberately broken down and 
replaced by a disorientating experience of space (the Bonaventure). 
As a counter to this 'dematerialisation' of both history and space Jameson theorises 
postmodernism within a framework of Marxist theory which attempts to assert a 
materialist critique of the forces of capital, or in Jameson's case, the forces of 
multinational capitalism. Jameson argues that the dominance of representation (which 
now operates on a global scale) re-presents social and cultural activity as a series of 
perpetual presents. That is, the configuration of everything into images exists detached 
from its particular or original moment in history. With the mutation of ideology into built 
space Jameson argues that there is an even greater erasure of a materialist past. 
In their analysis of postmodern theory, Steven Best and Douglas Kellner describe the 
nature of Jameson's engagement with Marxist cultural criticism: 
Jameson's postmodern Marxism is the first attempt to combine Marxian and postmodern 
positions, contextualizing postmodernism within the development of capitalism, while 
engaging postmodern positions in order to rethink Marxist theory and politics in the 
contemporary era. 51 
Best and Kellner go on to argue that Jameson's theory is overly totalising, exaggerating 
some tendencies (hyperreality and schizophrenia) which, they believe, do not in fact 
stand as the dominant features of postmodern society: 'Jameson tends to inflate insights 
that apply to limited sectors of contemporary social life into overly general concepts 
representing all social spheres, thereby failing to analyse each sector in its specificity. ' 
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For Best and Kellner, Jameson is almost too postmodern: 'Jameson is seduced by the 
siren song of extreme postmodernism and exaggerates certain cultural tendencies. ' 
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What is at stake for Best and Kellner is not so much Jameson's combining of Marxism 
51 Best, Steven and Douglas Kellner, Postmodern Theory: Critical Interrogations, London: Macmillan, 
1991, p. 183. 
51 Postmodern Theory, p. 188. 
53 Postmodern Theory, p. 192. 
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and postmodernism., but what they consider to be his privileging of postmodern cultural 
analysis over a Marxian political critique. Jameson's engagement with postmodern theory 
is for Best and Kellner somewhat 'extreme' and because of this they argue that Jameson 
tobscures the economic and class determination of culture that he otherwise wants to 
foreground. -)54: 
He (Jameson) uses Marxism to contextualize postmodernism as a new cultural logic of 
capitalism and adopts postmodern positions to theorize late capitalist culture as a culture 
of image, simulacra fragmentation, pastiche, and schizophrenia. But those postmodern 
positions are sometimes incompatible with or detract from his Marxist position. " 
Best and Kellner's analysis goes on to establish the contradictory nature of postmodern 
and Marxist positions. Although Best and Kellner bring a sobering voice to the hysteria 
of Jameson's writing, there appears a stubborn avoidance of any critique of Jameson's 
return to a Marxian mode of analysis. Put simply, Best and Kellner attack Jameson for 
negating 'his Marxist position' but fail to problematise Jameson's 'Marxist' reading of 
postmodern culture. 
Postmodernism or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism most clearly reflects Jameson's 
attempts to theorise postmodem culture through a Marxist critique. Like Marx, Jameson 
attempts to make us conscious of the discrepancy between contemporary subjectivity and 
the proper, original or real moment of being that capitalism is understood to have now 
destroyed. The abundance of representations that are generated through global 
information and computer networks are seen by Jameson to have advanced far beyond 
our ability to comprehend them, 'postmodern hyperspace has finally succeeded in 
transcending the capacities of the individual human body to locate itself... ' (PM, 44). 
Jameson returns to Marx to again suggest that the materialist activity that once allowed 
men to transform their surroundings to suit their needs has somehow been reversed. That 
is, ideological representation (in the guise of multinational capitalism) now transforms 
men to suit its needs. Jameson's adherence to Marx is then a means for him to reiterate 
" Postmodern Theory, P. 192. 
" Postmodern Theory, P. 192. 
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Marx's call for the material relations of social activity and labour (that once allowed men 
to act on their surroundings in a way that benefited their 'real' interests). 
Jameson's task, however, is more complex than a mere recontextualisation of Marx's 
materialism. Jameson's (Marxian) reading of postmodern space turns to the issue of the 
relation between two modes of spatial representation. That is, Jameson asks if 
postmodern space can now be read as a new representational image, if the mutation of 
ideological representation into architectural space might offer some 'privileged' insight 
into the inner workings of the much larger representational form of late capitaliSM. 56 
I want to suggest that our faulty representations of some immense communicational and 
computer network are themselves but a distorted figuration of something even deeper, 
namely, the whole world system of a present day multinational capitalism. The 
technology of contemporary society is therefore mesmerizing and fascinating not so 
much in its own right but because it seems to offer some privileged representational 
shorthand for grasping a network of power and control even more difficult for our minds 
and imaginations to grasp: the whole new decentred global network of the third stage of 
capitalism itself (PM, 38) 
In other words, mimetic representation and ideological representation are located in a 
single totality, the relation between these illusory modes of space is of great importance 
as it is the visible forms of postmodern space that provide an 'entry point' into the 
ideological structures that shape our beliefs. That is, for Jameson, the 'faulty 
representations' we encounter in the spaces of daily praxis 'offer some privileged 
representational shorthand for grasping a network of power and control even more 
difficult for our minds and imaginations to grasp: the whole new decentred global 
network of the third stage of capital itself (PM, 38). 
"I develop this formulation in Chapter Four by looking at the relation between what I describe as two 
distinct modes of spatial illusion; the transcendental: transubstantiation, and the representational: 
experiential placemaking. I argue that this coexistence of divergent modes of illusion in built space signals 
an important point of disruption. However, this view runs counter to Jameson's analysis which claims a 
linear and I logical' progression of multinational capitalism into postmodern space. 
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For the most part Jameson does not develop the critical possibilities that emerge through 
this 'relation between elements'. Instead, postmodern space is theorised as a passive 
vessel for ideological imperatives and consequently slips back into the old Marxist 
structure of cause and effect and base and superstructure. Once again it is a case of what 
is visible to perception being far removed from reality and truth. While those things that 
appear to perception are not theorised as an inversion of a 'natural' or 'authentic origin' 
(camera obscura), the global networks of multinational capitalism stand as a hidden 
essence that directs our experience of space and the representational realities therein. 
Like Marx and Plato, Jameson focuses his attention on the complicity of (postmodem) 
space to argue that ideological representation is increasingly 'strengthened and 
intensified' by the mimetic products of cultural representation. Moreover, our ability to 
cact' and 'struggle' is 'neutralized by our spatial as well as our social confusion' (PM, 
54). 
The question of how Jameson's understanding of postmodern space is inscribed (through 
Marx) with a Platonic logic is most clearly represented in his preferred representational 
figure: cognitive mapping. As Hartley has argued, cognitive mapping 'presses the 
representational apparatus to its limits, to the moment of its breakdown that casts up the 
illusion of the beyond in its current historical state. ' 57 Rather than functioning as a means 
to span the gap between individual experience and knowledge of the whole (as Althusser 
characterised ideology), I will now consider how cognitive mapping moves us into the 
metaphysical terrain of the unrepresentable. 
Cognitive Mapping 
Jameson's belief in the disappearance of any critical distance in postmodern space leads 
him to stress the importance of spatial issues in the cultural realm; that is, the issue of 
how one might locate oneself or more specifically, regain control over the disorientating 
placelessness of postmodern space: 
57 The Abyss ofRepresentation, p, 226. 
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The conception of space that has been developed here suggests that a model of political 
culture appropriate to our own situation will necessarily have to raise spatial issues as its 
fundamental organising concern. (PM, 5 1) 
Jameson argues that the reclaiming of social and cultural space from the spectacular, 
distorting and alienating effects of late capitalism is a question of spatial representation. 
Central to Jameson's argument is the notion of 'cognitive mapping': 
Disalienation in the traditional city, then, involves the practical reconquest of a sense of 
place and the construction or reconstruction of an articulated ensemble which can be 
retained in memory and which the individual subject can map and remap along the 
moment of mobile, alternative trajectories. (PM, 5 1) 
Jameson takes this mode of spatial representation from Kevin Lynch's book, The Image 
of the City, which seeks out an alternative to the alienating grid system of American cities 
such as New Jersey which no longer contains the traditional spatial markers such as 
'monuments'. 'nodes', 'natural boundaries' and 'built perspectives'. Lynch argues for 
legibility in the urban setting, stressing the importance of the 'environmental image', 
which functions as a 'generalised mental picture of the exterior physical world. 58 The 
environmental image is argued by Lynch to join the immediate sensation of a place with 
a memory of an experience. The environmental image is then used by the individual to 
interpret information and navigate the body through space. This mode of spatial 
representation demands the reinstatement of the familiar landmarks that could be found in 
older cities (Lynch cites Florence) to allow for a sense of place, way finding and 
disalienation. 
Jameson is quick to point out that Lynch's representational model does not refer to a 
mimetic form but to a 'precartographic' form: 
The cognitive map is not exactly mimetic in that older sense; indeed, the theoretical 
58 Lynch, Kevin. The Image of the City, Cambridge: MIT Press, 1960, p. 4. 
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issues it possesses allows us to renew the analysis of representation on a higher and much 
more complex level. (PM, 5 1) 
This 'higher' mode of representation does not refer to map making, which is seen to fix a 
single image of the environment in the mind of the individual. Jameson instead suggests 
cognitive mapping to be more fluid as a representational form, 'like diagrams centred 
around a still-subject which mark out key features of ajourney' (PM, 52). The notion of a 
type of itinerary that can unfold in space is for Jameson what is needed to regain a sense 
of location. Cognitive mapping combines the real with the imaginary so that a familiarity 
exists between the individual and his or her environment. Instead of a sign or a map that 
might mark out a linear route through urban space, cognitive mapping exist as a distinct 
mental image that gives the individual the freedom to map and remap alternative 
traj ectories. 
As we have seen, the relation between the physical city and the vaster network of 
society's structures is understood by Jameson to exist as a single totality. To argue this 
(Marxian) notion of society's structures as a dialectical totality, Jameson turns to 
Althusser's redefinition of ideology as 'the representation of the subject imaginary 
relationship to his or her real conditions of existence' (LP, 162). Cognitive mapping is 
seen by Jameson to follow Althusser's formula, the image of the totality is gained 
through this 'higher' form of representation (cognitive mapping) which bridges the 
'imaginary' with the 'real'. This new aesthetic formula is thought to integrate the 
subject's immediate existential experience with a knowledge of a larger social whole. 
Jameson's analysis of representation therefore seeks to develop Lynch's analysis of city 
planning into the much broader question of postmodern culture. Jameson turns from 
urban space to social or ideological space to suggest the disappearance of any social, 
political or cultural 'familiarity' or 'location'. In this way Jameson argues that cognitive 
mapping is not merely a procedure for way finding, but a necessary means of locating the 
ideological: 
Surely this is what the cognitive map is called upon to do in the narrower framework of 
daily life in the physical city: to enable a situational representation on the part of the 
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individual subject to that vaster and properly unrepresentable totality which is the 
ensemble of society's structures as a whole. (PM, 5 1) 
The fixing of postmodem space to a series of spatial markers that can be recognised and 
remembered by the subject is key to locating the imaginary, which takes its cue from 'the 
real conditions of existence' (PM, 5 1). 59 In this way the architectural space of the modem 
city is a clear expression of the ideological status of society. If we are unable to navigate 
our bodies around the space that defines our 'real conditions' (the Bonaventure) we 
apparently lose our ability to locate ourselves both socially and politically. 
The central point that runs throughout PM is that we have to find some new way of 
representing ourselves in space. If we are to 'begin to grasp our positioning as individuals 
and collective subjects and regain a capacity to act and struggle which is at present is 
neutralized by our spatial as well as our social confusion' (PM, 54), Jameson believes 
that we must seek out a new and previously unimagined mode of representation. 
What Jameson appears to be proposing, however, is a new representational form that has 
all the characteristics of a Platonic ideal. Cognitive mapping might in this way be argued 
to simply reinstate an old metaphysical logic to suggest a representational counter to the 
[mis]representations of late capitalism. This 'representational real' remains set in 
opposition to the copies of contemporary culture that are seen by Jameson to have been 
colonised by a developed mode of ideological representation. This view is supported by 
Hartley when he asks: 
Does Jameson's turn to regulative judgment (cognitive mapping must function as if it 
were in fact capable of mapping some posited pre-existing, yet unrepresentable 'real' 
substratum) in a determining judgment (whereby cognitive mapping gives us some kind 
of genuine knowledge of the substratum). " 
The point here is that the real conditions of existence are for Jameson not real enough and 
59 Here Jameson is quoting directly from Althusser (see, LP, 162). 
60 The Abyss ofRepresentation, p. 225. 
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the representational tools that are now available are a logical extension of late capitalism. 
The clarity of Plato's attack on representation is here delivered at high speed through the 
emphatic rhetoric of Jameson's analysis. The rational and grounding image of cognitive 
mapping suggests an ideal form of representation. This 'higher' representational mode is 
somehow immune to the sublimating hold of the ideological. In this way Jameson creates 
a (Platonic) order between copies: (i) the global information and media networks (being 
of the lowest grade); (ii) the cultural realm, which can be read as a 'representational 
shorthand for grasping a network of power and control even more difficult for our minds 
and imaginations to grasp: the whole new decentred global network of the third stage of 
capitalism itself (PM, 38). This second order of copies is of a greater value because it 
contains 'moments of truth' which are both mesmerising and catastrophic; (iii) cognitive 
mapping, Jameson's ideal form of representation and the least 'representational' of the 
three orders. Like Althusser's formula for the ideological, cognitive mapping bridges the 
imaginary with the real. But unlike multinational capitalism, cognitive mapping 'endows 
the individual subject with some new heightened sense of place in the global system' 
(PM, 54). Like Plato's belief in the foundational truths of abstract thought, Jameson 
points to a mode of representation that can offer the individual unmediated access to the 
greater realities and truths of our postmodern condition, a representational system that 
will 'enable a situational representation on the part of the individual subject to the vaster 
and properly unrepresentable totality' (PC, 5 1). 
While Jameson is proposing a dialectical approach to thinking representation in space, we 
find that it remains inscribed by an outmoded conceptual framework that privileges 
abstract thought over perception. Although Jameson's Marxian method begins with the 
real experiences of people, representation remains set in a system of hierarchical and 
metaphysical oppositions. Moreover, the singularity that defines cognitive mapping does 
not allow us to think of mimetic representation and ideological representation as a 
differentiated totality, but rather (re)introduces a metaphysical fon-nulation to act as a 
counter to the new spatialities of postmodern culture. 
I have considered how Jameson fails to explore the full potential of differentiated modes 
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of spatial representation. Furthermore, I have argued that Jameson returns to a conceptual 
logic that negates a fuller analysis of the forces at play in contemporary space. More 
generally, I have mapped out an epistemological context to the theoretical and practical 
problems that I address in the following chapters. Consequently, I am now able to return 
to my initial question with a greater critical force to again ask how it is possible to remain 
tied to a classical/historical/metaphysicaI methodology when the site of analysis bears no 
relation to that approach to thinking. And perhaps more importantly, how can the 
contemporary subject make any claim to the real (in cultural or social space) when the 
broad and differentiated range of representational spatialities are repeatedly theorised as 
the site of falsehood. 
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The Westin Bonaventure Hotel, Los Angeles, 1978 
The four cylinders that flank the central cylinder are 
made of mirrored glass and contain luxury rooms and 
suites. Inside of the square base of the building can be 
found reflecting pools, glass elevators that climb the 
sides, and eight levels of shops and restaurants. 
A restaurant on the 35th floor boasts a revolving 
cocktail lounge that provides a 360 degree panoramic 
view of L. A. 
I 
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-, 
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3.1 - The Westin Bonaventure Hotel. 3.2 - The Westin Bonaventure Hotel (exterior view). 
3.3 - Looking out 
from the Bonaventure, elevator. 
Phantasmagoria 
Chapter 2 
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From Fetishism to Phantasmagoria 
In this chapter I will consider how Karl Marx and Walter Benjamin expand the field of 
illusion into the terrain of social activity. In line with the technological developments of 
the nineteenth century, I will trace how new modes of illusion have increasingly become 
associated with a collective experience of capitalist space. To do this I will move between 
Marx's theory of 'Commodity Fetishism' (Capitao and Benjamin's notion of 
'phantasmagoria' (The Arcades Project). With these accounts of fetishism and 
phantasmagoria, I will explore the mutation of the commodity into social and cultural 
space. However, instead of demystifying the perceived phantoms of capital, I will argue 
that Marx and Benjamin lend form to a new category of phenomena. 
In Chapter One I explored a broad range of approaches to thinking representation. This 
overview began with a close analysis of Plato's attack on representation and found the 
underlying morality of this philosophical argument to be inscribed in the political theories 
of Marx and the later cultural analysis of Fredric Jameson. These philosophical, political 
and cultural approaches to representation were seen to continue a series of judgments 
concerning the moral status of the copy and consequently were argued to generate a deep 
anxiety around the 'representational reality' of cultural and social space. In this chapter I 
return to Marx to consider how his detailed and figurative analysis of the commodity 
lends 'illusion' form and meaning. 
In Capital, Marx takes fetishism to inhabit an autonomous world of goods which, like 
religious deities, are considered to be inhabited by a phantasmagoric spirit. 61 In this 
analysis Marx focuses on the experience of the fetishistic commodity. Marx represents 
this mode of fetishism with an image of phantasmagoria (die Phantasmagorische). Here 
61 As is well known, the fetish object has its history in the worship of religious deities that were believed to 
possess a supernatural meaning. As the Oxford dictionary defines it: 'Fetish is an inanimate object 
worshipped by primitive peoples for its supposed inherent magical powers or as being inhabited by a spirit, 
irrationally reverenced'. In Capital, fetishism is used to describe the re-presentation of an object and the 
consequent distortion of its 'authentic' properties. In this way fetishism is taken as a mode of representation 
and mediation. If fetish is understood to occur where a meaning becomes fixed or attached to an object, 
person or race, then in Marx's case the original form is the commodity's 
'use value': and the fetishistic or 
distorted representation is its 'exchange value'. In this new form the object appears to have been generated 
magically, to be something of a divine creation. 
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we find the illusionistic shows of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries used 
to describe the affects of the dazzling - but essentially objectifying and alienating - 
commodity form. 62 With this new engagement with fetishism, phantasmagoria and the 
religious, the field of economic theory is expanded to include a broad range of illusory 
phenomena. 
Central to this chapter is Benjamin's re-conceptualisation of phantasmagoria as an 
important critical tool. In contrast to the rational materialism of Marx's enquiry, 
Benjamin looks to new technological and cultural developments as a dialectical 
expression of the changing shape of urban experience. With Benjamin's Arcades, I 
explore what I shall term the synchronic relation of phantasmagoric space. 
My interest in both Marx and Benjamin's reading of illusion centres on the changing 
status of the imaginary and the apparent in social space. These expanded formulations of 
'fetishism' and 'phantasmagoria' attempt to identify where illusion is most manifest and 
how it acts on subjectivity. However, with both Marx and Benjamin we are required to 
think of the site of illusion as living relations between the dead. Consequently I will be 
asking if Benjamin's image of the deluded masses, who are 'observed' (through the 
window of history) sleepwalking through shopping arcades, remains a useful figuration 
for grasping the meaning and status of illusion within contemporary social space. 
62 The term phantasmagoria became widely used in the nineteenth century with touring shows of optical 
illusions, which were produced by means of the magic lantern. Back projection was an important feature of 
these shows which succeeded in keeping the audience unaware of the lantern. With the apparatus 
concealed, projected figures were 'made to increase and decrease in size, to advance and retreat, dissolve, 
vanish, and pass into each other, in a manner then considered marvellous' 
(P, 27). The effects of 
phantasmagoria were played out in specially prepared theatres and a popular 
form of entertainment 
throughout the nineteenth century. 
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The Arcades (Paris) 
These arcades, a recent invention of industrial luxury, are glass-roofed, marble-panelled 
corridors extending through whole blocks of buildings, whose owners have joined 
together for such enterprises. Lining both sides of these corridors, which get the light 
from above, are the most elegant shops, so that the arcade is a city, a world in miniature, 
63 in which consumers find everything they need . 
The Parisian shopping arcades have long been associated with the spectacle and delirium 
of nineteenth-century consumer culture. The long enclosed corridors that cut through 
buildings and intersect streets tempted the passing shopper with a phantasmagoric 
alternative to the wide boulevards of Paris. Like the Bonaventure Hotel, the Parisian 
arcade replaces the city by closing itself off from the city outside. The shopper moves 
between interior spaces where the usual dichotomy between inside and outside is 
replaced by a 'constructed exterior'. The illusion, however, is as much generated by the 
goods on display - which remain behind the glass window of the arcade shops - as it is 
by the surrounding architecture. As Susan Buck-Morss describes: 
The publicly traversed passages displayed commodities in window showcases like icons 
in niches. The very profane pleasure houses found there tempted passersby with 
gastronomical perfections, intoxicating drinks, wealth without labour at the roulette 
wheel, gaiety in the vaudeville theatres, and, in the first floor galleries, transports of 
sexual pleasure sold by a heavenly host of fashionably dressed ladies of the night. 64 
The Parisian Arcades stand as an early site of economic mutation in which the 
commodity is theorised as a spatial entity. 
63 From the Illustrated Guide to Paris, 1852. This citation appears as the first clipping in Convolute A of 
Walter Benjamin's Arcade Project (Al, 1). Benjamin takes this citation from Luciien Dubech and Piere 
d'Espezel, Histoire de Paris (Paris, 1926). 
64 Susan Buck-Morss, The Dialectics of Seeing: Walter Benjamin and the Arcades Project, Cambridge: 
Mass, MIT Press, 1999) p, 83. 
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In The Arcades Project, Walter Benjamin traces the mutation of the commodity into new 
spaces of consumer culture. Unlike Marx's rational critique of commodity fetishism, 
Benjamin engages in a more ambiguous approach to illusion, in addition to the ghostly 
phantasmagorisation of capital we also see a positive (re)conceptualisation of a 'whole 
new universe of phantasmagoria' (AP, 14). The ambiguity and complexity that 
distinguish Benjamin from the Marxian position is articulated by Benjamin in the 
introductory pages to his project: 
What is expressed here is a feeling of vertigo characteristic of the nineteenth century's 
conception of history. It corresponds to a viewpoint according to which the course of the 
world is an endless series of facts congealed in the form of thing... Our investigation 
proposes to show how, as a consequence of this reifying representation of civilization, the 
new forms of behaviour and the new economically and technologically based creations 
that we owe to the nineteenth century enter the universe of phantasmagoria. These 
creations undergo this illumination not only in a theoretical manner, by an ideological 
transposition, but also in the immediacy of their perceptual presence. They are manifest 
as phantasmagoria. Thus appear the arcades - first entry in the field of iron construction; 
thus appear the world exhibitions, whose link to the entertainment industry is significant. 
(AP, 14) 
Like Marx, Benjamin takes phantasmagoria as a 'transposition' of the ideological, but 
rather than opposing all things illusory, Benjamin argues that certain modes of 
phantasmagoria provide an 'illumination' and 'immediacy' of their 'perceptual presence'. 
This departure from the binary logic of Marx's analysis is explained by Benjamin in 
(Convolute) N- 'On the Theory of Knowledge, Theory of Progress': 
Marx lays bare the causal connection between economy and culture. For us, what matters 
is the thread of expression. It is not the economic origins of culture that will be presented, 
but the expression of the economy in its culture. At issue, in other words, is the attempt to 
grasp an economic process as perceptible ur- phenomenon, from out of which proceed all 
manifestations of life. (AP, Nla, 6) 
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Benjamin's emphasis on the vertigo and delirium invoked by the new products of 
consumer culture is expressed through the Arcades in both content and style. After the 
introduction, Benjamin does not attempt to rationalise the spatial, cultural and economic 
complexities of the city but instead deepens the confusion, excess and disorientation with 
a vast collection of citations and clippings that are periodically interspersed with his own 
commentary. This mass of quotations and other fragments is organised into separate 
folders (Convolutes) designated by letter (A-Z and a-z) and subject heading (Fashion, 
Arcades, Iron Construction, The Streets of Paris, etc. ). Moving through the book, it is as 
if we experience Benjamin imagining himself passing along the arcades of nineteenth- 
century Paris. In (Convolute) 'G, Exhibitions, Advertising, Grandville, ' the textual 
juxtapositions range from the handbill of a Parisian textiles dealer from the 1830s: 'My 
desire to contribute to your eternal salvation compels me to address you .... '(AP, GI, 4), 
to Debech and Espezel's Histoire de Paris (1926): 'It is characteristic of these enormous 
fairs to be ephemeral, yet each of them has left its trace in Paris.... ' (AP, G4,4), and then 
on to Karl Marx's description of the commodity form (1928): 'It is only the particular 
social relation between people that here assumes, in the eyes of these people, the 
phantasmagoric al form of a relation between things... ' (AP, G5,1). Throughout the 
Convolutes the reader is bombarded with a vast montage of diverse citations and like a 
steady stream of morphological projections, there is a constant movement between the 
large and the small, kitsch and high culture, the spectacular and the mundane. Adorno 
notes, 'politics and metaphysics, theology and materialism, myth and modernity, 
intentionless material and extravagant speculation - all streets in Benjamin's cityscape 
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converge in the plan of the book on Paris as they do in the city's Etoile'. With this 
agglomeration of interconnected material Benjamin explores the changing economic 
conditions shaping subjectivity. 
In the Arcades the nineteenth-century steps into the present mediated through time but 
(on his own assertion) unmediated by Benjamin. He writes: 'Method of this project: 
65 1 quote Graeme Gilloch quoting these passages from Adorno. Gilloch also notes that Adorno found 
Benjamin's earlier book on Baudelaire (Paris of the Second Empire in Baudelaire) 'undialectical'. 'The 
crucial absence of any adequate form of mediation resulted, Adorno claimed, in a shallow immediacy and 
bald facticity - located at the crossroads of magic and positivism. ' Graerne Gilloch, Myth and Metropolis: 
Walter Benjamin and the City, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996, p. 10 1. 
71 
Literary montage. I needn't say anything. Merely show' (AP, NIa, 8). There is an attempt 
to collect as much as possible and to display that material in order that we will observe 
and, in observing, witness ourselves in the same phantasmagoria of urban experience, a 
dream state from which we will then exit. 'The true method of making things present is to 
represent them in our space (not to represent ourselves in their space)... We don't 
displace our being into theirs; they step into our life' (AP, H2,3). With this historical 
perspective Benjamin intends to wake us from the illusions of a 'collective dream state', 
his method is to show the dream, to represent the dream as it is experienced but out of its 
own time. As Graeme Gilloch notes: 
Elimination of the mythic is not to be achieved through reason as such at all; rather, the 
disenchantment of the world is to take place paradoxically and precisely through 
enchantment. Enchantment disenchants modernity. It is this that constitutes Benjamin's 
66 dialectical fairy tale, the telling of which breaks the spell that holds us in thrall . 
Benjamin focuses his attention on the industrial and cultural developments that best 
characterise nineteenth century Paris. These new urban forms are taken to express 
something about the relation between social activity and industrial capitalism. The nature 
of these new spatial experiences is expressed through Benjamin's repeated use of the 
term 'phantasmagoria'. As I will later argue more fully, this revisiting of Marx's 
(ideological) figuration makes a clear departure from the traditional oppositions at work 
in Capital. In addition (and perhaps unwittingly), Benjamin's phantasmagoria presents 
something of a challenge to Marx's rational conceptualisation of illusion. That is, if the 
fetish that we will see Marx associates with the surplus value of the commodity is the 
result of an inverted reflection of the material life process, then Ben amin's fi ation i gur 
involves a different logic in which the phantasmagoric illusion paradoxically disrupts the 
collective dream state that he associates with the inter-subjective realm of social space. 
This shift in emphasis most notably concerns a new engagement with the immersive 
space of modernity which is seen by Benjamin to follow the logic of the phantasmagoric 
66 yamin and the City, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1996, p. Graerne Gilloch, Myth and Metropolis: Walter Ben 
109. 
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magic lantern. With new (spatial) products of industrial capitalism, Benjamin analyses 
the critical relation between different modes of spatial illusion: 'For us, what matters is 
the thread of expression. It is not the economic origins of culture that will be presented, 
but the expression of the economy in its culture'(AP, Nla, 6). 
For Benjamin, the ideological is most clearly expressed in (the experience of) new urban 
forms. In this way, Paris is both the capital of the nineteenth-century and the centre of 
capital. This critical transposition importantly involves a new conceptual framework in 
which the illusions that Marx associated with the commodity-form are extended into 
urban experience, but rather than continuing with Marx's view of the mediating 
appearance of essential relations, Benjamin takes these urban phantasmagorias to reveal 
some truth about the hidden mechanisms that determine the conditions of subjectivity, or 
as he puts it in 'Convolute N': 'to discover in the analysis of the small individual moment 
the crystal of the total event' (AP, N2,6). At work throughout the Arcades is a new series 
of relations in which illusion is employed as a mode of 'dialectical awakening'. 67 
However, it would be a mistake to draw a clear distinction between the phantasmagoria 
of Marx's 'commodity form' and those of Benjamin's 'urban experience'. As Giorgio 
Agamben has observed, Marx was in London when the first Universal Exposition was 
inaugurated in 1851 and was in the process of writing Capital. Agamben suggests that, 'it 
is probable that Marx had in mind the impression felt in the Crystal Palace when he wrote 
the chapter of Capital on commodity fetishism. ' 
68 While it is difficult to know precisely 
what drove Marx to introduce the concept of phantasmagoria into his analysis of the 
commodity, what is certain is that Marx, like Benjamin, invested critically in the 
turbulent relation between space and illusion. In order to explore these spatial relations 
more fully I will now return to Marx, as it is with Marx's critique that 'fetishism' and 
'phantasmagoria' are first employed as conceptual figurations. Like Benjamin, Marx 
67 Benjamin takes up the notion of 'dialectical awakening' throughout The Arcades Project by returning to 
products of industrial capitalism outside of their time. This 
historical perspective corresponds to: 'the 
realization of dream elements in the course of waking up' 
(AP, N4,4). But: 'In order for a part of the past 
to be touched by the present instant there must be no continuity between them. ' (AP, N7,7). 
6' Giorgio Agamben, Means Without Ends: Note on Politics, Vincenzo Binetti and Cesare Casarino (trans), 
Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis Press, 2000, p. 74. 
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intends to show the illusion, but instead of framing it by a relation of phantasmagoric 
events, we will see how Marx attempts to purify the commodity with the rational logic of 
scientific enquiry. 
Exorcism 
Would there be then some exorcism at the opening of Capital? When the curtain rises on 
the raising of a curtain? From the first chapter of its first book? However potential It may 
appear, and however preparatory, however virtual, would this promise of exorcism have 
developed enough power to sign and seal the whole logic of this great work? (SoM, 163) 
In Capital (Vol 1) Marx sets out to demystify what he terms as the 'mysterious character 
of the commodity-form' (C, 164). With an approach that is akin to the project of the 
enlightenment, Marx aims to lay bare the immaterial relations that lend the commodity its 
power of fascination and in so doing, reveal the mechanisms of subjugation and 
alienation that he understands to be embedded within the commodity-form. As Jacques 
Derrida points out, this critical account of economy involves a type of exorcism. Marx 
intends to have done with the mystical fetishism of the commodity. In counter-distinction 
to market forces (that 'conjure' an object of human labour into an object of exchange), 
Marx seeks out the material relations of use and production. It is intended that the 
mysterious and objectified commodity will have all appearances cleared away from its 
body to (re)emerge as a thing of real value. 
Consequently Capital offers a critical exposition of illusory phenomena. Marx is at pains 
to describe the suprasensible phantoms that attach themselves to commodities but in so 
doing, paradoxically gives form to the very apparitions that he intends to exorcise. The 
notion that there is more at stake in the commodity than its material form - that there 
exists a fantastical mode of value that eclipses the material properties of use and 
labour - 
lends some identity to the fetishism that he sees as emerging form the commodity-form. 
In this way Marx's representation of the (otherwise) invisible and non-sensuous provides 
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an 'expanded field' of illusion. 69 In other words, Marx unwittingly brings identity and 
meaning to the very phenomena that he seeks to eradicate. Consequently, as we will now 
see, Marx's project of dernystification makes visible a whole new category of illusory 
phenomena. 
Commodity Fetishism 
In the opening pages of Capital, the money-form is taken by Marx as a means to 
introduce the enigmatic and spectacular character of the commodity. 70 What is readily 
available in the money-form makes visible the illusions that Marx believes to reside in 
the commodity-form. The fetishism that is attached to money is understood by Marx to 
be immediately reducible to the commodity. In other words, the designation of value in 
the money-form brings to light the 'hidden secrets' (C, 168) of the commodity and makes 
visible the illusory body that distorts from its material properties of use and labour. The 
presence of the money-fetish in the commodity begins Marx's analysis of the illusory 
body of the commodity. 71 With this analysis Marx attempts to reveal the alienating 
contradictions at work in capital. 
69The notion of an expanded field of illusion, that is, not only mimetic representations but also ideological 
and spatial modes, is developed in Anthony Vidler's article 'Architecture's Expanded Field' (Aqforum, 
April, 2004) in which he argues that architecture has found new 'formal and programmatic inspiration in a 
host of disciplines and technologies'. 
70 The transition ftom the general form of value to the money-form is a transformation that sets in motion a 
law of equivalents. This movement involves a kind of commodity whose natural form is socially 
interwoven to become an equivalent form, or more specifically: 'it becomes its specific social function, and 
consequently its social monopoly, to play the part of universal equivalent within the world of commodities' 
(C, 162). To illustrate this point Marx looks to the social status of gold. Like the money-form, the specific 
natural properties of gold have become entwined with the social custom that lends it its value. This value 
form (gold) expresses the value of the world of commodities through one single commodity. Through this 
equation, the commodity assumes a value that is common to all commodities. In other words, the money 
form brings commodities into relation with one another as objects of exchange: 'The simple expression of 
the relative value of a single commodity, such as linen, in a commodity which is already functioning as the 
money commodity, such as gold, is the price form' (C, 163). Like all other commodities, the money-form 
works as a universal equivalent, it reduces separate and specific objects to a measure of value that is 
perceived in addition to and in spite of its material properties. In this way Marx shows the money-form to 
allow for equivalences between non-equivalents. That is, objects of labour magically assume a value that is 
relative and autonomous to other objects of exchange. 
71 As David Hawkes has put it: 'The most salient characteristic of money is that it does not exist. Or rather, 
it exists only as symbol, an idea in people's minds, as opposed to a physical object that one could see and 
touch. Money, in short, is an image that has attained the status of reality: it is an idol. ' David Hawkes, 
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What is of importance here is Marx's use of the term phantasmagoria 
(Phan tasmagorische). 72 This new figuration of illusion extends the fetishism that is 
associated with the appearance of value within the commodity to address the way the 
market and relations between people are subject to the same objectifying illusions of 
capital. To be clear, fetishism is the key (immaterial) figuration in Marx's account of the 
commodity-form. However, phantasmagoria or the phantasmagoric extends Marx's 
conceptual figuration of fetishism by describing the relation between inanimate 
commodities in the market which in the eyes of men, stand in for natural material 
relations between humans. Phantasmagoria is used by Marx to describe both the external 
relation and subjective affect of commodities in the market (that take on the appearance 
of social relations between living things). As Derrida puts it: 'This commerce among 
things stems from the phantasmagoria. The autonomy lent to commodities corresponds to 
anthropomorphic projection. The latter inspires the commodities, it breathes the spirit 
into them, a human spirit, the spirit of speech and the spirit of will. ' (SoM, 157). 
The commodity's 'mysterious flight' into the world of exchange, and, perhaps more 
importantly, the (mis)perception of the commodity as a thing that possesses a value that 
is distinct from its material value, is the fetishistic and phantasmagoric turn that Marx 
sets out to demystify. To understand how commodities appear in the market, it will be 
necessary to show how the appearance is distinct from 'essential' material relations. 
Moreover, for the commodity to be purified of its fetish making appearances, the 
essential qualities must be seen as distinct from the superficial phenomena that emanate 
from the commodity's appearance. Consequently, Marx divides the commodity into (a 
material thing of) 'use value' and (an illusory object of) 'exchange value'. Where use 
Ideology: the New Critical Idiom, London: Routledge, 2003, p. 17. It is precisely these fetishistic 
characteristics that Marx attaches to the commodity form. 
72 There are varying translations of this passage form Capital. In more recent publications (I refer to: Ben 
Fowkes, trans. Middlesex, England: Penguin Books in association with New Left Review, 1976) 
'Phantasmagorische' is translated as 'The 'fantastic' form of a relation between things' (C, 165). In 
citations from the same passage, that appear in Benjamin's The Arcades Project, and Adomo's, In Search 
of Wagner, Phantasmagorische is translated as phantasmagoria. The later shift to 'fantastic' is in this way 
problematic considering the importance that we will see Benjamin and Adomo to have attached to Marx 
conceptualisation of the term phantasmagoria. 
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value refers to genuine human needs, exchange value corresponds to the needs of the 
market. The problem for Marx is that the market has taken possession of objects of use 
(produced by people for the needs of people). Moreover, the use value that connects 
makers to the objects they produce is no longer visible; instead, the producers of 
commodities are confronted by a mesmerising and fetish-making surplus value. 
While Marx's distinction works as a useful analytical tool, Derrida suggests that it carries 
with it a certain idealism, 'namely, of permitting one to orient an analysis of the 
phantasmagoric process beginning at an origin that is itself fictive or ideal, thus already 
purified by a certain fantastics' (SoM, 160). Marx's emphasis on the 'real' (material) 
meaning of things, and hence his opposition to what is not, or as Derrida puts it, his 
opposition to the 'phantom form', reinstates a new ontology of presence. I will return to 
Derrida's questioning of an essential or original 'use value'. The task of cleansing the 
commodity of surplus phenomena must first be explored more fully as it is through this 
process of purification, naturalisation and exorcism that Marx paradoxically expands the 
field of illusion into the inter-subjective realm of everyday praxis. 
In his theory of commodity fetishism, Marx explains how the real time and labour 
involved in production is eclipsed by the value that a thing possesses in the market. Just 
as the value of gold is determined by forces external to its physical properties, the value 
that a commodity possesses in the market is independent of the labour that has gone into 
its making. As we have seen, the value that corresponds to the essential material qualities 
of use is concealed by the dazzling, fetish-making appearance of exchange. For Marx, the 
latter value is inessential: indeed, it is mere surplus. In order to further illustrate the 
'mysterious' and 'contradictory' nature of the commodity-form Marx describes an 
ordinary wooden table: 
The form of wood for instance, is altered if a table is made out of it. Nevertheless the 
table continues to be wood, an ordinary sensuous thing. But as soon as it emerges as a 
commodity, it changes into a thing which transcends sensuousness. (C, 163) 
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As Marx demonstrated with the money-form, the commodity abstracts from its concrete 
material status to become an equivalent, relative, representational, immaterial and 
symbolic mode of exchange (value). In this same way human labour assumes a social 
fonn, a form that distorts the proper time of production to appear instead as an 
autonomous and independent form of value: 
The equality of the kinds of human labour takes on a physical form in the equal 
objectivity of the products of labour as values; the measure of expenditure of human 
power by its duration takes on the form of the magnitude of the value of the products of 
labour; and finally the relationship between the producers, within which the social 
characteristics of their labours are manifested, take on the form of a social relation 
between products of labour. (C, 164) 
In other words, the natural properties of the commodity (including the labour of its 
making) become abstracted into relative forms of exchange: 'As soon as men start to 
work for each other in any way, their labour also assumes a social form' (C, 164). For 
Marx, the moment that objects become commodities is the moment that people become 
alienated from the products of their labour. This immaterial transmutation - the 
abstraction from material modes of labour into equivalent and exchangeable commodities 
- features as the ob . ect of Marx's critique. J 
As we have seen, the aim of Capital is to return the commodity to the material qualities 
that reflect the labour and needs of the producer 'plainly'. For Marx, this task is only 
possible with the aid of rational analysis. Once again, the distinction between the material 
and immaterial is a means to separate the essential from the superficial and the rational 
from the irrational. With this method of analysis, Marx intends to rid the commodity of 
its enigma. Marx believes that if we can distinguish between the real and the apparent 
then it may be possible to return objects of human labour to material relations between 
men. 
With this in mind, we return to the wooden table which 'no longer stands with its feet on 
the ground, but in relation to other commodities it stands on its head, and evolves out if 
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its wooden brain grotesque ideas' (C, 163). From this description we might imagine the 
wooden table to be animated. Marx is not describing an object that is fixed to its form; 
the commodity is instead understood to exist as an object of contradiction. 
At first sight the commodity is an extremely obvious, trivial thing (C, 164), but this 
impression is only because it operates in a fashion that is not immediately visible. The 
phantasmagoric body of the commodity is only visible on closer inspection. It is through 
analysis that Marx believes the enigma and fetish of the commodity to emerge as an 
appearance. With this, Marx can see the commodity in all of its many forms. The wooden 
table is a thing that transcends sensuousness. It is in this state of excess (sensuous- 
suprasensous) that the table spins around and captivates its audience. Instead of an 
ordinary sensuous thing, the table becomes 'far more wonderful than if it were to begin 
dancing of its own free will' (C, 164). The table performs as something that it is not: it 
appears to Marx as an apparition. The table takes on the ghostly figuration of a 'dancer', 
and addresses itself to other dancers; it faces the world on its head and begins to move 
with other commodities in the market. Instead of an obvious or trivial thing, the 
commodity is for Marx both phantasmagoric and contradictory. 
For the sake of analysis, knowing the commodity not to be reducible to any one form, 
Marx distinguishes between what is physically there and what is not, between those 
things that he considers to be proper to man and those phenomena that emanate from the 
market. The nature and mechanism of the illusion is, in this formulation, one of market 
forces; it is through this invisible force that the table mutates into a phantom-form. This 
supernatural figure evades the senses and abstracts from its physical properties. The 
movement from the inanimate to the animate, the transmutation from the fixity of the 
wooden table to a thing that is without attachment is for Marx the moment that man 
relinquishes all control over the objects of his labour: 'It (the table) no longer stands with 
its feet on the ground, but, in relation to other commodities, it stands on its head' (C, 
163). The problem with this upside-down table is its newly found autonomy. The table 
moves from a thing that responds to the needs of people (use) to a thing that responds to 
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the needs of the market (exchange). With its flight into the world of exchange the table 
has gained both autonomy and volition. 
The phantasmagoric body of the commodity returns us to the religious. Here also evolves 
a process of fetishistic transmutation. The illusory mechanism that Marx shows to be true 
of both the commodity and religion is one that activates a chain of relations: 'They enter 
into relation with both each other and the human race' (C, 163). Like the religious, the 
commodity stimulates (market) relations, and consequently becomes both autonomous 
and self-transformative: 'It is only by being exchanged that the products of labour acquire 
a socially uniform objectivity as values... ' (C, 166). The phantasmagoric transmutation of 
human qualities into autonomous and relative phenomena is brought into motion by 
ideology. The analogy with the religious is a means for Marx to describe the space of 
ideology. Just as the money fetish is reducible to the commodity fetish, the religious 
makes visible the ideological body of the commodity-form. In the same way that 
religious beliefs have returned as a force of repression, the commodity has returned as an 
object of sublimation and alienation. In this sense, social relations (whether idea or 
object, brain or hand) are judged by Marx to have developed beyond the control of 
people: 
Their own movement within society has for them the form of a movement made by 
things, and these things, far from being under their control, in fact control them. (C, 167- 
168) 
Commodity Fetishism: Religion and Alienation 
Marx continues his analysis of commodity fetishism with a reference to the 'misty realm 
of religion, ' 'There (in religious activity) the products of the human brain appear as 
autonomous figures endowed with a life of their own' (C, 165). The construction of a 
belief system that is taken to possess a life that is independent of the human brain, the 
conception (by people) of a force that is understood to be the judge of people is, for 
Marx, representative of the fetishistic hold the commodity has over its own producer. The 
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relationship between religion and the commodity marks an important area of Marx's 
conceptual framework. Not only is the mechanism of religious faith a means for Marx to 
understand the 'theological niceties' of the commodity-form, but the mystical nature of 
the religious also serves as a vehicle for Marx to articulate his hatred for all things 
illusory. In 'A Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of the Right', Marx 
argues that: 
The abolition of religion as the illusory happiness of the people is the demand for their 
real happiness. To call on them to give up their illusions about their conditions is to call 
on them to give up a condition that requires illusions. The criticism of religion is 
therefore in embryo the criticism of that vale of tears of which religion is the halo. 73 
In Capital, Marx's reference to religion represents much more than a mere analogy. Here, 
the illusions of the religious are understood to be a product of the social relations that 
require illusions. The task is to rid the world of all illusions. The critique of religion is an 
essential aspect of this project for it demonstrates the method that Marx applies both to 
his demystification of the commodity and to his theorisation of ideology. If religion has 
returned products of the human brain as a repressive and authoritative body, then the 
market returns objects of human labour as alienating commodities (serving the interest of 
the ruling minority). In showing the invisible force of the ideological to exist in religion, 
Marx seeks to make visible the ideological mechanisms of dispossession and alienation 
that he believes to reside in the fetish-making appearance of the commodity. With the 
religious Marx gives representation to the ideological forces that determine our subjective 
relation to commodities. 
Marx's reading of Ludwig Feuerbach's philosophy of religious faith is key to his attack 
on religion. In a letter to Feuerbach Marx writes: 'Your philosophy of the future and 
essence of faith are, in spite of their limited scope, of more weight than the whole of 
73 Karl Marx, EarlY Writings: Marx, Rodney Livingstone (trans), Middlesex, England, Penguin Books in 
association with New Left Review, 1974, p. 244. 
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German literature put together. ' 74 The influence of Feuerbach is of great significance to 
Marx's formulation of the commodity. Marx builds on the 'limited scope' of Feuerbach's 
work, applying his critique of religion to the wider field of political economy. 
In The Essence of Christianity, Feuerbach had sought to find a way to describe how 
sensuous men represent salvation and perfection to themselves in another supra-sensuous 
world (as a projection of their own essential qualities into imaginary beings and 
situations). In his critique, Feuerbach suggests the idea of God to be a composite of 
human predicates. What is worshipped as divine is really a synthesis of human qualities: 
In every case it is human power, attributes, or capacity that is deified; but once it is 
deified, it is separated from all specific properties attaching to the real human power, 
capacity, or attribute; so that, when this process of abstraction is carried to the extreme, 
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nothing is left but a mere word . 
Feuerbach argues that in becoming aware of this fetishistic projection, we will become 
capable of reappropriating our essence (which has been alienated in God) and hence, of 
really living out fraternity on earth. 
Marx develops Feuerbach's theory by suggesting the 'inverted' world of religion to be a 
consequence of 'man's' alienation from the social relations of everyday life. Marx states 
that, 'man is no abstract being squatting outside the world. Man is the world of man, 
state, society. This state and this society produce religion, which is an inverted 
consciousness of the world. 976 Marx extends Feuerbach's schema to include a 'practical 
critical activity', suggesting that any critique of religion must be understood as a critique 
" Karl Marx, Karl Marx Selected Writings, David McLellan (ed. ), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977, 
p. 113. 
75 Ludwig Feuerbach, Lectures on the Essence of Religion, Ralph Manheim. (trans), London: Harper & 
Row, 1967,264. 
76 Karl Marx, Early Writings: Marx, 1974, p. 244. Later in the chapter I return to Marx's notion of the 
ideological as an inverted consciousness' to argue that, although Marx first introduces phantasmagoria as a 
figure of ideological delusion, however, his governing conceptual framework will be seen to remain with 
the binary logic of the camera obscura. 
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of the social conditions that estrange people from their surroundings: 'Religion is the sigh 
of the oppressed creature, the heart of the heartless world and the soul of soulless 
conditions. It is the opium of the people. ' 77 Marx takes Feuerbach's thesis as a model for 
his critique of the commodity and simultaneously distances himself from what he 
believes to be the limitations of philosophical interpretation: 
Feuerbach resolves the religious essence into the human essence. But the human essence 
is no abstraction inherent in each single individual. In its reality it is the ensemble of the 
social relations. 78 
Marx describes how for Feuerbach the secular is the basis for understanding the illusory 
mechanism of religious belief- 'the secular basis detaches it from itself and establishes 
itself as an independent reahn in the clouds. ' 79 It is from this foundation that Feuerbach 
attempts to dispel the autonomous and illusory world of religion. For Marx, it is the 
secular itself that exists as an immaterial 'ensemble of social relations. ' What Feuerbach 
takes as the real, Marx identifies as illusory: 'The religious reflections of the real world 
can, in any case, vanish only when the practical relations of everyday life between man 
and man, and man and nature, generally present themselves to him in a transparent and 
rational form' (C, 173). 
The relationship between the 'mysterious realm of religion' and the 'hidden secrets of the 
commodity' is for Marx both theoretically analogous and socially entwined. First, Marx 
understands the commodity's power of fascination to function with the same alienating 
force as religion (Feuerbach). Second, Marx believes social relations, of which the 
commodity is a objectified reflection, to sustain the need for religious dependency. 
Turning back to the commodity-form we will see how Marx redirects Feuerbach's 
critique of religious distortion, sublimation and alienation onto the commodity-form to 
extend the field of illusion into the spaces of everyday praxis. 
77 Early Writings, p. 244 
78 Lectures on the Essence ofReligion, p. 423. 
79 Lectures on the Essence ofReligion, p. 422. 
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Commodity Fetishism: False Reflections 
For Marx, the overriding contradiction involves the problem of reflection, or more 
specifically, the problem of the reflection that covers the 'real' contradiction. The 
commodity reflects an image that distorts its own form. In this distorted form, human 
labour is no longer shown as a relation between men but instead returns as a relation 
between objects. As Derrida puts it: 
There is a mirror, and the commodity form is also this mirror, but since all of a sudden it 
no longer plays its role, since it does not reflect back the expected image, those who are 
looking for themselves can no longer find themselves in it. (SoM, 155) 
Marx's table does not reflect an image of labour but rather an image that fascinates and 
seduces. Instead of reflecting an image of material human values, objects of labour 
appear autonomous and self-transformative. 
Marx suggests the money-form to play a crucial role in this fetish-making abstraction, 80 
circulating a dernaterialised form of value in order to conceal that its value no longer 
corresponds to 'real' social relations between men: 
It is however precisely this finished form of the world of commodities - the money-form - 
which conceals the social character of private labour and the social relations between 
individual workers, by making those relations appear as relations between material 
objects, instead of revealing them plainly. (C, 168) 
Rather than retaining the authentic and essential properties of production, labour is 
objectified into a form of exchange. Marx understands this distorting mediation to signal 
the entrance of another phenomenon: a fetish value that attaches itself to the commodity. 
With this dual identity, the commodity functions as a thing that is both material and 
80 SlavqJ Zizek argues that the money-form most clearly reveals the fetish at work within the commodity 
because of the manner in which it alters behaviour: 'The problem is that in their social activity itself, 
in 
what they are doing, they are acting as 
if money, in its material reality, is the immediate embodiment of 
wealth as such.. --' 
'What they overlook, what they mis-recognise, is not the reality but the illusion which is 
structuring their reality, their real social activity. 
They know very well how things really are, but still they 
are doing it as if they did not 
know', The Sublime Object ofIdeology, London, Verso, 1989, pp. 31-32. 
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immaterial, or as Marx puts it, 'Through this substitution, the products of labour become 
commodities, sensuous things that are at the same time supra-sensible or social' (C, 165). 
In other words, the commodity embodies the conjunction of the sensuous and the supra- 
sensible. What is perceived, however, is an object whose value appears to reside in its 
physical properties, 'for in his eyes they are immutable, but of their content and meaning' 
(C, 168). Instead of a thing that shows itself 'plainly', the commodity conceals the 
contradictions of its form to appear instead as an object that is a product of the market: 
the commodity form, and the value-relation of the products of labour within which it 
appears, have absolutely no connection with the physical nature of the commodity and 
the material (dinglich) relations arising out of this. (C, 165) 
The mystical and fetishistic 'inversion' of objects into forms of value exist as a result of a 
misrecognition: 'It is only the particular social relations between men that assumes, in 
their eyes, the phantasmagorical form (die phantasmagorische) of a relation between 
things. ' 81 In other words, commodities exist only because there is a collective 
misjudgement of their actual material value. Marx suggests that in our eyes the 
immaterial relations that are external to the commodity stand-in for concrete material 
properties of use and labour. What is considered as our misrecognition (of material 
relations between people for social relations between commodities), is described by Marx 
as commodityfetishism. 82 
81 Capital, Vol 1, Harmondsworth: London, 1970. See note 72 (p. 76) for commentary on translation of die 
phantasmagorische. 
82 Theodor Adorno takes up Marx's notion of commodity fetishism when he characterises Wagner's operas 
as phantasmagoria: 'Tannhauser, the phantasmagoria par excellence' (Theodor Adorno, In Search of 
Wagner, Rodney Livingstone (trans), London, Verso, 198 1, p. 86). This critique of Wagner is based on the 
way Adorno understands commodity fetishism to have put new pressures on the work of art. Adorno argues 
that Wagner's operas yield to the pressures of the commodity-form. This experience of music is: 
'Phantasmagoria as the point at which aesthetic appearance becomes a function of the character of the 
commodity. As a commodity it purveys illusions. The absolute reality of the unreal is nothing 
but the 
reality of a phenomena that not only strives increasingly to spirit away its own origins in 
human labour, but 
also, inseparably from this process and in thrall to exchange value, assiduously emphasizes 
its use value, 
stressing that this is its authentic reality, that it is no imitation - and all this in order to 
further the cause of 
exchange value' (In Search of Wagner, p. 128). For Adorno, this 
dream world (of mass culture) has been 
caught in the vortex of commodification which 
distorts the processes of its making to appear as a mythical 
form detached from material life. Like Marx, Adorno's conceptualises phantasmagoria as a fetishistic 
impostor that produces a false understanding of reality. 
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We have seen how a thing becomes a commodity once it enters the market and how, once 
in the market, the use value of an object of labour is eclipsed by a phantasmagoric surplus 
value. This mutation from a thing of use to a thing of exchange is the mysterious turn that 
Marx wants to pin down, understand, expose and demystify. But it is the fetishistic affect 
that the circulation of commodities in the market has on those who produce commodities 
which is of the greatest significance to Marx. That is, objects produced by people appear 
not as the work of people, but as an alien form confronting them as a commodity to be 
purchased by them. The alien fonn is mesmerising and wondrous; it is phantasmagoric 
because it is determined by an invisible force (exchange) that conceals all the signs of its 
making. The material origins of production and labour are concealed by the entrancing 
movement of commodities in the market. Marx represents this system of fetish-making 
with the spectral illusions of the magic lantern. That is, the illusion is now figured 
through a set of illusionistic transformations that as we will see with the ghostly 
projections of heroes and villains, conceal all traces of its own production. Moreover, out 
of this movement between autonomous objects emerge commodities which, as Derrida 
notes, appear to possess 'a human spirit. ' 
I will return to Marx's notion of phantasmagoria to argue that although this new 
figuration demonstrates the expanded terrain of immaterial phenomena, it does not 
engage with the relations between differentiated modes of illusion. 83 The psychological, 
spatial and technological complexities of the phantasmagoric event are already evident in 
the early illusionistic shows of the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Although 
they are physically confined to the space of entertainment, the spectral shows of the 
original phantasmagoria present a conceptual challenge to the rational logic of the 
camera obscura. As I will later argue in relation to Benjamin's Arcades, this 
development in new technologies of entertainment offers the possibility for thinking 
illusion differently. 
83 Marx's transition from fetish to phantasmagoria is not altogether straightforward. Unlike fetishism, 
whose effect is organised through a subjective value system, phantasmagoria is produced mechanically 
through the lens of a magic lantern. As I will argue, Marx fails to develop the full meaning of this new 
illusory model - any extension to this figuration would suggest the human relations 
involved in the 
production of things to be themselves the site of illusion as the image projected has no more 'authenticity' 
than the painted slide that is held behind the lens of the phantoscope. 
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Phantasmagoria 
In his article 'Phantasmagoria, Spectral Technology and the Metaphorics of Modem 
Reverie', Terry Castle describes how the illusionistic shows from the late eighteenth and 
early nineteenth centuries mediated oddly between rational and irrational imperatives. 
Castle explains how the spectacular shows that involved projections of ghosts and 
monsters were thought to 'cause a new public enlightenment by exposing the frauds and 
Charlatans and supposed ghost-seers' (P, 16). However, rather than demystifying those 
ancient stories, the sophisticated instruments of the illusionist created an 'intense 
supernatural effect, where the audience members sometimes tried to fend off moving 
phantoms with their hands or flee the room in terror' (P, 17). 
The play of scale and distance was crucial to the success of the phantasmagoric shows. 
The most famous of these projections were those of Etienne-Gaspard Robertson who, in 
the late 1790's, invented the first phantasmagoria. Robertson's illusory spectacle was 
hugely popular with audiences across Europe and many accounts of the phantasmagoric 
experience were published in the newspapers of the time. 84 Robertson first came to public 
notice in 1796 when he proposed a scheme for burning the British Fleet with an 
assemblage of mirrors designed to concentrate solar rays on distant objects until they 
caught fire. As Castle notes, these ideas may have grown out of Robertson's fascination 
with the magic lantern which similarly concentrated a light source with a mirror and 
helped Robertson to develop new technologies of illusion and entertainment. 85 
84 In his article Castle quotes from newspaper articles that document the audiences frenzied response to the 
phantasmagoric shows of the early eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 
85 The Jesuit priest, Athanasius Kirchner, invented the magic lantern in the seventeenth century by using the 
light of a burning candle to project painted images through a tube. Kirchner enlarged projected images by 
positioning two convex lenses at each end of a tube and used a groove in the middle of the device to hold a 
small image painted on glass. The candle light, reflected by a concave mirror, was concentrated onto the 
painted image by the first lens while the second lens then magnified and projected the image (onto a wall or 
gauze screen). 
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Robertson exploited the immersive potential of this image-making technology with 
elaborate shows in specially modified theatres. With new modifications to the magic 
lantern, 86 illuminated images were made to float in space and perform chilling 
transfort'nations. Robertson listed some of the more complex aspects of his 
phantasmagoria in his manuscripts: 
Several, we notice, specifically involved a metamorphosis, or one shape rapidly changing 
into another - an effect easily achieved by doubling two glass slides in the tube of the 
magic lantern over one another in a quick, deft manner. Thus the image of The Three 
Graces, turning into skeletons. 87 (cited in, P, 36) 
As Robertson makes clear, the entire phantasmagoria was founded on metamorphoses 
and transformation. The projections did not jump between opposing forms but mutated 
into varying states of horror. 
Robertson would further animate his projections by addressing the audience with 
elaborate introductions and theatrical conjuring effects: 'A moment of silence ensued, 
then an Arlesain-looking man in great disorder, with brisling hair and wild eyes, said: 
since I wasn't able.. to re-establish the cult ofMarat, I would at least like to see his face' 
(P, 35). Robertson would then mix up potions for bringing such figures back to life. 
While this was being played out on stage, a series of projected images would be seen to 
float in the air above the heads of the terrified audience. The intense psychological effect 
of these shows is argued by Castle to run against the original ambitions of the 
phantasmagoric event: 
86 As the demand for more spectacular phantasmagoric shows increased the technology surrounding the 
magic lantern was also developed. In place of the burning candle came lime ball, hydrogen, and magnesium 
gaslight and the older painted slides were gradually replaced by photographic transparencies. Like other 
image-reproduction techniques of the nineteenth century such as the panorama, the bioscope and 
stereoscopic projection, the illusory technologies behind the phantasmagoria provided inspiration for early 
developments in cinematography: 'Well into the twentieth century motion picture shows and many early 
films, such as Georges Melies, featured explicitly phantasmagorical illusions. In various ways the new 
medium of motion pictures continued to acknowledge and reflect on its spectral nature and origins' (P, 42). 
87 1 quote from Castle who takes this extract from the Fantasmagorie de Robertson, which contains a list of 
experiments and illusions performed at the Cour 
des capucines (the University of Illinois Library). 
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What we find, it seems to me, is that the demystifying project was peculiarly 
compromised from the start. The rationalists did not so much negate the traditional spirit 
world as displace it into the realm of psychology. Ghosts were not exorcised, only 
internalised and reinterpreted as hallucinatory thoughts. (P, 18) 
The paradox that Castle points to raises important questions about the status of illusion in 
social space. To some extent Robertson's experiments appeals to reason, showing 
supernatural beings to be the product of human ingenuity. That is, Robertson intends to 
convince his audience that supernatural beings are only mystified effects of human 
invention. At the same time, however, Robertson devotes his attention to endowing his 
fanciful creations with the illusion of independent life. 
The early magic lantern shows developed as mock exercises in scientific demystification, 
complete with preliminary lectures on the fallacy of ghost belief and the various cheats 
perpetrated by conjures and necromancers over the centuries. But the pretence of 
pedagogy quickly gave way when the phantasmagoria itself began, for clever illusionists 
were careful never to reveal exactly how their own bizarre, sometimes frightening 
apparitions were produced. Everything was done, quite shamelessly, to intensify the 
supernatural effect. (P, 30) 
Castle argues that this mechanical conjuring of ghostly figures ushers into existence a 
new psychological reality. A world that had only existed in the imagination was made to 
exist in the social space of popular entertainment. 
The subliminal power of the phantasmagoria lay in the fact that it induced in the spectator 
a kind of maddening, irrational perception: one might believe ghosts to be illusions, 
present in the mind's eye alone, but one experienced them here as real entities, existing 
outside the boundary of the psyche. The overall effect was unsettling, like seeing a real 
ghost. (P, 50) 
This phantasmagoric challenge to rationalist boundaries (that attempt to divide between 
fantasy and reality) signals an important challenge to the laws of absolutism and 
determinacy. With the spectral images of these illusionistic shows reality and appearance 
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are no longer fixed as separate entities but coexist as an inter-subjective extension of the 
living present. 
Derrida's reading of Marx draws directly on the paradox of these same spectral 
representations: 
This critical ontology means to deploy the possibility of dissipating the phantom, let us 
venture to say again of conjuring it away as representative consciousness of the subject, 
and of bringing this representation back to the world of labour, production, and exchange, 
so as to reduce it to its conditions (SoM, 170). 
Derrida asks at what point the commodity exist as a natural, plain and singular object of 
use value. Furthermore, is the notion that use value can ever be cleansed of its surplus 
value not itself something of a fiction? The point here, however, is that Marx's 
engagement with the phantasmagoric body of the commodity does not reduce it to a 
single category (which, as Derrida points out, begins as something of a fiction), but 
instead lends form and identity to the invisible movements of the market. Robertson's 
projections illustrate this problem clearly. If images of a dancing table were intended to 
rid the commodity of its own phantoms, the rationalist project of demystification appears 
deeply flawed. In Capital we find that the boundaries that separate science from myth 
becoming increasingly blurred. Moreover, Marx's eagerness to represent what had 
always been imagined forces an image of social activity that consistently involves 
illusion. Not only does Marx dwell on the temporal, fleeting and unstable world of 
appearances as a possible location of meaning, he shows us how illusion exists in the 
everyday. 
Like Robertson, Marx endows the objects of his attention (commodities) with the illusion 
of independent life. These illusions of capital perform in the phantasmagoria of exchange, 
a type of freak show in which immaterial phenomena are 'conjured' into existence only 
to be told to leave. This same logic applies to Robertson's phantasmagorias, the medieval 
tales of ghost and monsters would be paraded on stage only to dissipate the strength of 
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tales of ghost and monsters would be paraded on stage only to dissipate the strength of 
myth and mysticism. The problem for both Robertson and Marx is that these phenomena 
refuse to leave. Instead, they state their claim to existence and in gaining material 
identity, fight for a territory in the space of social activity. 
Turning back to Benjamin I will now consider how the phantasmagoric show is re- 
conceptualised into a critical account of nineteenth-century urban space. With this 
documentation of urban experience, we will see how differentiated modes of illusion 
converge within the new spatialities of social activity. 
Benjamin: The Synchronic Relation of Phantasmagoric Space 
When Benjamin argues that industrial and cultural developments of the nineteenth- 
century are 'manifest as phantasmagoria' (AP, 14), there appears to be a new formulation 
of this Marxian term. That is, Benjamin's understanding addresses the developments of 
new spatial forms which increasingly produce a meaning that is independent of any 
(privileged) point of origin. As we have already seen, Benjamin moves away from the 
Marxian emphasis on the phantasmagoria's veiling of its own means of production 
(Adorno) to focus instead on new spaces of immersion and their expressive links to 
determining systems of power. In this way Benjamin comes to realize that it is no longer 
a question of 'ridding the world of illusion' but of understanding how the fusion of 
commodities with new visual and spatial technologies represents a world that is itself an 
illusion (ideology). Adorno's fear of phantasmagoria 'laying claim to being 88 is set aside 
and the phantasmagoric experience stands as an 'illuminating' vehicle for figuring 
nineteenth-century subjectivity. 
88 In his chapter on Phantasmagoria Adomo applies his Marxian conceptualisation of phantasmagoria to a 
critical analysis of Wagner's operas. Here Adorno explains that: 'In the absence of any glimpse of the 
underlying forces or conditions of its production, this outer appearance can lay claim to the status of being', 
Its perfection is at the same time the perfection of the illusion that the work of art is a reality sui generis 
that constitutes itself in the realm of the absolute without having to renounce its claim to image the world. 
Wagner's operas tend toward magic delusion, to what Schopenhauer calls "the outside of the worthless 
commodity", in short towards phantasmagoria' (In Search of Wagner, p. 85). 
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Instead of presenting the 'economic origins of culture', Benjamin looks to 'the expression 
of the economy in its culture' (AP, Nla, 6). The metaphysical essentialism that Derrida 
problematises in Marx's emphasis on 'use value' is rethought by Benjamin into a 
theorisation of industrialised urban space. As Susan Buck-Morss writes: 
Marx had used the term 'phantasmagoria' to refer to deceptive appearances of 
commodities as 'fetishes' in the marketplace. The Passagen- Werk entries cite the relevant 
passages from capital on the fetish character of the commodities, describing how 
exchange value obfuscates the source of the value of commodities in the productive 
market. But for Benjamin, whose point of departure was a philosophy of historical 
experience rather then an economic analysis of capital, the key to the new urban 
phantasmagoria was not so much the commodity-in-the-market as the commodity-on- 
display, where exchange value no less that use value lost practical meaning, and purely 
representational value came to the fore. '9 
Benjamin's new emphasis on (visual) experience and the occulation of urban space 
invests in a deeper consideration of the critical and 'illuminating' possibilities of illusion 
in urban space. The arcades, world trade fairs and the entertaim-nent industries ('0, 
Gambling, prostitution, Q, Panorama, T, Modes of Lighting') figure as both an 
expression of the economy in its culture and a manifestation of competing 
phantasmagorias. The intoxicating presence of these spatial products is not a simple 
extension of Marx's theory of the fetish-making commodity but figures as a causal link to 
a wider system of power. What is of importance in the Arcades is how new cultural forms 
compete with and outgrow one another. Benjamin illustrates how their perceptual 
immediacy is constantly being refined and updated. Consequently these new spaces are 
without fixity and, like fashion, exist as a passing expression of the moment. 
Benjamin introduces his project with citations documenting the rise and steady decline of 
the Parisian arcades. These spaces of retail are taken as a 'dream world' that 'will charm 
the fancy of Parisians well into the second half of the century' (AP, 17). The 
89 The Dialectics ofSeeing, pp. 81-82 
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'intoxication' and 'vertigo' that Benjamin associates with the arcades performs as a 
pivotal figuration for his study of nineteenth-century experience. Benjamin explores how 
these forerunners of the department store represent (one of many) urban phantasmagorias 
that, like the commodity-form, mask the century's failure to respond 'to new 
technological possibilities with a new social order' (AP, 26). Of interest to Benjamin is 
how these cavernous spaces, which exist both as interior and exterior, have developed 
into a 'dream-house. ' 90 
The arcades had to be lit by various forms of half-light, which Benjamin associates with 
the descent of a 'dream sleep over Europe' or collective phantasmagoria. 91 The mental 
delusion thus engendered in turn infects architectural practice. But these new spaces of 
exchange will inevitably fall into ruin. Just as the nineteenth-century arcades replaced 
their eighteenth-century counterpart, they too are superseded by multi-story department 
stores. 92 In addition, new railway stations, museums, winter gardens, sports palaces, 
exhibition halls and boulevards are shown to eclipse the spectacle of the original arcades. 
As Buck-Morss describes: 'These once magnificent fairy grottoes that had spawned the 
phantasmagoria went into eclipse: their narrowness appeared stifling, their perspectives 
claustrophobic, their gaslight too dim. ' 93 
Benjamin's 'fairytale' is synonymous with a nightmare, the arcades feature as part of a 
continuous movement of ever-greater phantasmagorias. Along with other forms of 
industrial development, Benjamin takes the arcades to exist as an ephemeral phenomena 
and, in so doing, shows the signs of their inevitable demise. This moving cycle of cultural 
and economic forms is of great importance to Benjamin's study. Through the Arcades we 
see how monuments of industrial power and technological progress fall into ruin to 
become obsolete relicts of a forgotten past. 
90 The 'dream houses' of the modem epoch - the arcade, museum and constructions for the world 
exhibitions - are the ultimate settings for the phantasmagoria of the metropolis. 9' The development of artificial light in nineteenth-century Paris and its consequent affects on urban 
subjectivity is taken up by Wolfgang Schivelbusch in his book, Disenchanted Night, The Industrialisation 
of Light in the Nineteenth Century, Angela Davies (trans), Los Angeles: The University of California Press, 
1995. 
92 The Bon Marche department store in Paris features as the main successor to the arcades. 
93 The Dialectics ofSeeing, p. 92. 
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Over the course of Convolute A, Benjamin traces how the arcades become more 
labyrinthine and removed from the streets outside; in short, the arcades become 'wholly 
adapted to arousing desire' (A3a, 7) . 
94 As we have seen, this dream-like effect is partly 
achieved by the interiorising of the street with glass roofs. In addition, the arcades 
aroused interest through their innovative and modem construction techniques which first 
introduced iron and glass into new buildings. Most importantly, however, was the fact 
that the arcade was home to the commodity. The arousing of desire centred around the 
display of luxury goods which, seen through the windows of interiorised shop fronts, 
would line the narrow corridors. Here, 'the commodity proliferates along the margins and 
enters into fantastic combinations' (A3a, 7)). However, it is not long before the arcades 
fall into decline. Jules Claretie notes: 'The arcades have one great defect for modem 
Parisians: you could say that, just like certain paintings done from stifled perspectives, 
95 they're in need of air' (AP, E 1,5). 
For Benjamin, it is in observing the decline of the once fashionable arcades that we 
glimpse at their truth. In documenting the rise and fall of these sites of shopping 
Benjamin intends to 'break the spell that hold us in thrall'). 96 The historical displacement 
of industrial and spatial products of capital is taken to question the myth of progress. Like 
the fetishism that Marx associates with the commodity, Benjamin's reanimation of dead 
arcades goes to remind us that the spectacle of innovation and progress conceals the 
unhappy social conditions that lie behind the products of industrial capitalism. 
.9 In addition to Benjamin s diachronic displacement of cultural and economic forms, the 
phantasmagoria" s 'immediacy of perceptual presence9 is employed as a counter to the 
illusions of permanence and fixity that exude from the monumental facades and wide 
boulevards of nineteenth-century Paris. This way Benjamin's ideological demystification 
94 In this passage Benjamin responds to the shift from the constructions of the eighteenth-century, such as 
the Palais-Royal, to the nineteenth-century arcades, which open into another interior hall. In the eighteenth- 
century arcades the buildings open onto the street. 
95 Here Benjamin quotes ftom Jules Claretie, La Vie a Paris, 1895 (Paris, 1896), pp. 47ff 
96 Graeme Gilloch, Myth and Metropolis: Walter Benjamin and the City, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1996, p, 
109. 
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also involves a conceptual framework that is synchronic: 'Every present day is 
determined by the images that are synchronic with it: each now is the now of a particular 
recognisability. In it, truth is charged to the bursting point with time' (AP, N3,1). The 
point here is that the 'ideological transposition' involved in the Arcades is most clearly 
exposed through what I shall call, the synchronic relation of phantasmagoric space. 97 
What is of interest to Benjamin not only concerns how these phantasmagorias are 
illuminating through their 'ideological transposition, but also in the immediacy of their 
perceptual presence' (AP, 14). The relation between the phantasmagorias that are paraded 
through the Arcades moves away from the Marxian view of ideological distortion to 
suggest that the new spatial forms and the experiences they produce (in the nineteenth- 
century subject) are 'manifest as phantasmagoria' (AP, 14). 
The demolition and rebuilding of large sections of Paris by Baron Haussmann involved 
the construction of new national monuments that laid claim to the supremacy of the 
French empire under Napoleon 111. To illustrate this point Benjamin turns to D. 
Laverdant who in 1845 wrote: 'What fate does the present movement of society have in 
store for architecture? Let us look around us... ' 'Ever more monuments, ever more 
palaces. On all sides rise up great stone blocks, and everything tends toward the solid, the 
heavy, the vulgar' (AP, E8a, 2). 98 In the introduction to the Arcades BenJamin suggests 
that this illusion of coherence, authority and permanence is simply another (spatial) 
phantasmagoria, the 'phantasmagoria of civilization itself where 'the pomp and the 
splendour with which commodity-producing society surrounds itself, as well as the 
illusory sense of security, are not immune to dangers' (AP, 14-15). In placing the 
phantasmagoria of permanence and authority next to the short lived phantasmagorias of 
entertainment and shopping, Benjamin takes the perceptual immediacy of the 
phantasmagoric event as an (illuminating) critical tool. In other words, Benjamin places 
the political and cultural investment in architectural representations of power and control 
in the context of the more immediate and ephemeral character of other cultural 
forms 
97 What I have referred to as the 'synchronic relation of phantasmagoric space' is intended to 
describe the 
relation between the events, experiences and urban 
forms that Benjamin juxtaposes. In short, the relation 
between competing modes of spatial illusion. 
98 D. Laverdant, de la mission de Vart et A role des artistes: Salon de 1845 (Paris 1845), from the offices 
of La Phalange, pp. 13-15. 
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(Arcades, International Exhibitions, New Modes of lighting, etc. ). Consequently, the 
spectacular conjurations and projections of phantasmagoria reveal the ideological 
mechanism at work in urban space as a whole. Benjamin here turns to J. J. Honegger who 
in 1874 writes: 'Haussmann's urban works are a wholly appropriate representation of the 
absolute governing principles of Empire: repression of every individual formation, every 
organic self-development, fundamental hatred of all individuality' (AP, Ela, 1). 99 This 
critical relation of phantasmic illusions moves beyond the old division between essence 
and appearance. Benjamin demonstrates how space becomes a matrix for turbulent and 
critical exchanges between the illusion of historical and political fixity and the 
phantasmagoric spaces of consumer culture. 
As Michael Jennings has recently argued, Benjamin's phantasmagoria is 'progressive not 
as analysis or revelation but as a device that condenses and exacerbates central, if hidden, 
features of time as sameness and repetition. "Oo In this way, the concern is 
, 
not only with 
the diachronic 'awakening' (involved in historical displacement) but with what is 
revealed through a critical relation of differentiated modes of illusion. No longer are we 
orientated through a series of binary oppositions; through the Arcades we find ourselves 
caught within a repetition of synchronic interferences. 
Soon after the section on Haussmannisation (E) Benjamin moves to Exhibitions, 
Advertising and Grandville (G). It is at this point in the Arcades that Benjamin turns 
directly to Marx's theory of commodity fetishism to argue that extravagant displays of 
industry erases the traces left by human labour to re-appear in a phantasmagoric fon-n. If 
Haussmann's phantasmagoria of urban design reflects coherence, social regeneration and 
stasis as a means to conceal the social unrest that Benjamin evidences throughout the 
Arcades, then the phantasmagoria of the world trade fairs project an image of 
99 JI Honegger, Grundsteine einer allgemeinen Kulturgeschichte der neuesten Zeit, vol. 5 (Leipzig, 1874), 
p. 326. 
100 Michael Jennings connects Benjamin's returning phantasmagorias with Nietzsche's notion of 'eternal 
return' to argue that: 'These phantasmagorias are the product of crisis but have the unusual ability to 
identify and intensify that crisis itself, Michael Jennings, 'On the Banks of a New Lethe: Commodification 
and Experience in Benjamin's Baudelaire Book', see, 'boundary 2, an international journal of literature 
and culture, (Vol. 30, number 1, Spring 2003), Benjamin Now: Critical Encounters with The Arcades 
Project, Kevin Mclaughlin and Philip Rosen (eds), p. 103. 
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technological progress and cultural development that, like the arcades before them, 
eclipse the alienation of the individual worker. As Benjamin puts it, 'We can speak of 
fetishistic autonomy not only with regard to the commodity but also ... with regard to the 
means of production'... 'Instead of being consumed by him as material elements of 
productive activity, they consume him as the ferment necessary to their own life process' 
(AP Gl2a, 3). 
Throughout Convolute G the phantasmagoria of the world trade fair is shown alongside 
numerous and lengthy citations from Marx. But this engagement with Marx's theory of 
fetishism seems only to clarify the way Benjamin comes to think the illusions of capital 
differently. Benjamin cites a broad range of responses to the world trade fair including 
A. S. de Doncourt's account from 1867: 
Whoever visited the Champ de Mars for the first time got a singular impression. Arriving 
by the central avenues, he saw at first... only iron and smoke... This initial impression 
exerted such an influence on the visitor that, ignoring the tempting diversions offered by 
the arcade, he would hasten towards the movement and noise that attracted him. At every 
point... where the machines were momentarily still, he could hear the strains of steam- 
powered organs and the symphonies of brass instruments. A. S. de Doncourt, Les 
Expositions Universelles (Lille and Paris, 1889). (AP, G7a, 5) 
The phantasmagorias of the trade fairs are central to the synchronic relation of 
phantasmagoric space. In the above citation we see how these spatial relations involve a 
series of competing forms (in which the arcades loses out to the new 'symphonies' of the 
trade fair). This cycle of spectacular forms is precisely how Benjamin constructs the 
whole of his project. Benjamin's parade of monotonous forms and events is a type of 
eternal return, 101 which appear to him 'as an image flashing up in the now of its 
recognizability' (AP, N9,7) emerges suddenly as a dialectical mode of awakening. 
101 In The Arcades Project Benjamin devotes a convolute to the notion of eternal return - D, Boredom, 
Eternal Return - in which he evidences to sameness and repetition of industrial capitalism as a counter- 
image to the 'myth of progress'. 
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Samuel Webber also highlights Benjamin's use of 'synchronicity' in the Arcades when 
he writes: 
Such synchronicity is constituted as much by separation as by convergence. It is precisely 
this simultaneity, involving both proximity and distance that is the condition of any 
possible 'knowledge' of images, their 'knowability. ' Such 'knowability' is situated not in 
the interval between two fixed points, for instance between the past shedding light on the 
present, or the present shedding light on the past, but rather in a different sort of space: 
that of a convergence which does not result in simple identity. 'O' 
Benjamin's synchronicity is, as Weber points out, not to do with creating synthesis 
between the past and the present in which a single identity is determined, but rather a 
'disjunctive bringing together and keeping apart. ' 103 This is what connects the synchronic 
to the phantasmic in Benjamin's Arcades. Like the phantasmic show, the relation 
between events is not intended to determine meaning to a singularity - inside/outside, 
reality/appearance - but instead employed as point of convergence which is both temporal 
and spatial. 
At first sight, Benjamin's concern with documenting these spaces of fantasy and 
intoxication seems at odds with the possibility of any critical engagement. As Adorno 
puts it in one of his many responses to the Arcades: 'Our task is to polarise and dissolve 
this (false) consciousness dialectically in terms of society and singular subjects, not to 
galvanize it as a imagistic correlative of the commodity character. " 04 The theoretical 
ambiguity that Benjamin attaches to the cultural forms of nineteenth-century capitalism 
is, however, expressed through his investment in the critical potential of phantasmagoria. 
102 Samuel Weber, 'Streets, Squares, Theatres: A City on The Move, Walter Benjamin's Paris', see, 
boundary 2 (Vol. 30, number 1, Spring 2003), Benjamin Now. - Critical Encounters with The Arcades 
Project, p. 20. 
103 boundary 2 (Vol. 30, number 1, Spring 2003), Benjamin Now: Critical Encounters with The Arcades 
Project, p, 2 1. 
104 From a letter sent to Benjamin from Adorno and Grestel Karplus (02.07.1935), taken from, Theodor W 
Adorno and Walter Benjamin: The Complete Correspondence 1928-1940, Henri Lonitz (ed. ), Nicholas 
Walker (trans), Cambridge: Polity Press: 1999, p. 107. 
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This series of illusions work as 'interferences. ' 105 That is, in their synchronic relation 
they work as points of disruption that are taken by Benjamin to make us conscious of the 
otherwise hidden mechanism and structures that are at work within urban space. The 
critical value of Benjamin's investment in phantasmagoria can also be seen in the 
challenge it makes to the way illusion is thought by Marx, a development which further 
supports the, critical potential of space and illusion. 
Figuring Illusion 
As we have seen, Benjamin's interest in demystifying the ideological transpositions of 
nineteenth-century Paris does not attempt to 'abolish' all illusion. Where Marx uses 
phantasmagoria to represent the ghostly form of the dancing commodity, Benjamin's 
analysis of historical experience takes the working mechanism of the phantasmagoric 
show as an important methodological tool. This shift from thinking within the limits of 
the camera obscura - where the real world exists as an inverted image projected through 
a lens into a dark chamber - to phantasmagoria - where the projected image is itself a 
painted representation and therefore disassociated from any 'origin' - not only signals the 
conceptual distance between Marx and Benjamin but goes to establish a more complex 
and ambiguous approach to thinking illusion. In contrast to the rational materialism of 
Marx's enquiry into commodity fetishism, Benjamin looks to new technological and 
cultural developments as differentiated modes of spatial illusion. 
In Profane Illuminations, Margaret Cohen argues that Benjamin's 'reawakening' of 
phantasmagoria Erom the pages of Capital involves a new understanding of the term. The 
rise in importance of the phantasmagoria in the Arcades not only illustrates Benjamin's 
move away from the language of 'the dream' but demonstrates a new figuring of the 
ideological. 
105 The term interferences is used by Michael Jennings to argue that: 'The paradoxical hope of overcoming 
delusion, however intermittently, of attaining to a form of experience that might enable the recognition of 
truth, might reside precisely in those interferences - in Benjamin's progressive phantasmagorias. ' 
On the 
Banks of a New Lethe: Commodification and Experience in Benjamin's Baudelaire Book, see, 'boundary 
2 
(Vol. 30, number 1, Spring 2003), Benjamin Now: Critical Encounters with The Arcades Project, p. 104. 
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The technology of Robertson's phantasmagoria modifies the Renaissance technology of 
the camera obscura in a fashion aptly expressing Benjamin's challenge to the way in 
which 'historical vulgar naturalism' understands ideological representation. While, like 
the 'historical vulgar naturalism', the camera obscura mechanically reverses the world 
out there in the darkened chamber of thought, the magic lantern of the phantasmagoria 
inverts painted slides that are themselves artistic products (PI, 140). 
In other words, Benjamin updates Marx's figuration of an inverting camera obscura to 
the phantasmagoric shows of the early nineteenth century. Instead of a fetishistic 
inversion, we see the reproduction of other modes of illusion. Benjamin's move away 
from Marx is expressed through the critical potential of phantasmagoria. As Cohen puts 
it; 'the fire kindled in the phantoscope (of the phantasmagoric show) transforms the 
unfiltered natural light of rational understanding into an energy somewhere between 
nature and art' (PI, 256). This new figuring of illusion is central to Benjamin's dialectical 
representation of nineteenth-century subjectivity. Instead of the rational oppositions that 
we have seen to dominate how space and social activity are thought, we find, with 
Benjamin's analysis of the arcades, both a generative and critical understanding of 
capitalist space. 
This shift in thinking is further supported by Derrida's account of Marx's theory of 
commodity fetishism. In Specters of Marx, Derrida argues that although Marx develops a 
theory of absence, we are asked to think of presence in relation to the absent body of the 
commodity. The use value of the commodity is the authentic form, a form that relates 
directly to the essence of man, that is, a value that reflects our 'being' in the world. This 
essential form is affirming and empowering, it connects us to the world of nature and at 
the same time determines how we are social beings that produce and develop our own 
reality. However, as Derrida points out, the pure form of 'use value' is also a fiction, 
there is no removing the corrupting value of exchange: 'use value becomes a pure origin 
to which no object should ever correspond, an origin that is fictive or ideal, use value is 
inhabited by its other' (SOM, 160). The simple opposition of absence with presence, 
reality and appearance is no longer an adequate logic with which to critique new forms of 
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capital. Instead, we must think 'two times at the same time' (SoM, 163). With Marx, the 
relation between surplus and use remains with the figuration of the camera obscura. The 
apparition of exchange is the moment of inversion, but this is an inversion that remains 
tied to a point of origin, the essence of the real object that exists elsewhere. The table 
may have a phantasmagoric quality to its animated and anthropomorphised projection but 
we find that our point of orientation lies outside of the illusion with the metaphysical 
concept of a plain, naturalised and purified use value. The limit of this concept is equally 
the limitation of the camera obscura that, in distorting and inverting the real original, 
determines a world that cannot exist, or more precisely, a world that only exists as a 
concept (metaphysics). 
Marx's wooden table is chosen on the grounds of its inanimate and everyday character. It 
is positioned on stage and transformed into a distorted and anthropomorphised figuration. 
In contrast, Benjamin's magic show does not offer the same surprise, the urban 
phantasmagorias have already been animated and we are already familiar with their 
phantasmagoric movements. Through the Arcade we see the old painted slide blown up 
and re-animated. Benjamin supplies image after image so that we can see them exist as a 
series of transformations. The paraphernalia of Robertson's illusionistic show is matched 
by Benjamin's 'physiognomic reading, facticity and concreteness, and imagistic 
historiography. ' 106 The phantasmagoria is not alchemy, we do not see concrete reality 
transformed into the 'supra-sensible or social'. Benjamin's show is instead quite boring 
and non-eventful, the transfiguration is slow and methodical. It is also very long. After 
plodding a while, we come to realise that the action is taking place in slow motion. At 
this sobering speed we see the way one representation comes to replace another, or rather, 
the way one cultural form out-performs another to momentarily steal the show. This way, 
Benjamin reveals the mechanism and movement of urban, cultural and economic 
phantasmagorias over time, over a long time. Benjamin takes all the fun out of the show 
by identifying its existence everywhere; the phantasmagoria does not mediate reality, it 
106 Myth and MetroPolis: Walter Benjamin and the City, p. 10 1. 
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simply ignores reality and embarks on its own cycle of projected representations and, in 
so doing, gains control of its own limits. 
In forefronting phantasmagoria as a new analytical tool, Benjamin identifies the need for 
a new logic. To some extent Benjamin does in the Arcades what Derrida has asked of 
Marx, 'far from effacing differences and analytic determinations, this other logic calls for 
other concepts. One may hope it will allow for a more defined and more rigorous 
restructuration' (SoM. 163). Although Benjamin's interest in phantasmagoria is closely 
related to a reading of Marx, or perhaps more specifically, Adorno's interpretation of 
Marx's Phantasmagorische, Benjamin gives the site of illusion a more open and what I 
would argue to be a more progressive reading. The projection of a painted image through 
the lens of a magic lantern performs as an updated figuration of industrial capitalism. No 
longer is it a distorted reflection of real relations but the experience of a world that is 
already the product of phantasmagoric representations. 
Living Relations Between the Dead 
With both Marx and Benjamin we are to think of the illusions of capital as living 
relations between the dead. If Marx animates, automatises and anthropomorphises the 
commodity-form, Benjamin does the same, only in this case we encounter these illusions 
in the 'dead' spaces of industrial capitalism. As we have seen, Benjamin looks back at the 
ruins of urban forms (the arcades) and attempts to restore their phantasmagoric appeal. In 
both instances the site of illusion is central to understanding how we see, experience and 
understand the world around us, or more specifically, is key to comprehending how our 
consciousness of the world is both false and misleading. 
The important shift that we have seen to take place in this expanded field of illusion 
involves a certain reconciliation. That is, in the work of Benjamin we are not subject to 
the same redemptive drive I have argued to characterise Marx's thought. Instead, the 
phantasmic illusions of the ideological are inescapable from any notion of material 
reality. Examining them out of their time is Benjamin's way of bringing them to light 
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(this way they occupy the space of dead ruins and loose their mesmerising and fetishistic 
hold to become a dialectical image that is 'awakening'). 
Benjamin's re-conceptualisation also takes the site of illusion to be somehow 
illuminating. The paradox of this position becomes most evident in relation to Plato's 
thinking. That is, if Benjamin was to argue with Plato he might suggest a different 
interpretation of the stick seen in water. For Benjamin, the stick will always, in some 
way, be bent. Moreover, in this distorted form - and alongside all the other objects seen 
through water - we encounter some truth. This move away from the rational logic of 
Platonic thought, this critical engagement with contradiction (that is to be understood 
rather than eradicated) is also what we have seen to distinguish Benjamin from Marx. 
More importantly, we can take Benjamin's shift in approach as a means to return to Plato 
with a new logic. Here we find that the sun is paradoxically analogous with illusion. The 
dazzling phantasmic light is, however, too dangerous to consider unmediated. In the 
Arcades we are perceived as too weak to gaze at the illusions of capital in the present; 
instead, we explore the 'afterimage' and, like the phantasmic projections of ghosts, we 
observe the sobering glow of dead remains. 
With Benjamin, the privileged moment of pure origin is challenged by the synchronic 
relation of phantasmic space. In the Arcades the living dead do not start off as pure forms 
but emerge through the lens of the phantoscope. Moreover, there is not only one mode of 
illusion, there are a whole series of competing phantasmagorias which, in their 
synchronicity, go some way to revealing the hidden forces that determine subjectivity. 
The problem, however, is that in the Arcades we remain as a privileged observer looking 
down on the conditions of subjectivity only through the window of history. 
The problem that remains concerns the status of illusion in the present. Living relations 
between the dead are no longer a useful figuration for grasping the meaning and status of 
illusion in contemporary experience. With this paradoxical half-life emerges the fear and 
suspicion that remains attached to the way immaterial phenomena are both thought and 
experienced. Just as George A. Romero has shown in his film, Dawn -of the Dead, the 
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shopping mall is where the zombies stagger up and down escalators, stare with dulled 
fascination at department store dummies wearing fur caps and try to eat perfume bottles. 
It is not, however, only a question of the living relations between dead objects. As we 
have seen, the fetishism and phantasmagoria that figures market relations also transforms 
the consumer into one of the same walking dead. It is precisely this fear of becoming 
possessed that determines how illusion is thought. 
Romero illustrates this problem clearly when he shows the movie's four protagonists 
looking down from the rooftop skylights into the shopping mall. While watching the 
zombies walking around the store, the female reporter asks, 'Why do they come here', 
the paratrooper replies: 'it is the place that they know, it is where they have gathered 
before'. Throughout Romero's film, we are reminded that the zombies might very well 
reflect the way we conduct our lives and we are forced to ask ourselves if the living 
heroes are any more alive than the half dead creatures that are driven by the sole need to 
consume (human flesh). 
In documenting the phantasmagoria of nineteenth-century industrial capitalism Benjamin 
intends to show us in a dream state so that we might then wake from the illusions that 
hold us captive. Put differently, Benjamin turns the site of illusion onto itself to produce a 
sobering image of intoxication. Although Benjamin's re-conceptualisation of 
phantasmagoria has been awarded a critical dimension, with his analysis we remain 
deeply suspicious of phantasmagoric space. Turning to the present, we anxiously ask 
ourselves if we too are zombies. Benjamin, like Debord, Lefebvre and Jameson after him, 
rely on the existence of a world outside the dream (or 'world beyond the nightmare' as it 
is often referred to). Yet it is precisely this assumed ground - the world 'beyond the 
illusion' - that negates any meaningful analysis of the forces in play. Not only does this 
analysis lay claim to the 'natural', the 'authentic' and the 'real', this line of enquiry 
generates anxiety and suspicion around the spaces that we inhabit. 
In the following chapter I will consider the difficulties and problems of applying Marx's 
critique of the commodity to a reading of contemporary social space. As we have seen 
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with Benjamin, Marx's figuring of the exchange of commodities as living relations 
between the dead (die Phan tasmagorische) continues to determine how the constructions 
and affects of contemporary social space are theorised and represented. In order to test 
out both the value and limitations of Marx's critique, I will turn to spaces of retail, leisure 
and entertaimnent. With empirical data drawn from this research I will ask if the principle 
of the commodity, as Marx understood it, remains a useful tool for comprehending the 
economic, political and social mutations of capitalist space. 
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Paris Arcades 
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4.1 - Passage Choiseul, Paris, late nineteenth-century. 
4.2 - Passage Choiseul, Paris. 
Phantasmagoria 
in an old Capucine Chapel, Paris, 1797 
5.2 - Often the projector was behind a translucent screen, out of the view 
of the audience. This greatly added to the mystery of the show. 
5.3 - Robertson used a special latern on wheels, 
which he called a Phantascope or Fantascope. 
By moving the projector backwards and forwards the 
operator could rapidly alter the size of the images 
on the screen. The device was designed to keep the 
picture in focus and at a constant brightness as the 
machine moved back and forth. 
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5.1 - Etienne-Gaspard Robertson's Phantasmagoria in a disused cloister 
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I 
Dawn of the Dead, 1978 
7.1 - Dawn of the Dead, dir. George Romero. The zombies walking through the shopping 
Mall. 
living. 
109 
7.2 - The view from the lift as the zombies attack the 
Placemaking 
Chapter 3 
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Experiential Placemaking 
While the relationship between the commodity and its surrounding context remains a 
useful and necessary vehicle for exploring the complex and differentiated status of 
illusion in social space, 107 my analysis of space does not follow the well-known theories 
which seek to separate and protect culture from the ongoing mutations of global capital. 
That is, the development of Marx's dialectical materialism in architectural and cultural 
theory often focuses on the sublimation and the consequent alienation and estrangement 
of the individual subject living under the forces of late capitalism. Examples include the 
work of Guy Debord, Henri Lefebvre and Fredric Jameson. It is my intention to look 
beyond the materialist position to consider the possibility of critical activity within the 
site of both illusion and capital. My engagement with the spaces of retail, leisure and 
entertainment is based on the belief that the inscription - of commodity onto space - does 
not constitute a passive commoditisation of both space and the individuals within it. That 
is, instead of the zombie condemned to a half-life of mindless consumption, I will argue 
that the contemporary spaces of retail and leisure provide a critical insight into the global 
economic systems that govern our lives. 
Through this chapter I will focus on the relation between 'experiential placemaking' in 
urban design'08 and the 'experience economy'. 109 Following Benjamin's synchronic 
relation of phantasmagoric space, I will consider how today's spaces of retail also 
107 The notion that retail space is now the dominant site of social activity is taken up in a number of 
publications. The Harvard Design School: Guide to Shopping offers a comprehensive study of the 
development and social status of retail space. In the introduction the editors write: 'Shopping is arguably 
the last remaining form of public activity. Through a battery of increasingly predatory forms, shopping has 
infiltrated, colonised, and even replaced, almost every aspect of urban life'. Chuihua Judy Chung, Jeffrey 
Inaba, Rem Koolhaas and Sze Tsung Leong, eds, Harvard Design School: Guide to Shopping, Koln: 
Benedickt Taschen, 2001, inside front cover. The (changing) relationship between social space and 
shopping is also the focus of the following publications: Rachael Bowlby, Carried Away: The Invention of 
Modern Shopping, London: Faber and Faber, 2000, Shopping: A Century of Art and Consumer Culture, 
Christoph Grunenberg and Max Hollein (eds), Ostfilden-Ruit, Germany: Hatje Cantz Publishers, 2002. 
108 Jon Jerde International define their approach to 'experiential design' as spaces that 'engage the human 
spirit' (JPIW, 4). They continue: 'What we've been able to figure out is that place, and its persona, have the 
ability to trigger aesthetic emotion, and that when you create moments and vignettes, and string them 
together on a physical time line you have an opportunity to give the human being experiences and 
opportunities that are unique, even extraordinary. '(JPIW, 3). 
109 Joseph Pine and James H. Gilmore, The Experience Economy: Work is Theatre and Every Business is a 
Stage, Massachusetts: Harvard Business School Press, 1999. 
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encompass the mutations, coexistences and temporalities of the global market. However, 
in contrast to Benjamin, I will be considering these spatialities as they exist in the 
present. That is, instead of the 'objective dialectics', which remain outside the spaces in 
question, I will be looking from within. I will be questioning the notion that social space 
is determined through a single trajectory that is reducible to an overarching theory of 
mass commoditisation. To do this I will return to Marx's theorisation of the commodity 
while, at the same time, exploring the differentiations, coexistences and temporalities that 
exist in the spectacular and disorientating constructions of contemporary space. While the 
relation between space and illusion remains strongly connected to the phantasmagoric 
movement of the commodity, I will take the turbulent and generative relation between 
differentiated modes of illusion to challenge what might otherwise appear to be a 
'logical' or 'natural' flow between space and commodity. 
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Commodity, Space, Automation 
It (the table) emancipates itself on its own initiative: all alone, autonomous and 
automation, its fantastic silhouette moves on its own, free and without attachment. It goes 
into trances, it levitates, it appears relieved of its body, like all ghosts, a little mad and 
unsettled as well, upset, 'out of joint', delirious, capricious, and unpredictable. It appears 
to put itself spontaneously into motion, but it also puts others into motion, yes, it puts 
everything around it into motion, as though pour encourager les autres (to encourage the 
others). (SoM, 153) 
Like the commodities that are placed in it, the space of retail is now designed to hold a 
value that is independent of the traditional architectural principles of form and function. 
This addition is not simply an extended or excessive notion of architectural fon-n; the 
phantasmagoric instead involves the morphological experiences of spectacle and 
disorientation. As Elizabeth Grosz points out, 'Space is not simply an ether, a medium 
through which other forces, like gravity, produce their effects: it is inscribed by and in its 
turn inscribes those objects and activities placed within it. '110 The generative movement 
between space, objects and activities inscribes both architectural space and the 
individuals within it. The fantasy and autonomy of the commodity has inscribed the space 
that surrounds it and in turn, has lent the activity of shopping a new dimension. 
Like the commodity on display, retail space embodies a surplus to its material reality of 
use and function. This 'extra', as has already been suggested, relies on spectacle and 
disorientation to bring fantasy and entertainment to the activity of shopping. Automation 
is crucial to these immaterial and morphological additions, providing a physical and 
perceptual mobility that goes to support and intensify the consumer's fantasy of a living 
mode of architecture. It is in this sense that space appears to posses a 'human spirit'. 
In the case of Rem Koolhaas's Prada store (575 Broadway, NYC), the commodities on 
sale have lent the intenor a new level of automation. Concealed within the moving walls 
110 Elizabeth Grosz, Architecture from the Outside, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2002, p. 163 
113 
of the interior, the clothes and accessories are hidden in the fabric of the building. In 
order to see the main collection, the shopper must step down through the large empty 
space in the centre of the building. At the bottom of the stairs are two small entrances. In 
these cavernous rooms the clothes and accessories are displayed on large mobile units. 
Not only are the commodities placed out of view but the display units, which are built on 
metal tracks, ensure that the spatial dimensions of the store can be easily reconfigured. In 
the changing rooms the fixed materiality of the walls are again subject to a complex 
reconfiguration of spatial dimensions. In addition to the familiar changing room mirrors, 
Koolhaas has inset a video monitor into the reflective glass. With this new perspective 
the consumer can see him/herself from the front and the back simultaneously. The 
continuous movement between mirror image and video image automates both the interior 
of the changing rooms and the self-image of the shopper, which is fractured into a series 
of competing reflections-"' The added movement within the space increases the state of 
animation of the commodity and in so doing, adds to the surplus value of the goods on 
display. 
The process of becoming automated is always an addition to the materialist notion of use 
and labour. The market brings a value to the commodity that is independent of its 
material value, surplus value. This immaterial extra is what Marx suggests brings the 
commodity to life so that it can dance with other commodities in the market. In 
Koolhaas's Prada Store a new level of automation develops what Marx had located 
within the commodity's relation to the market at large, and perhaps more importantly, 
works to materialize what Marx described in Capital as the commodity's 'metaphysical 
subtleties and theological niceties' (C, 163). However, with this inscription there is also 
difference. While new spaces of retail are irreducibly tied to the commodity we find the 
relation to involve a displacement of some of the older laws that govern the way space is 
111 Dan Graham has repeatedly accused Koolhaas of stealing this design concept from his 1974 installation 
Present Continuous Past(s) - most notably in a lecture delivered by Graham at the Bartlett School of 
Architecture in 2002. The relationship is interesting as Graham's installation sets out to explore the affect 
of temporal space displaced into differentiated moments of lived experience. In her essay, 'Vision in 
Process', Bridgit Pelzer writes of Graham's Present Continuous Past(s) that 'by providing a glimpse of the 
subject's multiple incarnations, these installations materialise the space of mistaken identity 
(meconnaissance) that structures subjectivity. In other words, they describe our inevitable lie, since the 
place where we see ourselves is never that from which we see', October 10,1979, pp. 105-121. 
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experienced. 
With its flight into the world of exchange Marx explains how an inanimate wooden table 
becomes a commodity, not simply an object of use but an object that stands up and 
addresses the consumer. With Marx's analysis in mind, it might be suggested that the 
automated body of the commodity has come to inscribe the retail space that surrounds it 
and that, in its turn, retail space has re-inscribed the commodity to lend it a new level of 
movement and fascination. The automation of space is in this way a clear indication of 
the phantasmagorization of space - the process by which the fixed body of a store's 
architecture mutates into a temporal condition of movement and flux. The relation 
between the automated object (the commodity) and the automization of retail space is one 
that is always responding to the changing needs of the market. Just as the value of a 
commodity is determined in relation to other commodities, the (surplus) value of built 
space is determined by external market forces. However, the movement that is generated 
through these immaterial relations also emerges from within; the commodity not only 
puts itself into motion but, as Derrida points out, 'it puts everything around it into 
motion' (SoM, 153). 
The importance of this inscription exists in relation to a critical questioning of the old 
division between the fixed and the temporal, between the 'architectural laws' that 
governed the outside structure of a building and the more temporal 'designs' that filled 
the inside. In other words, the immaterial surplus that has come to attach itself to retail 
architecture forces a questioning of the traditional and conservative principles which look 
to permanence and fixity as the overriding ambition for built space. Retail space is no 
longer simply required to act as a shelter or box in which the theatre of shopping can take 
place. The automation of this mode of 'architecture' makes new demands on the 
formulation of the outside structure that has previously seen itself as immune to the 
experiential placemaking of retail space. The relation between the phantasmagoric 
commodity and the space that surrounds it has not only come to describe the 'hidden 
secrets" involved in exchange, but also the invisible movements between object and space 
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have made new demands on the way retail space is thought and experienced. 
Selfridges: London and Birmingham 
The relation between Selfridges Department Store (Oxford Street, London) and the more 
recent Selfridges, in Birmingham serves as an indication of the changing nature of retail 
space at large. Most notably, the new approach to the exterior design of Selfridges 
(Birmingham) reflects an important shift in the way the phantasmagoric space of retail is 
no longer restricted to the theatre of the interior. 
Selfridges Department Store (London), which opened in 1909, was the first major retail 
outlet to merge fantasy with shopping in Britain. With the longest commercial neo- 
classical fagade ever built, plunging atriums, a roof garden, nine passenger lifts, a library 
and silence room, a first aid ward, a ticket booking office, a bank and the potential for 
eight floors of retail space, Selfridges (London) has always been an image of spatial 
excess. However, unlike the new Selfridges, the outside of the building remains fixed as a 
traditional box which, despite the constant changes to the interior, has been left 
untouched. The traditional distinction between inside and outside both intensifies the 
affect of retail space and defines some boundary between the realities of the city and the 
fantasy of the department store. 
The experience of entering the London Selfridges reflects the chaotic nature of the city 
outside. The space is open plan so that a range of commodities are all seen at once. The 
chaotic array of goods makes the journey between different types of product and brands 
almost imperceptible. As Neil Cummings and Marysia Lewandowska suggest, the spatial 
uncertainty that takes hold of the shopper is consciously monitored by the stores 
management and design teams: 
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At times, the interior of the department store creates the impression of a casual confusion 
of things. But it is merely an illusion, masking the powerful application of the results of 
exhaustive retail analysis, coupled with the recommendations of extensive consumer 
research. Nothing is left to chance, every item, image, sign, display fixture, and the 
position of every service desk, point of sale and walkway is tested, and its effects on sales 
calculated. ' 12 
The 'illusion' of a chaotic abundance of things is further intensified by bright theatrical 
lighting (often with mock stage lights for extra effect) and a broad range of different 
sound tracks (depending on the location). In addition, the space is hung with plasma 
screens, providing the shopper with a stream of information about the store. The 
escalators that rise and cross through the centre of the store also intensify the effect of 
energy, movement and disorientation, ferrying people through the space and creating a 
visual spectacle of mechanised movement. This excess is carefully manufactured not only 
to bring the commodities to life, but also to animate the space itself. The spatial 
confusion encourages the visitor to browse through the commodities on sale by 
stimulating the senses with visual and sonic strategies. In addition, the internal design of 
the store guides the shopper through a carefully thought-out series of sensory 
experiences. However, this range of temporal experiences - that are generated through the 
design and careful regulation of the space - remains in opposition to the traditional and 
unchanging architecture of the exterior. 
In the new Selfridges building in Birmingham, the architects (Future Systems) have 
extended the logic of an automated interior to the outside surface of the building. The 
curved exterior is covered with 15,000 spun aluminum disks. This highly reflective 
surface responds to the light of the sun and appears to move with each change in the 
weather. Unlike the heavy and unchanging facades of most shopping centers, Future 
Systems have designed a curved and reflective concrete wall. The irony is that 
112 Neil Cummings and Marysia Lewandowska, The Value of Things, London & Basel: August/Birkhauser: 
2000, p. 130. 
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movement, lightness and reflection are created from a solid and windowless elevation. In 
other words, the fixed and the permanent also speak of the temporal realities of shopping, 
fashion and design. This outward expression of change is a site of contradiction. Like the 
commodity, we experience the immaterial or external effects as the key features of the 
building, which becomes automated as a consequence of the changes in light that take 
place around it. 
As Marx points out in Capital, it is in the market that the commodity becomes automated; 
it is in relation to other commodities that he understands the inanimate to become 
animated. The immaterial surplus that is attached to the commodity is a temporal 
reflection of the market and, as with the reflective disks on the outer surface of Selfridges 
(Birmingham) consumers become dazzled by the spectacle of the phantasmagoric 
surplus. As we have seen, the reflected light of this surface skin is a contradiction, for 
while we know that the thick concrete walls could never move, on their surface we see 
the changing light of the sky. At this moment the form of the building can no longer be 
determined because it is also something else, something more than the sum of its parts, 
appearing as something other than itself 
.r 
The contradiction of this immaterial surplus returns us to a Platonic question: that is, the 
issue of the relation between the 'reality' and 'appearance', the question of territories and 
distinctions. Plato asks what is reality and what is appearance, what territories do they 
inhabit and how are they distinct? If we are to gain some insight into the morphological 
continuum of contemporary subjectivity we must begin to think differently. The 
Platonic 
distinctions that have moulded an image of 'the real' bear no relation to the complexities 
of social space. That is, the self-transformative and contradictory motion of retail space 
bears no relation to a fixed or determining structure. As we have already observed, there 
is no perceivable division between appearance and reality. The phantasmagoric space of 
experiential placemaking instead demonstrates the movement and coexistence of a 
divergent range of spatialities that now inscribes what has traditionally been 
designated 
as the site of the real (the outside). 
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The relationship between Selfridges Department Store (London) and its more recent 
relation suggests that the automated and phantasmagoric space of retail architecture has 
moved beyond the old distinctions of inside/outside, fantasy/reality. Instead we find that 
spatial coexistences and temporalities exist both inside and outside. What has been 
thought of in isolation (the outside or fixed structure of a building) is now thought 
differently, not as a division between architecture and design or permanence and fashion, 
but as a totality, able to speak of movement and change and to express the complexity of 
urban space. This phantasmagoric surplus not only externalises the temporalities and 
coexistences of the space within, the outer movement also 'exposes' the inscription (of 
commodity onto space) to involve a number of differentiated systems. 
Re-inscription 
In The Society of the Spectacle, Guy Debord develops Marx's theory of commodity 
fetishism into a critique of new modes of media, mass communication and consumer 
space. He writes: 
Here we have the principle of commodity fetishism, the domination of society by those 
whose qualities are 'at the same time perceptible and imperceptible by the senses. ' The 
principle is absolutely fulfilled in the spectacle, where the perceptible world is replaced 
by a set of images that are superior to the world yet at the same time impose themselves 
as eminently perceptible. (S, 26) 
In conceptualising social space into a fetishistic spectacle, Debord reduces differentiated 
and critical spatialities to the status of commodity. Consequently Debord returns us to the 
question of how the contemporary subject might make any claim to the real (within 
cultural or social space) when the broad and differentiated instances of social space are 
repeatedly theorised as the site of falsehood. 
As I have already argued, the commodity inscribes space and 'sets everything around it 
into motion, ' but this process of automation should not return us to a relation that is 
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oppositional. That is, the commodity does not simply reproduce itself as an equivalent 
spatial form nor does it dictate the movements of the space around it from a position that 
is unchanging. In contrast to Guy Debord's argument that the spectacle of mass 
communication and entertaim-nent is 'defined by the principle of the commodity' (S, 25); 
social space is actively produced by the relations between physical, experiential and 
imagined spatialities. Debord's assertion that 'the spectacle corresponds to the historical 
moment at which the commodity completes its colonisation of social life' (S, 29), 
overlooks the (re)inscription of the commodity by social space. Moreover, Debord's view 
that 'in the spectacle the totality of the commodity world is visible in one piece' (S, 33), 
fails to acknowledge the differentiated modes of illusion that have come to generate a 
new relation. This theory of an overarching spectacle that 'negates life' with new 
technologies of mass entertainment and communication - 'All goods proposed by the 
spectacular system, from cars to televisions, also serve as a weapon for that system as it 
strives to reinforce the isolation of the lonely crowd' (S, 22) - overlooks the generative 
and critical interruptions and interferences that occupy social space. 
This problem is continued by Giorgio Agamben who takes Debord's analysis of the 
spectacle as a stable ground on which to assess the state of world politics. While 
Agamben is correct in linking Debord's concept of the spectacle to Marx's theory of the 
commodity fetishism, the assumption that Debord's analysis remains a stable foundation 
for thinking about contemporary space and global politics is deeply problematic: 
The 'becoming-image' (spectacle) of capital is nothing more than the commodity's last 
metamorphosis, in which exchange value has completely eclipsed use value and now 
achieves the status of absolute and irrespective sovereignty over life in its entirety after 
having falsified the entire social production. "' 
Agamben looks to the 'situation' of human action as the assertion of life over the 
spectacle and, in passing, discusses the 'positive possibility of the spectacle', 
114 but the 
113 Giorgio Agamben, Vincenzo Binetti and Cesare Casarino (trans), London: University of Minneapolis 
Press, 2000, p. 75. 
114 Means Without End: Notes on Politics. p. 82. 
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event of thinking beyond the all encompassing falsehood of the spectacle (which through 
the text remains set in opposition to 'life'), is never fully developed. Agamben's 
willingness to embrace the old rhetoric of 'exchange' over 'use value' and appearance 
over essence limits the critical potential of his project. Moreover, in thinking the spaces 
of political and social activity in opposition to life, Agamben once again calls up 
Romero's portrayal of the living dead. 
The relation between the commodity, space and the subject should instead be considered 
within a new structure. As we have seen, the spatial illusions involved in placemaking are 
not merely defined by the 'principle of the commodity'. Turning back to Derrida we find 
that any duplication serves as a displacement to what has been thought of as a central or 
6governing' origin. Derrida writes: 'The inscription is the written origin, traced and 
henceforth inscribed in a system, in a figure which no longer governs. " 15 While the 
commodity's inscription of space is already well established, the way that space returns 
with a different system of relations has not been fully acknowledged. In other words, 
while space is inscribed by the commodity, it is not governed by that same system. With 
the inscription of the commodity, space opens itself to a range of systems. That is, space 
and illusion involve a differentiated range of systems that are not reducible to a single 
origin. As we have seen, this play of illusory systems 'does not' engender a single line or 
logical flow. 
To reiterate, the relation between commodity and space is one of inscription - retail space 
is inscribed by the commodity- form: the commodity puts everything around it into 
motion. However, this process of inscription also opens itself up to other systems. While 
space resembles, duplicates and reflects the commodity, it also displaces it. That is, the 
commodity is no longer at the centre of exchange. Displaced by new spatial coexistences 
and temporalities, the commodity is both decentred and subject to difference; the relation 
is both one of sameness and one of difference. As Derrida argues in Of Grammatology, 
"' Jacques Derrida, Writing and Difference, Alan Bass (trans), London: Routledge, 1990, p. 115 
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the inscription is not a 'contingent accident', but that which 'produces the spatiality of 
space. 5116 
The ability of the economy to reinvent itself and absorb the mutations in culturalý social 
and ideological space certainly reflects the constant restructuring of capitalism. ' 17 Joseph 
Pine II and James Gilmore's account of the 'experience economy' describe the new 
relations that exist in social space and trace the mutation from 'mass produced object' to 
individual 'transformation'. Although this analysis of economy seeks to inspire 
maximum profitability from global business, the underlying argument provides clear 
evidence of how social space does not correspond to 'the principle of the commodity' 
and, perhaps more importantly, how the forces in play increasingly correspond to a 
complex relation of spatial illusions. 
Experience Economy 
The market value of new representational and highly constructed spatialities is already 
well known to the business community which has come to realize that 'experience' can 
be sold at a higher profit than mass produced goods. Pine and Gilmore argue that 
6experiences are a fourth economic offering, as distinct from services as services are from 
goods, but one that has until now gone largely unrecognised'. 1 18 The notion that the 
economy has come to produce 'experience' is of no great surprise; what is new about 
Pine and Gilmore's theory is the proposition that the production of differentiated 
experiences is quickly becoming the dominant mode of economic activity: 
The experiences that we have affect who we are, what we can accomplish, and where we 
are going, and we will increasingly ask companies to stage experiences that change us. 
Human beings have always sought out new and exciting experiences to leam and grow, 
develop and improve, mend and reform. But as the world progresses further into the 
experience economy, much that was previously obtained through non-economic activity 
"' Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, Gayatri Chakravoty Spivak (trans), Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1974, p. 290 
117 Luc Boltanski & Eve Chiapello, The New Spirit of Capitalism, Gregory Elliott (trans), London: Verso, 
2005. 
"' Joseph Pine and James H. Gilmore. The Experience Economy, 1999, p. 2 
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will increasingly be found in the domain of commerce. That represents a significant 
change. It means that what we once sought for free, we now pay for. 119 
The experience economy places a new emphasis on the possibilities and relations 
involved in space and illusion. No longer is space designed around the exchange of goods 
but it is constructed in a way that offers the consumer a continually updated series of 
experiences. As Pine and Gilmore point out: 'While commodities are fungible, goods 
tangible, and services intangible, experiences are memorable. Buyers of experiences 
value being engaged by what the company reveals over a duration of time. 1120 Although 
this production of experience moves beyond 'mere entertainment', there remains an 
important connection with the traditional fantasy zones of recreation and leisure. In 
contrast to the commodity - which automates its enviromnent through the inter-subjective 
affects of the market - the sale of experiences involves the physical construction of 
automated, spectacular and disorientating architectural forms. 
In light of these new developments we should now consider how the relation between the 
commodity and its surrounding context has changed. If, as Pine and Gilmore argue, the 
flow of the market is now conducted through 'staging' experience, we will need to re- 
assess the movement between object, space and activity. From this account of economy 
we can see how the mass produced commodity-form has been displaced by the spaces 
that surround it. The mutation of object into experience is not, as I have already argued, a 
logical progression of the commodity into space. With this new emphasis on 'staging' we 
find a wide range of competing systems in which the relation between object and space is 
substituted for a more immersive relation between different spatialities. 
Turning to Debord's assertion that contemporary space is 'defined by the principle of the 
commodity', we see that this critique does not allow for any meaningful analysis of the 
movements and developments in play. Put simply, social space is not reducible to an 
overarching theory of mass commoditisation. While the relation between commodity and 
space remains an important vehicle for understanding the mutations of both exchange and 
119 The Experience Economy, p. 163. 
120 The Experience Economy, p. 11 - 12. 
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our experience of exchange, we should be careful not to remain with the Marxian 
formulation that divides material use value and immaterial surplus value. Benjamin's 
engagement with the synchronic relation of phantasmic space continues to offer a more 
appropriate form of analysis, as it is the relation between differentiated modes of illusion 
that brings us closer to the turbulent and generative forces at work in social space. 
Although the nature, effects and economic imperatives of experiential placemaking have 
developed beyond the fantasy zones of entertainment space (Pine and Gilmore), there 
remains an important relation with the highly fabricated and experimental techniques of 
the theme park and the pleasure zone. These sites of fantasy act as a testing ground for 
urban regeneration (Jerde Partnership International), establish a wide range of 
experiential and spatial effects (Coney Island, Disneyland, Las Vegas) and, perhaps most 
importantly, forefront illusion as the key factor in architectural design. With the 
experience economy's emphasis on 'staging' social space we find that the older and more 
extreme modes of spatial illusion enter into the nonnative zones of work and business. 
With this blurring of activities I will consider the economic, social and ideological 
consequences of these spatial effects. 
Entertainment Space 
Contemporary urban space is increasingly subject to the experiential entertainments 
traditionally reserved for the theme park. The popularity of placemaking 
is evident 
through a wide range - of inner city lighting schemes, audiovisual 
displays, and 
experiential attractions. 121 While the addition of experiential effects 
in urban design is not 
reducible to entertainment space, sites that have long been 
dedicated to leisure and 
entertainment have come to function as an important testing ground 
for the construction 
of differentiated experiences. I will turn to key examples of entertainment space and 
consider a range of spatial effects. With the dissemination of 
highly constructed 
spatialities into urban design, I will be asking if the old 
divisions between; leisure and 
121 Glasgow: City of Light (2005) is one of a number of projects that has designed urban light 
displays to 
'ensure the City will become a dazzling journey of discovery'. (British Design. com. uk) 
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work, fiction and reality are increasingly challenged by a competing range of 
differentiated spatialities. 
The influence of entertaimnent space on urban design is clearly represented in the 
fantasyscape of New York City. In Delirious New York, Rem Koolhaas argues that the 
illuminated towers of Coney Island acted as a model for the design and infrastructure of 
Manhattan: 
It is no coincidence that the 'countless impressions of Coney Island' - products of a 
hopelessly obstinate desire to record and preserve a mirage - can all be substituted not 
only for each other but also for a flood of later descriptions of Manhattan. "' 
For Koolhaas, the theme park architecture of Coney Island functioned as an 'incubator' 
for the spatial designs and experiences that we now associate with the Manhattan skyline. 
Far from offering nature as a contrast to the busy metropolis, Coney Island responded to 
the influx of city dwellers with the intensification of urban experience. New technologies 
of automation, spectacle and delirium - which included the invention of the Roller 
Coaster in 1884 and the Shoot-the-Chutes water ride in 1895 - found material form. 
Towards 1890, the introduction of electricity made it possible to decorate the 1,221 
towers of the theme park with millions of light bulbs. Unlike the later skyscrapers of 
Manhattan, the towers only purpose was to stimulate the imagination. As Koolhaas puts 
it, 'the electric city, phantom offspring of the real city, is an even more powerful 
instrument for the fulfillment of fantasy. ' 123 In addition, interior spaces were later 
developed to simulate tourist attractions around the world: 
The Canals of Venice is a gigantic model of Venice inside a reduced version of the Ducal 
Palace, the largest city in Dreamland. Inside it is night, 'with the soft moonlight typical of 
the city of water streets... accomplished by newly invented electric device. 
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By the turn of the century Coney Island had developed into a 'laboratory' for generating 
a wide range of new and exhilarating experiences. In each case the activity was highly 
constructed and relied heavily upon technological experimentation and unique design 
concepts. As Koolhaas points out, this generation of new architectural fonns was 
ultimately intended for Manhattan. With this mutation of fantasy into spaces of work and 
international finance came a much broader interest in staging experience. 
From Koolhaas' account we can see that the relation between Manhattan and Coney 
Island does not involve the old fantasy/reality opposition but consists of a play between 
different levels of fabrication. In both cases experience is produced through highly 
constructed spatial forms. 
Since Coney Island, the entertainment industry has continued to test out and develop new 
techniques of spatial immersion and fantasy placemaking. While theme shops and 
restaurants are more recent manifestations of the experience economy, the casinos and 
hotels of 1960's Las Vegas and the earlier theme parks designed by Walt Disney provide 
something of a formal history to new design concepts being introduced by urban 
planners. As we have seen, the shift in economic structure, from 'tangible goods' to 
'memorable experience', forms an important relation with the way architectural design is 
now thought. For this reason, the older spaces of fantasy and entertainment provide an 
important insight into understanding some of the formal techniques involved in staging 
experience. Moreover, it is their introduction into places of work that goes to challenge 
the common assumption that experiential placemaking can stand in opposition to a 'real', 
authentic or normative experience of space. 
In Learning From Las Vegas, Robert Venturi and Denise Scott Brown describe how the 
architecture of Las Vegas obscures the normal modes of orientation (daylight, local 
context, etc. ). They observe how without these psycho-geographical markers of space and 
time, the casinos and hotels disorientate the participant. Just as the Roman church was 
conceived as a site that might transcend everyday experience, Las Vegas architecture is 
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commonly understood to separate itself from the repetitive cycles that define spaces of 
work and international business. 125 Most importantly, Las Vegas architecture generates 
excitement, intrigue and curiosity with a series of visual contradictions. Venturi and 
Brown articulate this phenomenon with the notion of the 'decorated shed', 'this is 
architecture as shelter with symbols on' (LV, 35). The sharp divide between inside and 
outside space, the negation of the natural environment, night becoming day (outside), day 
becoming night (inside), allows for an experience of architecture that contradicts the 
fixed structures of the building's physical properties. What is visible to the participant is 
always accompanied by an awareness of what is invisible. 
Venturi and Brown suggest that Las Vegas architecture might offer a more dynamic 
experience of space. Instead of the 'rational transparency' and 'truth to materials' of 
modernist architecture (the glass box), the decorated shed conceals its internal space in 
order that it might exist independent of any distractions from the surrounding 
environment. The decorated shed abandons pure form in favour of a symbolic 
preoccupation with the facade, the proliferation of pictorial space (neon signs) divides the 
front from the shed like structure of the back, 'regardless of the front, the back of the 
building is styleless, because the whole is turned toward the front and no one sees the 
back' (LV, 77). The apparent grandeur of the facade defines the space, what is 
immediately visible is made impossible to avoid. In addition to maximising the spectacle 
of the facade, the screening or partitioning of space determines the participant's trajectory 
from the exterior through the interior. 
Venturi and Brown's account of Las Vegas architecture might be understood to take 
concealment as a productive and dynamic articulation of space. In always keeping 
something from view, in emphasising that there is always 'more' elsewhere, the casinos 
125 While the common perception of Las Vegas is shaped by its exceptionality, we should remember that 
Las Vegas remains the fastest growing city in the USA. Like 'Celebration' outside Disneyland, many 
people choose to live within the fantasyscape. Moreover, Las Vegas is quickly becoming the model for 
urban design. As Bruce Begout writes: 'Las Vegas represents nothing more than what is all around me 
these days as an ordinary homo urbanaus. ' Bruce Begout, Zeropolis, The Experience ofLas Vegas, 
London: Reaktion books, 2003, p, 11. 
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and hotels engage the spectator in a series of changing appearances. In addition to 
encouraging the shopper or gambler to partake in the process of exchange, the logic of 
contaim, nent and control works to liberate space from a fixed material framework. This 
fantasyscape allows the imagination to extend experience into a terrain that is always in 
motion. 
Like Las Vegas, Disneyland is central to the development of entertainment space and its 
influence on urban design. In an essay on 'Disney Space', Chuihua Judy Chung explores 
how the creation of Disneyland in the early 1950's brought a series of new design 
principles to architectural practice. 126 The success of Disney's animations had led to the 
possibility of a built environment that offered visitors the chance to 'live' the cartoon 
world that they had seen on TV. These Theme Parks not only entertain but involve the 
visitor in an unfolding story. To design this fantasyscape Disney drew from a range of 
cinematic techniques and the expertise of the animators or 'imagineers' 127 as they were 
otherwise known (Disney's imagination engineers). Scale manipulation and forced 
perspective were both employed as key principles behind the designs. With cinematic 
tricks of scale and perspective visitors could experience the park as if they had entered 
the film. Disney had designed this mode of fantasy architecture as a sequence of events 
that integrated geographically and architecturally unrelated elements into a seamless, 
apparently logical whole. 
Judy Chung also describes how with forced perspective, a device well known in motion 
picture production, the eye could be tricked into seeing structures larger and taller than 
their actual size: 'The view through Main Street frames sleeping Beauty Castle, making it 
appear 'more' stately and imposing than it really is., 
128 At the end of the forced 
perspective is the fixed point of focus that pulls visitors into the scene. To achieve this, 
the focal point must be visible from any place in the park. The castle, tall enough to be 
126 Chuihua Judy Chung, 'Disney Space', Harvard Design School: Guide to Shopping, Chuihua Judy 
Chung, Jeffrey Inaba, Rem Koolhaas, Sze Tsung Leong (eds), New York: Taschen, 2001, pp, 270-297 
127 6 Disney Space', p, 276. 
128 'Disney Space', p, 277. 
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seen throughout Disneyland, is the Park's focal point and provides the fantasyscape at the 
end of the vista. 
While the influence of entertainment space on social spaces of retail and leisure accounts 
for many of the design concepts involved in urban development and planning, there is an 
important shift that takes place when these spatial illusions enter the arena of everyday 
praxis. As Pine and Gilmore point out in their analysis of experience economy, 
entertainment is only one aspect of the experience: 'Companies stage an experience 
whenever they engage customers, connecting with them in a personal memorable way. 
Many dining experiences have less to do with the entertainment motif or celebrity of the 
financial backers than with the merging of dining with comedy, art architecture, history 
or nature. ' 129 It is precisely this interrelation of differentiated modes of illusion that 
demands a new understating of space and the way it is experienced. No longer is it a case 
of leisure and work, fantasy and reality or essence and appearance, the relation instead 
consists of a play of illusory systems which, like the morphing images projected in 
phantasmagoric shows, generate a changing spatial narrative. 
Scripted Space and Experiential Placemaking 
For Norman Klein, the 'unfolding narrative' of the theme park is increasingly becoming a 
major feature of retail outlets across America. Klein describes this construction of spatial 
narratives as 'scripted space': 
Scripted spaces are a walk through or click through environment (a mall, a church, 
casino, a theme park, a computer game). They are designed to emphasize the viewers 
journey-the space between-rather than the gimmicks on the wall. The audience walks 
into the story. What's more, this walk should respond to viewer's whims, even though 
129 The Experience Economy, p. 3. 
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each step along the way is pre-scripted (or should I say preordained? ). It is gentle 
repression posing as free will. "0 
Scripted space is concerned with the physical realisation of a fictional narrative. The 
ambition of these spaces is to transform fiction into a lived experience and to lend a 
material body to a collective imaginary. 
Experiential placemaking, which has been employed in a number of American cities, 
reflects an important development in the way the formal origins of scripted space (Coney 
Island, Las Vegas, Disneyland, etc. ) has been introduced into retail space. In this wider 
context, experiential placemaking might not function as a physical interpretation of a film 
or animation (although this has been known), but as a more general stage set that 
represents or refers to a space that is elsewhere. In addition, the role of experiential 
placemaking has come to take on a new social function. In place of rundown city centers 
new mini-cities offer the urban experience as it is imagined. 
The large-scale developments of the Jerde Partnership International (JPI) provide some 
insight into the social and economic ambitions of experiential placemaking. Fantasy and 
entertainment are the main ingredients of the Partnership's designs and with a spectacular 
range of audio and visual effects, JPI's aim is to both 're-introduce the chaos and 
disorientation of the city' and to 're-connect public space with a lost communal scene' 
(JPIW, 4). The Fremont Street Experience (1997) in downtown Las Vegas is a key 
example of the JPI's approach to retail design. ' 31 The main requirement facing the 
architects was to create a level of entertainment worthy of luring the crowds from the 
spectacular casinos and hotels of the competing Strip. 
130 Nonnan M Klein, The Vatican to Vegas. - A History ofSpecial Effects, New York: the new Press, 2004, 
P. 11. 
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When designing The Fremont Street Experience (FSE) JPI looked directly to the 
vernacular of high Renaissance church building. The vaulted celestial field that houses 
Fremont Street recreates a wide range of artificial environments that draw from the 
anamorphic perspective of the sixteenth century ceiling painting of Andrea Pozzo. Just as 
church painting sought to engage the congregation in a transcendental realm of 
experience, the architectural language of experiential placemaking and the motion and 
fantasy associated with scripted space aims to immerse the visitor in an environment that 
is removed from what is already known. What is clear is that the JPI's designs for 
Freemont Street followed a tradition of designing perceptual illusion into space, a 
tradition that evolved out of church building: 
To create the paintings on the vault of the church, artist Andrea Pozzo designed an 
illusory architecture with a perspective so precise that the vault is meant to be viewed 
from a single spot only, otherwise the figures are at odd angles and the details distorted. 
After experiencing this anamorphic perspective, I realized we could move away from 
building mechanical reality and, instead, create perceptual reality illusionistically. "' 
To access the full phantasmagoria of the Las Vegas vernacular Jerde turned to a type of 
spatial illusion that distorts its parts in order to create an effect. The 2.1 million LEDs that 
are built into Fremont Street's celestial ceiling produce images that are only perceptible 
from a fixed distance. With this use of light and illusion architecture takes control of both 
what is seen and how it is seen. What is available to perception is built on a 
misperception, what we perceive is produced through distortion. The concealment of the 
parade's physical reality allows for perception to override the material constraints of the 
supporting structural framework. With this manipulation of space Jerde suggests the 
audience is, 'totally immerse[d] in an environment without predictability. '133 
132 Jon Jerde, 'Revitalised City', Tate. - The Art Magazine: The Urban Myth, Century City Special Issue 24: 
Spring, 2001, p. 29. 
133 'Revitalised City', p. 29. 
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Jerde's notion of experiential placemaking is part of a much larger ambition than the 
mere design of retail outlets. 134 Jerde explains that the challenge that the Partnership face 
is: 'to inspire-to-trigger-unity' out of the dismembered, disassembled parts of the once- 
cohesive city, within the abbreviated time frames of our fast-past world' QPIW, 1). The 
aim is not only to create the conditions for a lost urban diversity, cultural identity and 
communal scene, but to (re)create what has traditionally evolved over hundreds of years 
in the space of a decade: 
Today market forces require that similar evolutionary processes acting on space are 
completed in ten years. Participants in the global economy no longer have time for slow 
growth. Our landscape and environments are now designed as instant worlds. (JPIW, 1) 
The idea of an instant world that comes equipped with all the trappings of a culturally 
vibrant community represents the aims and ambitions of experiential placemaking. In 
order to achieve this, the Jerde Partnership recreates the space of the city through 
constructing a lived narrative that unfolds through time. 
The emergence of experiential placemaking and scripted space in urban development and 
city planning demands a new understanding of the status of illusion in social space. There 
is no doubt that the influence of entertainment space on experiential placemaking has 
been central to the formal development of urban design. However, just as the principle of 
the commodity is not reducible to an understanding of space, the introduction of new 
spatial illusions into urban design does not render those developments reducible to the 
logic of a theme park. Instead of a homogenous space of immersion, entertaim-nent and 
delirium, we find the relation between space and illusion to be made up of a complex 
134 In the Phaidon publication of JPI designs, YOU ARE HERE, The Jerde Partnership International, the 
transformative nature of experiential placemaking is further described: 'Transformative projects occur in 
built-up areas in inner cities and suburbs, which have been blighted or fallen into decline. They can 
revitalize such neighorhoods, taking architectural cues from the existing and surrounding environments and 
transforming their previous identity. These interventions often act as catalysts for economic growth and 
social regeneration. ' YOU ARE HERE, The Jerde Partnership International, London: Phaidon Press, 1999, 
p. 4. 
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series of relations. 
In exploring these relations I have been considering how illusion provides us with a clear 
insight into how space is constructed. No longer is it a case of the relation between the 
commodity and space, what is of importance now is the relation between spatialities. This 
shift not only demands a rethinking of post-Marxist critique (Debord, Lefebvre, 
Jameson), these new spatialities serve as an important framework for understanding the 
developments and mutations taking place within global economy. Moreover, with the 
emphasis on constructing 'transformations' in both the individual (Pine and Gilmore) and 
urban regeneration (Jerde International), differentiated modes of spatial illusion are 
becoming increasingly visible. 
Differentiated Space 
The analysis of space envelopes may be expected to take markets (local national, and 
hence also worldwide) as a starting point, and eventually to link up with the theory of 
networks and flows and the theory of use value, so badly obscured and misapprehended 
since Marx, will be restored and returned, complete with complexities, to its former 
standing. "5 
Like Debord, Lefebvre applies Marx's analysis of the commodity-form to a critique of 
capitalist space. Andy Merrifield puts this succinctly when he writes: 'what we have here 
(in The Production o Space) is a spatialised rendering of Marx's famous analysis on the ýf 
fetishism of commodities from Volume One of Capital ,, 136 and goes on to point out that 
'Lefebvre's shift, accordingly from conceiving things in space to that of the actual 
production of space itself, is the same conceptual and political shift Marx made from 
things in exchange to social relations of production. ' 137 While Lefebvre draws out the 
135 Henri Lefebvre, The Production of Space, Donald Nicholson-Smith (trans), Oxford: Blackwell, 1991, 
p. 15 1. 
136 Andy Merrifield, 'Henri Lefebvre: a socialist in space', Mike Crang and Nigel Thrift (eds), Thinking 
Space, London: Routledge, 2000, p. 171. 
137 6 Henri Lefebvre: a socialist in space', p. 172. 
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political forces at work in space and establishes what he terms differential space, the 
categories used to define spaces that are 'productive' and 'unproductive' remain fixed to 
the materialist critique of the commodity. Lefebvre writes: 
The contradiction that lies, then, in the clash between a consumption of space which 
produces surplus value and one which produces only enjoyment - and is therefore 
unproductive. It is a clash, in other words, between capitalist 'utilizers' and community 
6 users'. 138 
The question of how we distinguish between 'capitalist utilizers' and 'community users' 
assumes both the possibility and desire to remove ourselves from the movement and flow 
of the global market. With these old oppositions a seamless movement takes place 'from 
the space of consumption to the consumption of space via leisure and within the space of 
leisure. ' 139 Lefebvre's divide between productive and unproductive space is firmly 
grounded in a Materialist critique and fails to comprehend the movements and 
interruptions that occur with the staging of new urban environments. 
In spite of Lefebvre's renewed emphasis on use value, The Production of Space provides 
us with an important insight into how space is conceived, perceived and lived. Moreover, 
Lefebvre carefully considers how space is littered with complexity and motion: 
Just as white light, though uniform in appearance, may be broken down into a spectrum, 
space likewise decomposes when subjected to analysis; in the case of space, however, the 
knowledge to be derived from analysis extends to the recognition of conflicts internal to 
what on the surface appears homogenous and coherent - and presents itself and behaves 
as though it were. 140 
As we have seen, this close analysis of space is inspired by Marx's analysis of the 
commodity. Lefebvre intends to get to the root of things and get beyond the fetishism of 
the observable appearance. Although the relation between commodity and space remains 
138 The Production ofSpace, p. 360. 
139 The Production ofSpace, p. 354. 
140 The Production ofSpace, p. 352. 
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a necessary vehicle for exploring how space is produced, there are limits to how far this 
analogy can be usefully applied. While Marx's critique provides us with a method of 
interpretation for understanding the contradictory relationship between visible and 
invisible phenomena that exist in products of capital, it is no longer possible to remain 
with the old opposition (that may or may not move into a dialectical mode) of surplus 
value and use value. 
Differentiated modes of illusion are not set within the framework of use and surplus or 
productive and unproductive space. Moreover, my analysis of illusion does not seek to 
look 'beyond' appearances but sets out to consider the relation they have within a larger 
global system. It is in these relations - between differentiated modes of illusion - that 
arise internal conflicts, conflicts that interrupt and expose the forces at work in space. 
Space and Economy 
What, then, emerges from considering recent shifts in economy alongside examples of 
experiential placemaking? First, these spaces coexist and perform as a relation between 
the global and the everyday. It is not simply a case of Jerde International reflecting new 
trends in economy; in these sites of fantasy and illusion the highly constructed experience 
can be seen to coexist with the space of global economy. However, the inscription is 
always followed by a re-inscription. If - as we have seen through the work of Marx, 
Benjamin, Debord and Jameson - the economy can be clearly seen to inscribe social 
space, we should begin to consider how the staging of experiences in retail and leisure 
marks the economy (I return to this central point throughout the next chapter). In 
addition, there is a sequence of differentiated spatial illusions that unfold through space. 
Although 'scripted space' certainly features in the experience, this changing narrative is 
interrupted and broken by a range of competing effects. The close relation between 
economy and placemaking means that highly fabricated experiences compete and overlap 
with one another. Instead of a single narrative we find a range of scripted spaces 
producing alternative experiences. 
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Jon Jerde's design for Citywalk (1993) 141 clearly illustrates this synchronic relation of 
constructed space. Built to connect Universal Studios with the car park, Universal 
Citywalk is a 'between space' that houses a wide range of shops, bars, restaurants 
nightclubs and theatres. The movement from car to street and then on to Universal Studio 
Tours involves a series of highly constructed experiences. As Klein writes, 'Jerde was 
operating at the intersection of many ideologies at once: shopping, tourism: real estate, 
global entertainment - and finally, local imaginaries. ' 142 This juxtaposition of space 
involves moving between a series of spatial illusions that have entirely different 
functions. The street that connects the car park to the theme park is highly staged but is 
only one element in the whole experience. Moving through these spaces, any indication 
of being inside or outside the space of fantasy, entertainment and illusion has been set 
aside. In place of the old boundaries that maintained some difference between the real 
and the artificial, we find a change in experience that is as visibly constructed as the next. 
In her article, Jon Jerde'S Consuming Fantasies and Other Urban Interiors, Karin 
Jaschke asks if 'Jerde's ready-made dreamscapes really have the potential to generate 
more than business. ' 143 Jaschke's question is important, as on first inspection it would 
appear that experiential placemaking merely serves the needs of new mutations and 
developments in capitalism. However, while these highly constructed urban landscapes 
tell us something about the state of global economy, although experiential placemaking 
reflects new ways of making increased profit, the relation between space and economy 
is 
not simply a question of cause and effect. Jaschke takes this same 
issue up when she 
wntes: 
it is impossible to predict how possible it will be to appropriate Jerde's urban 
interiors 
and subvert their inherent social and cultural limitations and political 
dangers. It would be 
141 See illustration. 
142 Klein, Norman M. The Vatican to Vegas: A History ofSpecial Effects, New York, The 
New Press, 2004, 
p. 258. 
143 Karin Jaschke, Jerde's Consuming Fantasies and Other Urban Interiors', Architectural 
Design: New 
Babylonians, lain Borden and Sandy McCreery (eds), London: Wiley Academy, 
2001, p. 72. 
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wrong though to underestimate the potential of urban high impact projects to transform 
and reconfigure urban situations in unexpected and sometimes positive ways. 144 
The internal conflicts that take place in these 'urban high impact projects' are not 
determinable. The struggle between diverse systems of constructed realities does not 
involve dividing truth from illusion or reality from fiction. Moreover, it is not simply a 
case of positioning experiential placemaking against the 'historic'. 'authentic' or 
6normalised' experience of space. To put it simply, our entire urban and social 
environment is constructed. When considering what is positive about this realisation -a 
realisation which for many cultural theorists is a catastrophe (Baudrillard) - we should 
return to the critical contradiction of contemporary spatial illusion. That is, we are not 
only subject to the illusion, we are increasingly aware of the mechanisms through which 
our experience of space is produced. 
When placed in opposition to 'the real', the relation between space and illusion appears 
homogenous and the internal conflicts - which arise from the interrelation of 
differentiated modes of illusion - are overlooked. Through my analysis I have considered 
the extent to which illusion shapes our experience of space, not as a single line that is 
reducible to an overarching theory of commoditisation, but as a play of differentiated 
modes. As we saw in Chapter Two, Benjamin's re-conceptualisation of phantasmagoria 
engages with the critical potential of illusion in social space. Instead of the origin of the 
projected representation remaining as the outside light of the real, a moving cycle of 
illusory phenomena was produced by a carefully painted slide. Like the Arcades and 
International exhibitions of nineteenth-century Paris, experiential placemaking transforms 
the phantasmagoric cycle of constructed realities into lived experience. These spaces of 
social activity are projected through the lens of economy, which, as we have observed, 
has shifted away from objects and moved towards the exchange of experiences. 
Earlier in this chapter I considered the relation between the commodity and the spaces 
that surround it. I argued that it was not merely a case of the mutation of the commodity 
144 Jerde's Consuming Fantasies and Other Urban Interiors', p. 72. 
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into space but of space re-inscribing the commodity. Turning back to Elizabeth Grosz, we 
find the assertion that space is inscribed by and in its turn inscribes those objects and 
activities placed within it, in need of updating. Although this inscribing movement 
remains important for understanding our role in defining the spaces that surround us, the 
question of how highly constructed spaces interrelate and inscribe one another to produce 
experience requires a new understanding of the relations in play. With the emergence of 
the experience economy, the commodity (as mass produced good) shifts to a new 
emphasis on the staging of experience. In place of a relation between objects and space 
we see a relation between highly constructed spatialities. As I will argue in the following 
chapter, this change marks an important development in the critical status of illusion in 
social space. Rather than a 'logical' or 'natural' continuation of our capitalisation, I will 
consider how the site of illusion provides a critical insight into the turbulent forces that 
shape our lives. 
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Prada, New York, 2001 
In addition to the moving walls and live 
video feedback displays inserted into the 
changing room mirrors, Rem Koolhaas' 
interior for the flagship Prada Store is 
adaptable to cultural performances. In the 
centre of the store a concealed stage flips 
out of a large internal ramp. Performances 
are also made possible by the movable 
overhead towers that allow the garments 
on display to be pushed to the back of the 
store. 
8.1 - 8.2 - The walls in the stores 
basement can be moved on the metal tracks that 
cross the floor. 
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8.1 - Prada, 575 Broadway. 
Selfridges 
140 
9.1 - Selfridges, Oxford Street, 1909. 
9.2 - Selfridges, Birmingham, Future Systems, 2003. 
Selfridges - Automation 
10.1 - Selfridges, Oxford Street, 1909. 
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10.2 - Selfridges, Birmingham, 
Future Systems, 2003. 
Manhattan and Coney Island 
11.1 - Manhattan skyline at night. 
142 
11.4 - Towards the end of the nineteenth- 
century Manhattan's bridges and 
transportation technologies made Coney 
Island accessible to the masses. 
11.2 - Luna Park skyline by day, 1903. 
11.3 - Beacon Tower at night. 
Disneyland 
12.1 - Sleepy Beauty Castle. 
- 
--"-- 
12.2 - Wait Disney 
World Resort. 
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The Fremont Street Experience, Las Vegas, 1997 
The Fremont Street experience is an example of urban placemaking. The Jerde Partnership International were commissioned to build the 
project with the brief of luring the crowds away from the Strip and back 
to downtown Las Vegas. To do this they fashioned existing neon-covered 
casino facades into a 'tube of light'. 
13.2 - The'celestial vault'is covered 
with 2.1 million lights and is activated 
every hour after dusk with a light 
show. This digitalized light display is 
accompanied by symphonic sound 
booming out of a 540.000-watt sound 
system. 
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13.1 - Different stages of the light 
spectacular designed by Jeremy 
Railton. 
13.3 - The vaulted canopy spans 
four blocks of downtown Las Vegas. 
Universal Citywalk, Los Angeles, 1993 
14.1 - The 1,500-foot-long strip is intended to house a shopping mall, movie theaters, 
along with production studios, and executive offices, is the first phase of a large-scale 
project for the whole entertainment compound known as Universal City. Designed using 
computer-compiled traces of local Los Angeles architecture, Universal Citywalk 
reproduces at a larger scale its streetscape. A circular plaza hinges together two blocks 
of restaurants, retail stores, nightclubs, bars, theaters, offices and classrooms that stretch 
along a promenade connecting an 18-screen movie theater with the Universal Studios 
Hollywood theme park, tour and amphitheater. 
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14.2 - UnIversal 
Citywalk forms the central spine of the Universal City Masterplan, a plan 
which seeks to recreate the image of the city on the hill. 
De-transubstantiation 
Chapter 4 
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Summary 
At the start of this investigation I considered a range of spatial appearances at play within 
the Rainbow Room, New York. Looking out from the 65tý floor of the Rockefeller Centre 
we saw how mirror image Manhattan (reflected back from the window recesses adjacent 
to the twenty-four large windows that circle the room) was as much an illusion as the 
unmediated cityscape seen through the window. In contrast to anamorphic, extreme 
perspective or tromp-l'oeil wall and ceiling painting, we saw how the context of the site 
was the content of the image. However, while the spectacular cityscape and its mirror 
image fell into the general category of appearance, I argued that their 'differences' were 
key to understanding the turbulent interferences that operate within social space. 
Through the following chapters I have both identified different modes of spatial illusion 
and tried to understand their relation. The foundation for this analysis involved Plato's 
attack on the mimetic representations of artists' and Marx's conception of 'ideological 
representation' as 'false consciousness'. With Jameson's analysis, we saw how both 
critiques of representation (Plato and Marx) are compressed into a single account of 
postmodern space: 
I want to suggest that our faulty representations of some immense communicational and 
computer network are themselves but a distorted figuration of something even deeper, 
namely, the whole world system of a present day multinational capitalism (PM, p. 38). 
The relation that Jameson identifies moved between the spatial effects of postmodern 
architecture (the Bonaventure Hotel) and the ideological affects of global capital. While 
Jameson identifies an important relation between differentiated modes of illusion, his 
conflation of illusory systems continues a traditional belief in the fixed and stable 
structures of the real (cognitive mapping) and consequently fails to identify the points of 
rupture that exist within the relation between systems. 
Instead of mimetic representation being subsumed by ideological representation 
(Jameson, Lefebvre, Debord), I look to what I identify as a critical tension between these 
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differentiated modes. Benjamin's investment in the tenn phantasmagoria is certainly 
useful for understanding how space is filled with illusions of every kind and how these 
illusions are not simply a poor imitation of the 'real' or the 'natural' world but how they 
exist as a consequence of a highly constructed universe. While there is some 'shock' 
involved in moving between different instances of phantasmagoria (Arcades), Benjamin's 
critical conceptualization of the fantastic projections of the magic lantern continues to 
operate from the position of the privileged observer. That is, urban experience is viewed 
through the window of history. From this elevated position we observe the subject caught 
in the intoxicating system of mass consumption. 
One ambition of critical theory is to return us to the 'real' where we can once again 'live' 
as freethinking subjects. No matter how complex the theorisation of space and illusion, 
we find there is always an underlying determination to break the spell. In the case of 
Lefebvre the full complexity of social space is brought to the surface and analysed in 
great detail. However, as we have seen, this theorisation of space remains committed to a 
utopian belief in 'use value' and 'natural life': 'In the areas set aside for leisure, the body 
regains a certain right to use, a right which is half imaginary and half real, and which 
does not go beyond an illusory 'culture of the body', an imitation of natural life. -) 145 It is 
Lefebvre's reliance on 'use' and the 'natural' - as a site of stable meaning - that renders 
his forniulation highly unstable. 
The question of the critical status of illusion in social space cannot be considered from a 
constructed exteriority nor can it be defined by reference to assumed notions of error or 
truth. Indeed, I start out from the principle that people are able to identify the structures 
and mechanisms at work in space and therefore 'choose' to take part in those spatialities. 
As Zizek has put it, 'one is well aware of a particular interest hidden behind an 
ideological universality, but still one does not renounce it. 
146 The notion of 'mass 
deception' (Adorno), 'dream sleep' (Benjamin) or 'living dead' (Romero) implies that it 
is only the critical theorist or social scientist that has the capacity to comprehend the 
145 The Production ofSpace, p. 353. 
146 The Sublime Object of1deology, p. 29. 
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ideological structures at work within spaces of capital. Moreover, it is this privileged 
individual who has the power to extricate us from our world of false appearances. The 
question of the critical status of illusion demands a new approach to understanding the 
agency of social space. The relation between differentiated modes of spatial illusion is 
crucial to questioning the fixed relations that remain determined by an oppositional 
framework of essence and appearance or truth and illusion. These binaries exist as a 
consequence of highly constructed forms of rhetoric and work to negate any claim to 
knowledge that we might seek through an experience of contemporary social space. 
In this chapter I will (re)turn to the relation between the mimetic constructions involved 
in placemaking and ideological transubstantiation to consider how these different modes 
of representation coexist as a force of movement and change. As I have already 
demonstrated, it is in the staged spaces of retail and leisure that we see representational 
narratives competing for our attention. Rather then a single flow of global capitalism we 
find interruptions and interferences that demand an engagement with a range of systems. 
Through this final analysis I will again focus on the relation between the mimetic and the 
ideological to ask: (i) if the fabricated representations of contemporary social space 
challenge utopian notions of 'authenticity' and 'truth'; (ii) how mimetic representations 
(placemaking) act on ideological representation (transubstantiation); and (iii) if we can 
understand the relations between space and illusion as a site of action and change. 
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De-transubstantiation 
The inscription is the written origin: traced and henceforth inscribed in a system, in a 
figure that no longer governs. 147 
In this analysis of space I want to focus on the relation between two modes of illusion; or, 
more specifically, I intend to consider how the ideological mode transubstantiation is 
altered by the mimetic mode experiential placemaking. These modes of illusion operate 
within the same system but function very differently. Where transubstantiation takes 
effect without transforming the physical appearance of a thing, experiential placemaking 
moves on the surface and visibly changes the appearance of its location. Where the forces 
of transubstantiation are ideological and, in part, external to physical space, the structure 
and mechanism of experiential placemaking is located within the fabric of the spatial 
event. These illusions are tied to the market and emerge as a product of social relations; 
their effects on space and the subject's experience of space are always in flux and bound 
to the changing conditions of capital. In this chapter I will explore how these coexistent 
but disjunctive modes of spatial illusion coexist in social space. With this in mind, I will 
argue that in the fusion of spatial illusions, social space negates and disrupts the inscribed 
relation between the original and the copy and in so doing, acts as a site of change. 
The notion of 'spatial inscription' will be linked to the mimetic mode of experiential 
placemaking. As we saw in the last chapter, experiential placemaking has come to 
describe something akin to a sophisticated stage set that mimics or references a space that 
is elsewhere. A clear example of this is the Venetian Hotel Casino Resort in Las Vegas, 
which recreates St Mark's Square and the canals of Venice to add a new level of wonder 
to the experience of shopping. The scaled-down reproduction, however, does not exist as 
a passive representation. Instead, the inscription is ongoing. In the case of the Venetian 
hotel, we find that Venice the city is inscribed with new meaning. The question that I 
consider relates directly to the consequences of this spatial inscription. With this re- 
inscription, I will be asking if the ideological forces that determine how space is 
"' Jacques Derrida, Writing and Difference, Alan Bass (trans), London: Routledge, 197 8, p. 115. 
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experienced are themselves acted upon by the mimetic representations of experiential 
placemaking 
In Christianity, the term Transubstantiation means the change by which the substance 
(though not the appearance) of the bread and the wine in the Eucharist becomes Christ's 
real presence, that is, his body and blood. The bread and the wine may not appear to be 
the actual blood and flesh of Christ but to the Christian believer the substance has been 
transformed into an extension of Christ's body. The Christian ideology has within its 
means the power to substitute ordinary food and drink for the extraordinary substance of 
Christ's body. The bread and the wine that is consumed in the ceremony may not appear 
to be transformed, yet for those who take part, for those who live with religious belief, 
plain organic matter comes to possess a supernatural meaning. 148 
Alienation is understood by Marx to be the necessary condition for the continuation of 
the capitalist ideology. When social relations, which once defined people as active 
individuals, are obscured by a governing doctrine (ideology), the possibility of social 
change or struggle ceases to exist. This mode of alienation is argued by Marx to involve a 
degree of misrecognition. With regard to the religious ideology or governing moral 
doctrines of metaphysical idealism, Marx suggests that men become subjugated by what 
originated as a product of the human brain. In this way alienation occurs through a 
process of dispossession. That is, intellectual systems and material products that arise 
from human thought and activity are reflected back to the individual as autonomous 
forces of subjugation. As Marx suggests in Capital, the forces of the market follow this 
same logic. The phantasmic and transcendental forces that surround commodities do not 
physically alter their material reality; instead it is the shared belief (or false 
148 Transubstantiation is derived from the Latin term transubstaniato, meaning 'change of substance'. This 
term was incorporated into the creed of the Fourth Lateran Council in AD 1215. Between 1545 and 1563 
the doctrine of Transubstantiation is stated by the Council of Trent as follows: 'In the sacrament of the 
Eucharist, when the bread and the wine are consecrated the whole substance of the bread is thereby turned 
into the substance of the body of Christ our Lord and the whole substance of the wine is thereby turned into 
the substance of his blood. This turning of one substance into another, the council affirmed, was aptly 
named by the holy Catholic Church: 'transubstantiation' (Session XIII, ca. 4). 
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consciousness) of those individuals that live within the capitalist system that goes to 
transform objects of use into commodities that are desired and fetishized: 
In order, therefore, that a commodity may in practice operate effectively as exchange 
value, it must divest itself of its natural physical body and become transformed from 
merely imaginary into real gold, although this act of transubstantiation may be more 
'troublesome' for it than the transition from necessity to freedom for the Hegelian 
(concept', the casting of his shell for a lobster, or the putting-off of the old Adam or Saint 
Jerome. (C, 197) 
The ideological powers of transubstantiation (that Marx believes to reside in the 
commodity) are not merely linked by 'analogy' but directly connected to our experience 
of social space. The relationship between commodity, space and social relations is 
determined by a complex network of immaterial phenomena. 
With this in mind I will turn to the relation between the highly visual illusions of 
experiential placemaking and the invisible but nevertheless transformative and 
determining forces of transubstantiation. Unlike the bread and the wine of the Eucharist, 
which does not change in its physical appearance but none the less stands in for the 
immaterial body of Christ, or perhaps more importantly, unlike the commodity that 
appears 'in the eyes of men' to have transformed into an automated and autonomous 
object of value (which also remains unchanged in its physical appearance), the illusions 
involved in experiential placemaking go to transform the appearance of physical matter. 
This 'change in substance' is different to the Christian and Marxian formulation as, with 
experiential placemaking, the structure and mechanism by which things are transformed 
remain physically determined. While these spatial 'changes' seek to direct us through 
highly constructed spatial narratives they do not claim a metaphysical status for their 
effects. 
Consequently, the mutation of capital into place and matter is not altogether logical. 
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While the mimetic illusions of experiential placemaking and the ideological forces of 
transubstantiation both serve the interest of the market, the relation between these modes 
of spatial illusion works to interrupt and rupture a wider global system. In Empire, 
Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri argue that globalisation is not eroding sovereignty but 
rather is transforming it into a system of diffuse national and supranational institutions. 
This shift is argued to signal an all- encompassing state of Empire. What Hardt and Negri 
have described as the 'non-place' in which the older designated sites of sovereignty have 
been subsumed into a global Empire can also very well describe the autonomy and 
fantasy of retail architecture and social space in general (given that there is no fixed 
relation within the physical identity of these sites). Moreover, the privatisation of social 
space (the shopping mall) is also a highly concentrated location for the new global 
market. As Hardt and Negri point out: 'profit can be generated only through contact, 
engagement, interchange, and commerce' (E, 190). It is precisely in the junction point of 
retail space that the movement of capital is located and most clearly identified. The 
interference emerges from the transparency involved in these locations - that is, out of 
how these sites of fantasy lend form to the movements of a world system that exists 'both 
everywhere and nowhere' (E, 190). It is no longer the commodity that holds the 'secrets' 
of capital: it is the space around it that speaks most clearly about the new world order. 
This emphasis on contact, engagement and interchange renders social space the most 
conducive to capital. 
This view is supported by Pine and Gilmore who not only argue that our economy is 
fuelled by the staging of experience (a distinctly spatial phenomena), but also that the 
production of subjectivity is only competitive when it 'transforms' the individual subject: 
What set of experiences bring about the necessary transformation? How can a customer 
be changed from where he is today to where his aspiration lies, or should lie? 
Transformations, of course, build on experiences that will cause the customer to realize 
his aspirations whether or not he can articulate what they are. 
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149 The Experience Economy, p. 179. 
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What is important here is that 'trans formation' takes place through contact, engagement 
and interchange within the social spaces of exchange. Unlike a 'false consciousness' 
imposed upon us, we are made aware of the constructed nature of experience; it is 
precisely this production of experience that transforms subjectivity. While the claim that 
the market can actually change the 'being of the buyer' appears somewhat unsavoury, it 
should be no surprise that the market economy changes us. After all: 'People value 
transformation above all other economic offerings because it addresses the ultimate 
source of all other needs: why the buyer desires the commodities, goods, services, and 
experiences he purchases. 050 If the transubstantiation of the bread and wine of the 
Eucharist functions as a transcendental process that is entirely external to the object, the 
illusions involved in our experience of social space remain physically bound to the site. 
Like the seventeenth-century ceiling paintings of Andreas Pozzo, the working mechanism 
that creates the affect of disorientation and spectacle remains physically tied to built 
space. It is in the spaces of retail and leisure that we see the mechanism through which 
both things and subjecýivities are transformed. However, the affects of experiential 
placemaking are of a different order to the illusion that Marx found to exist within the 
commodity. Not only does the appearance of material space change before our eyes, this 
primary illusory mechanism (experiential placemaking) provides an important entry point 
into the ideological forces that condition the way space is experienced globally. 
The Venetian 
Turning to the superstructures of Las Vegas, it is not difficult to see how illusion has 
transformed the activity of shopping into an experience of fantasy, disorientation and 
spectacle. The imitation has become so elaborate that Venice, Paris, New York and 
ancient Rome all exist as scaled-down reproductions. In the case of the Venetian Hotel 
Casino Resort, the streets and canals of Venice have been transplanted to the second floor 
of the building. Shoppers pass along winding streets that cross the squares and canals of 
150 The Experience Economy, p. 172. 
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Venice. This elaborate recreation is simply designed as an extravagant addition to 
shopping. The Venetian is designed to entertain the shopper who is immersed in a space 
that simulates daylight with vaulted ceilings and electric lights. This illusion is further 
strengthened by restaurant waiters who ask their customers if they will be dining inside or 
out. But instead of the natural cycles of light and dark, the time at the Venetian is 
pennanently set at dusk. 
At first sight the Venetian Hotel Casino Resort corresponds to the Platonic opposition 
between the authentic original and the fake copy; there is a notable correspondence 
between the historic original and the therned copy. Plato's attack on mimetic 
representation is based on a fear of misperception, of the impoverished copy being 
mistaken for the original. For Plato, this misperception is dangerous. The illusions of the 
painter and the poet distort reality and truth by passing on a falsehood that bears little 
resemblance to the ideal form. Although Plato's metaphysical notion of the pure original 
is now something of a redundant abstraction, the hierarchy between the authentic original 
and the false reproduction remains in place. For some, however, the copy holds more 
value than the original. In the case of Las Vegas, the copy is more efficient, cleaner, 
newer and fresher. ' 51 But this comparison is to miss the point, it is no longer a question of 
Platonic categories of reality and appearance but instead a question of what the copy 
reveals about the changing state of its niodel. This mimetic mode of representation (the 
therned reproduction/experiential placemaking) is directly linked to the imperceptible 
effects of spatial transubstantiation. The failure of the Venetian to be faithful to its model 
(the Rialto Bridge has been built to include a Travelater and the gondolas are designed 
with hidden motors) provides a useful insight into the actual state of things. The visible 
mutation of one thing into another, of the original city reduced and transplanted into the 
Nevada desert, forces the hidden workings of spatial transubstantiation to surface. It is at 
this very moment, however, that the turbulent relations between spatial illusions perform 
something of a de-transubstantiation. That is, instead of the bread and the wine mutating 
into the body of Christ, it is as if we begin to see a change in relations. To continue the 
"' in the television documentary, Superstructures of America (produced by Greg Lanning, Channel 4, 
2002), the architecture critic Paul Goldburger makes the case for the Venetian, arguing that it easily 
resolves many of the discomforts of the 'real Venice'. 
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analogy, it is as if both the ceremony and our participation in the event can be understood 
to act on and change the transformations that take place before us. This shift from the 
Platonic categorisations - that continue to inform received assumptions about space - 
marks an important challenge to the dominant theorisations of space and economy. 
The architecture critic Paul Goldburger describes how the 'crowds are attracted to each 
city, not for work but to be entertained'. 152 Goldburger argues that while there are clear 
differences between the ancient Italian city and the recent superstructures of Las Vegas, 
153 'increasingly the real Venice is like the theme park and Las Vegas is the same thing' . 
The divide between the original and the copy merely operates as a surface appearance, 
beneath the traditional inscription (Venice reproduced as an inferior representation) lies 
an important change in relations. Plato's privileging of origins has been rendered wholly 
inadequate, not because the model has disappeared, but because the copy has returned to 
speak of the changing identity of the original (as I will argue, this does not merely return 
us to the theorisation of 'simulation and simulacra' proposed by Baudrillard -I will not 
reflect on the 'catastrophic disappearance' of the 'real', the 'authentic' or the 'essential'; 
instead, the focus has remained on the relations, movements and interruptions that take 
place between differentiated modes of illusion). That is, the movement and flux operating 
in what is perceived to be fixed is, by way of the copy, brought to the surface and made 
visible. Consequently, the effect of the Venetian can be argued to inscribe and alter our 
perception of the 'real original' (Venice): the reconstruction of its streets and canals in 
Las Vegas gives a clear indication of the current identity of the model. It is precisely the 
fabricated constructions involved in experiential placemaking (mimetic representation) 
that are not only enmeshed with the workings of global economy but which also change 
it. 
In this way the inscription is not a passive representation, the act of inscription instead 
forces a re-inscription. This movement describes something about the way space speaks 
and like the immateriality of the spoken word, it is the immaterial representations of 
152 Superstructures ofAmerica, Channel 4,2002. 
153 Superstructures ofAmerica. 
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experiential placemaking that articulate the social realities of social space. The nature of 
this spatial inscription is at once rigid and fluid: the obsessive attention to recreating the 
original perversely acts on what is being copied. The relation between the mimetic 
representations of site and the ideological representation of economy do not perform as a 
unified entity: it is not simply a case of one mode subsuming another. The dialogue 
between the model and copy, between economy and site, serve as a cycle of changing 
relations. 
Writing on Las Vegas, Peter Weibel argues that both Venice and Las Vegas are cities of 
consumption: 
Venice is a model for Las Vegas as the first consumer city of the old world, as Las Vegas 
is the first consumer city of the new world. Therefore Las Vegas is architecturally 
imitating the most scenic views of Venice and one of the most famous hotels is called 
The Venetian Casino Hotel Resort. 154 
Instead of producing goods for exchange, these cities rely on tourism, recreation and 
entertainment to support their economies. Weibel points out that the relation between 
Venice and Las Vegas also involves important differences. Unlike Venice, 'Las Vegas 
was never a city of craft, production, and trade. It was conceived from the beginning as a 
place of consumption and recreation and services became the only function. 
155 The point 
here is that, as Venice has followed Las Vegas in its move to consumption, the historic 
original has mutated into a new form. In short, Venice has changed into a city that is 
more akin to its own reproduction. With the advent of the experience economy, these 
similarities have become even more transparent. Not only are both sites at the forefront of 
staging experience; Venice, like Las Vegas, elicits a context for change, both sites are in 
the business of generating transformations. 
'-ýA Peter Weibel, 'The City: A Place of Consumption in the Post-industrial Information Society', The Magic 
Hour: The Convergence of Art and Las Vegas, Germany: Hatje Cantz Publishers, 2001, p. 187. 
155 'The City: A Place of Consumption in the Post-industrial Information Society', p. 187. 
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It is via this representational mode of spatial illusion (experiential placemaking) that we 
can challenge what is perceived to be 'authentic' and 'natural, as a stable carrier of 
meaning. At this moment the forces of transubstantiation emerge and we are reminded 
that while the physical appearance of Venice does not change, it is nevertheless subject to 
one of the greatest and most sophisticated of spatial illusions. Although the outward 
phenomena remain fixed in time, the transcendental forces of transubstantiation are 
working to determine the course of future developments. What we see is an ancient city 
that has preserved its cultural heritage over the centuries. What exists is the total and 
absolute commoditisation of space (the Venetian). Instead of producing goods, the city 
has developed in line with the movements of global capital to exist as a commodity in the 
market, selling its services to anybody who wishes to visit. As Weibel points out, Venice, 
like Las Vegas, is a city of consumption and the thing that is being produced is 
experience. The old Platonic principle that takes origins, models and essences as the site 
of truth and meaning must now be reconsidered. 
The relation between experiential placemaking and transubstantiation involves a 
correspondence between differentiated modes of both space and illusion. Where one is 
explicit, the other is imperceptible, where one is seemingly specific, the other is general. 
What is clear is that, as regards transubstantiation and experiential placemaking, both 
instances of illusion are tied to the changing needs of the market. Placemaking not only 
functions as an outward expression of a developed ideological force; that is, the relation 
is not merely a question of cause and effect. As we have seen, there is an active and 
dynamic correspondence between systems in which the copy alters the model. Before I 
consider the wider implications of this relation I will turn to a force that is otherwise 
hidden -a determining force that conditions space on a global scale and transforms matter 
without altering its physical appearance. The relation between these modes of spatial 
illusion is of great importance because together they describe - and in so doing negate - 
the transcendental movement and flow of an entire global system. 
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Simulation and Simulacra 
The interrelation and coexistence of differentiated modes of illusory is precisely what 
Jean Baudrillard identifies in Simulation and Simulacra. The fantasy of Disneyland, he 
argues, is 'there to conceal the fact that it is the real country, all of real America, which is 
Disneyland' (SS, 172). Future worlds, the frontier, pirates, etc. play out the values and 
social frameworks of American society for children. This mode of experiential 
placemaking involves the physical construction of spatial narratives around both the real 
events and the dominant mythologies that have shaped a collective consciousness. These 
mimetic representations are not only simplified in form (scaled down and reduced to 
nominated zones of activity), but also reduced to a series of basic codes (history, science, 
myth, etc. ). For Baudrillard, this primary mode of placemaking simply 'masks and 
perverts a basic reality' (SS, 170). Through its miniaturisation and simplification of a 
mythological, historical and social relations, Disneyland distorts the complexity and 
hence the reality of the 'real original'. But Baudrillard also identifies third and fourth 
order simulacra to exist in the American theme park. It is this developed phase of 
simulation that corresponds to the relation of spatial illusions that I have argued to 
condition a wider experience of space: 
Disneyland is presented as imaginary in order to make us believe that the rest is real, 
when in fact all of Los Angeles and the America surrounding it are no longer real, but of 
the order of the hyperreal and simulation. It is no longer a question of a false 
representation of reality (ideology), but of concealing the fact that the real is no longer 
real, and thus of saving the reality principle (SS, 172) 
The third phase simulacrurn 'masks the absence of a basic reality' (SS, 170). This more 
'basic' mode of illusion is argued by Baudrillard to have advanced to a developed stage. 
The fourth and final incarnation not only conceals the fact that reality no longer exists, it 
reproduces the real to maintain a semblance of the real. 
Baudrillard's schema goes some way to articulating the relation of spatial illusions. The 
visible and perhaps more basic illusions of second order simulacra (experiential 
placemaking) maintain the imperceptible forces of third-and fourth-order simulacra 
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(transubstantiation) which transform physical matter without changing its appearance. 
This final phase of simulacrum/transubstantiation is not so much a false representation as 
an ideological force that maintains an image of old oppositions through the simulation of 
differences: 'it bears no relation to any reality whatever: [it is] its own pure simulacrum' 
(SS, 170). However, Baudrillard's linear passage of the false is inscribed by a 
metaphysical system of belief that continues to judge between truth and illusion. 156 This 
procession of simulacra describes the victory of the illusion over reality and truth. In 
short, Baudrillard's critical framework is bound to a set of determining judgments that 
equate the rise of immaterial phenomena with the catastrophic demise of the real. 
With this problem in mind, I propose that the relation between experiential placemaking 
and transubstantiation, between the mimetic and the ideological, is not a march away 
from a basic reality but a disjunctive entry point into a new system of relations. That is, 
the spatial illusions of placemaking are, as Baudrillard has suggested, joined to the 
imperceptible forces of transubstantiation. However, this relation does not work to 
'conceal' the operation of a more general and advanced illusory mechanism, nor as 
Baudrillard has stated it, 'feed the illusion of the real with imaginary stations' (SS, 172). 
Given that scripted spatial narratives and experiential urban planning are now a model for 
the way space is conceived in towns and cities around the world, ' 57 the placemaking of 
the theme park should instead be thought to externalise the mutations of ideological 
representation. It is not a question of the difference between the imaginary and the real 
being simulated or constructed to maintain the semblance of difference (Baudrillard). 
Although difference does not exist in the old framework of reality and illusion (and 
perhaps never has), we should not resort to the rhetoric of catastrophe and fatalism. As 
we have seen, meaningful difference exists - only today it appears in the form of an 
active and dynamic relation. 
'' 6See, Douglas Kellner, 'Baudrillard and the Return of Metaphysics', Jean Baudrillard: From Marxism to 
5 
Postmodernism and Beyond, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1989, pp. 177-186. 
'57 In 'Disney Space' Chuihua Judy Chung writes: 'Disney Space is the invention of a new urbanism by a 
single individual, Walt Disney, whose yearnings for an idealized environment produced a series of, in 
retrospect, visionary moves that irreversibly transformed the composition of the twentieth-century city' 
'Disney Space', p. 27 1. 
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It is, then, not a case of the illusion masking the fact that reality has disappeared 
(Baudrillard) but the differentiated modes of spatial illusion revealing reality to exist 
within the site of social space. Moreover, this relation does not merely indicate the 
absolute catastrophe of the modern world (Baudrillard), but instead establishes an 
important challenge to theoretical representations of the ideological. It is precisely the 
relation between placemaking and transubstantiation, between the mimetic and the 
ideological and between site and economy, that allows us to map the new territories and 
movements that have come to envelope our spatial surroundings. Moving in these 
'imagination stations' we find ourselves hard-wired to the reality of an ever-changing 
world system that has moved beyond the older physical geographies of time and space. 
Baudrillard's fear of our in-tmersion/sublimation into a false appearance and consequent 
disappearance as freethinking subjects should be set aside. Although these spatial 
illusions are attached to the same mechanism of power, the relation that takes place is 
reciprocal, just as our spatial surroundings are changed by mutations in economy those 
same surrounding act on and alter that larger world system. 
The invisibility/total reign of what Baudrillard has termed the fourth phase of simulacra 
is mapped out in the highly fabricated sites of retail, fantasy and entertaim-nent. The 
experiential placemaking of social space short-circuits the transcendental 
commoditisation of social relations. As we have seen,. this disjunctive coexistence of 
spatial illusions not only provides an important insight into the global framework and 
mechanism that shapes the way we think and live, the relation serves as an instrument of 
change. In addition, it is now clear that the old opposition between error and truth, and 
illusion and reality involve many problems and difficulties. Not least, we find that these 
idealist categories distract from any meaningful analysis of the critical differences that 
exist within the networks and mechanisms that surround us. 
The critical status of illusion in social space 
In contrast to the key theoretical arguments explored through the previous chapters, I 
have argued that both space and the ideologies that exist therein are not fixed to an 
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unchanging construct of power but are subject to a process of changing relations. 
Consequently, we can see that illusion, in all its differentiated forms, is not merely or 
simply imposed upon us. If, we take ideology to mean a changing system of shared 
beliefs 158 and not - as Marx would have it - false consciousness, ideology can be 
comprehended as a construct that is anchored to the realities of social space. It is here, at 
this point of contact, engagement and interchange that the critical relations between 
space and illusion come into play 
The focus of this final analysis rests with the force of representation, how the copy 
appropriates the model and how this inscription forces change. In light of these 
generative relations I will return to the earlier fusion between mimetic and ideological 
representation or as I have put it, placemaking and transubstantiation. What passes 
between these systems means that the event of transubstantiation (as it is played out 
through economic exchange) can no longer claim itself to be the sole agent of 
transformation (we knowingly buy transformations). With the inclusion of placemaking, 
with the presence of social space, the old formulation of false consciousness 
(transubstantiation) is reversed. Rather than simply manipulating social contact, 
engagement and interchange, we see that ideology is subject to and inscribed by the 
determinations of social space. What I have described as a de-transubstantiation goes to 
illustrate this change in formation. Before moving beyond this important point I will 
return to the question of ideology, as it is through this concept that we begin to 
understand how illusion is caught within a generative cycle of relations and, perhaps 
more importantly, we see how social space is a site of agency and change. 
For Luc Boltanski and Eve Chiapello, the ideological is a representation of a new spirit in 
capitalism. It is this latest mutation in capital that now stands as a dominant ideology: 
We may indeed speak of the dominant ideology, so long as we stop regarding it as mere 
subterfuge by the dominant to ensure the consent of the dominated, and acknowledge that 
the majority of those involved - the strong as well as the weak - rely on these schemas in 
As I discuss, Luc Boltanski and Eve Chiapello takes this view in The New Spirit of Capitalism. 
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order to represent to themselves the operation, benefits and constraints of the order in 
which they find themselves immersed. 1" 
Boltanski and Chiapello's conception of ideology is not determined by it being true or 
false but is understood as a reflection of the formation and transformation of 'the 
justifications of capital. ' 160 Moreover, ideology remains 'rooted in the reality of things, in 
as much as it helps to inflect peoples action and thus fashion the world they act in'. 161 
This engagement with ideology, which remains tied to the dominant modes of power, 
contests the definition of ideology as 'false consciousness'. Not only does the older 
definition of ideology as false consciousness (which I have explored through the work of 
Plato, Marx, Debord, Jameson and Baudrillard) assume that some ideas match or 
correspond to things while others do not, the very notion of false consciousness implies 
that there is a correct way of viewing the world. Moreover, as Terry Eagleton points out: 
'the belief that a minority of theorists monopolise a scientifically grounded knowledge of 
how society is, while the rest of us blunder around in some fog of false consciousness, 
does not particularly endear itself to democratic sensibility. ' 162 
As argued in Chapter One, moving beyond Marx's notion of ideology as false 
consciousness is central to understanding the critical status of illusion in social space. 
However,, the 'dominant ideology' is only open to change when it enters spaces of 
contact, engagement and interchange; in other words, the dominant ideology is rooted 
within both social space and the social relations that occupy space. When Eagleton asks if 
ideology is 'less a matter of representations of reality than lived relations', 163 we should 
be careful to avoid reconstructing the very oppositions that we have worked to dissolve. 
The relation between lived social relations and representations of lived experience should 
not be separated into distinct spheres. As we have seen, this is precisely the distinction 
that Lefebvre makes between 'representations of space' and 'representational space' and 
the very problem that Debord faces when he casts the world as a representational 
159 The New Spirit of Capitalism, p. 11. 
160 The New Spirit of Capitalism, p. 11. 
161 The New Spirit of Capitalism, p. 11. 
162 ideolog3V, P. i i. 
163 IdeoloS51, p. 20. 
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spectacle. Ideological representation and mimetic representation coexist as differentiated 
systems and it is only when they are analysed as distinct entities (Marx) or as a 
homogenous mass (Debord) that the world appears fixed within a 'fatal strategy' of 
image saturation, paroxysm and implosion (Baudrillard). 
Understanding the critical status of illusion is key to comprehending the political, 
economic and ideological relations that operate in social space. As I have argued 
throughout, the constructed, the fabricated and the false do not exist as a homogeneous 
entity but coexist as fields of differentiated modalities. Turning back to the Republic, we 
should once again consider Plato's motivation for banishing artists from his utopian state. 
As we saw in Chapter One, the products produced by the artists are of a 'different order' 
or 'lower grade' to the bed, the chair or the bridal made by the craftsman. At the same 
time, however, everything produced by the hands of men is only ever an inferior 
reproduction. Plato judges between the good and the deviant copy and with this moral 
division avoids any analysis of the relation between differentiated modes of illusion. In 
other words, the relation between copies is covered by a desire to keep them separate. In 
banishing the artists from the Republic Plato does not rid the state of illusion, he simply 
divides between different modes. What presents the greatest challenge to the rule of law, 
those appearances that promote and provoke action and change, and those representations 
that threaten the sovereignty of the model and the autonomy of rational logic are simply 
removed. This moral,, ideological and political censoring of illusion is precisely the 
problem at stake. 
Turning to Plato, Jacques Ranciere argues that the stage (Greek theatre), 'disturbs the 
clear portioning of identities, activities and spaces. ' 
164 That is, the work of the artists 
intervenes with the general distribution of labour. However, as Ranciere points out, it is 
the 'indetermination of identities, the deligitimation of positions of speech, the 
deregulation of partitions of space and time' that is political. 
165 By banishing the mimetic 
products of the artist, Plato seeks to depoliticise the Republic and establish a stable 
164The Politics ofA esthetics, p. 13. 
165 The Politics ofAesthetics, p. 13-14 
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community in which everybody knows their place. For Ranciere, Plato's opposition to the 
mimetic products of poets and painters goes to describe the politics, antagonism and 
subversion of the redistributing of the shared experience: 
Politics plays itself out in the theatrical paradigm as the relationship between the stage 
and the audience, as meaning produced by the actor's body, as games of proximity and 
distance. 166 
The Platonic principle, which divides and opposes reality and appearance, is set in place 
to protect the regime. As Ranciere argues: fiction is nominated as an exception to the 
real. By banishing the arts altogether, Plato removes the possibility of this subversive 
influence. The staging of experience is both a theatrical and political proposition. Given 
this relation, it might be argued that the re-inscription of the sensible through experiential 
placemaking serves as a subversion of government and a disruption of the portioning of 
space and time. However, before such an assertion can be made, we need to question the 
model of power that Ranciere's analysis relies on. As I have argued throughout, the 
forces that preside over social space are in a constant state of flux and not tied to a 
monolithic and unchanging regime of governance. It is precisely Ranciere's division 
between change and stasis, between 'art' and 'work' or reality and fiction that emerges as 
a highly unstable and problematic foundation for considering the critical possibilities of 
social space. With Ranciere's reading of Plato the divide between the governments 
distribution and the artists redistribution of the sensible is fixed in a system of inside and 
outside, the rule of law and external opposition. 
Through the previous chapters I have repeatedly returned to Plato: not because the 
Republic can help us 'lay down the terms of the problem', 167 but because the problem is 
so often understood in Platonic terms. At the start of this analysis of space and illusion I 
asked how it is possible to remain with a metaphysical logic when the site of analysis 
bears no relation to that approach to thinking. 
166 The Politics ofAesthetics, p. 17. 
167 The Politics ofAesthetics, p. 42. 
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Instead of remaining with an unchanging image of governance, my interrogation of 
differentiated modes of illusion has involved a consideration of mutations and 
developments in capitalism. Here I have argued that changes in economy and the 
ideologies inherent in exchange are both reflected in and inscribed by staging, 
placemaking and the scripted narratives of urban design. This relation - between 
placemaking and transubstantiation - has challenged a number of key texts (which 
continue to idealise the real and homogenise differences and relations in social space into 
a single category of false consciousness). The critical status of illusion in social space has 
not emerged from a constructed opposition to global networks and the spaces they affect. 
Instead, it has come into play as a consequence of the relation between ideological and 
economic forces and, immersive and disorientating spaces of retail, leisure and 
entertainment. Together these systems perform a critical function. That is, the spaces of 
social and economic activity allow for some entry into the structures and mechanisms of 
global economy. Our immersion within these spaces does not constitute a passive 
compliance with capitalism nor does it signal our fate as freethinking subjects. The 
interruptions and interferences that we have seen to occur between systems involve our 
own participation in the new geographies and networks that shape and reshape the real. 
Finally, de-transubstantiation should not be seen as a move to rid the world of illusion 
and our need for illusions (Marx). WUle I have taken the image of the Eucharist to mark 
a passive encounter with the affects of an ideological system that trades in metaphysics, I 
have argued that the affects of this modality are only compliant with an image of false 
consciousness when seen in opposition to the real. In contrast, the relation between 
differentiated systems shows us as active participants acting on mutating forces of power. 
Consequently, the theatrical paradigm that divides the stage from its audience is no 
longer an accurate image of the systems in play. Our proximity to the stage is, quite 
literally, that of actors. The shift from spectator to participant has far-reaching 
consequences, as it is here that we see the possibility for action. De-transubstantiation not 
only marks the disappearance of a passive audience, it also asserts the critical status of 
illusion in social space. 
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The Venetian Hotel Casino Resort, Las Vegas, 1999 
The 63-acre resort is a miniature Venice complete with replicated statuary, hand-painted frescoed ceilings and tributes to familiar Venetian landmarks. 
15.1 - The Grand Canal is situated 15.2 -A replica of the Rialto Bridge is 
on the first floor of the hotel. placed outside of the hotel. 
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15.3 - The fagade of the 
Doge's Palace is recreated (on a reduced scale) and serves as 
the main entrance to the hotel. 
Conclusion 
Chapter 5 
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Research Findings 
Throughout this research I have been asking how we might conceive of illusion as a site 
of difference, criticality and change? To do this I have explored how the 
spectacularisation of social space in the form of experiential placemaking continues to be 
theorised as a mode of false consciousness. With terms such as spectacle, hyperreality 
and simulacra, the traditional opposition between 'authenticity' and 'reality' - and the 
6active' or 'passive' activities that those binaries are understood to allow for - continues 
to determine how social space is theorised. Assessing the critical status of illusion in 
social space is then a starting point for thinking about the turbulent and generative 
relations that exist in the highly constructed universe of urban space. No longer is it a 
case of maintaining a critical distance (Jameson) or even mourning the disappearance of a 
lost reality (Baudrillard), but as I have argued throughout, the possibilities for social 
space reside in a new evaluation of the relations between differentiated modes of illusion. 
From the outset there has been something of a question mark after the term illusion, not 
least because it immediately calls up the very possibility of 'the false' and consequently 
its idealised opposite: 'the real'. The aim and focus of this research has been to consider 
how illusion can be thought differently, how Benjamin's notion of the synchronic 
relations of phantasmagoric space for example, can help us to think of illusion as a field 
of differentiation and consequently, how the spectacularisation of social space can be 
understood to embody difference, criticality and change. In order to evaluate the relations 
between differentiated modes of illusion we have had to dispose of the idea of urban 
space as simply complicit with a totalizing ideological framework in which 'real human 
relations' are replaced by pse udo representations (Debord) and the space of 'real history' 
overrun by pastiche, disorientation and media images (Jameson). To this end, more recent 
studies of capitalism have helped trace the complexity, mutation and flux of the market 
(Boltanksi and Chapiro) and theorise the global forces that affect and are affected by the 
spatial systems in play (Pine And Gilmore). From these accounts we have seen how 
developments in economy go to structure and restructure the spaces we inhabit with a 
range of spectacular and differentiated effects. It is precisely these effects and their 
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changes and developments, that provides the coordinates to the ideological forces that 
remain out of sight. 
De-transubstantiation is intended as a means of articulating the critical relation that takes 
place between differentiated modes of illusion. In other words, the systems, forces and 
relations that produce social space have been considered through their relation to 
economic, ideological and cultural global systems. More specifically, we saw how those 
spaces that produce the appearance of authenticity (Venice) can be explored through their 
spectacular simulation (the Venetian). Here I have argued that it is not just a case of 
experiential placemaking giving some insight into the hidden workings of global 
economy: but with the mimetic representations of placemaking we come to understand 
space differently. That is, the transcendental movements and flows of an entire global 
system are seen to act on what 'appears' fixed. In other words, the critical status of 
illusion serves as a vehicle for understanding the mutations and changes in space when, 
on the surface, space is seen as immutable. It should be noted that this relation does not 
return us to the old causality of a hidden essence-surface appearance. Unlike the knock- 
on consequences of cause and effect, the movements and flows that pass between these 
systems are always in flux and subject to the changing conditions of both social space 
and economic systems. The relation between representational and transcendental 
spatialities has been argued to perform a certain de-transubstantiation. This undoing of 
the mystery, myth and mysticism attached to the illusion of authenticity, this questioning 
of the assumed value that conditions our understanding of social space is made available 
by highly constructed and spectacular means. 
From here we have been able to conduct a better evaluation of the critical status of 
illusion in social space. Consequently, the following points can now be posited: 
0 the relation between mimetic and ideological representation involves a fusion of 
differentiated systems; 
illusion functions as a heterogeneous site of agency: 4-1 
the copy acts on and changes the model; 
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spaces of retail and leisure do not simply answer to an overarching theory of mass 
commoditisation but involve moments of rupture, interference and force. 
There is no doubt that we exist in a world of constructed fictions. Yet this is not The 
Wizard of Oz or The Truman Show: there is no 'real world' behind the stage set. The 
critical status of illusion exists in the relation between the local and the universal, 
between social space and global networks and between people and economy. In each case 
we find differentiated modes of illusion; in these differences there occurs movement and 
change. This play of illusions maintains a critical status because it cuts in a number of 
ways. It is well known that illusion affects us; we know this - not because critical theory 
attempts to expose it - but because we knowingly shape our lives around fictional 
constructs. However, the question for this thesis has been concerned with how illusion 
serves us, how it re-inscribes global networks and how the social spaces of everyday 
praxis interfere with and rupture the flow of global economy. This is not intended as a 
justification for capitalism; on the contrary, the aim of this study has been to identify 
illusion as a critical force that acts on economy. 
Context 
These research findings - that have been developed through a new notion of de- 
transubstantiation - impact directly on the way art practice can be thought. By focusing 
on the context of experiential placemaking, scripted space and retail architecture this 
research has led to new ways of considering the critical potential of artworks that engage 
with the spaces, products and technologies associated with commerce and exchange. That 
is, practices derided for conforming to the values of the market simply because they 
employ spectacular means of production or engage with sites of retail, leisure and 
entertainment, might also be considered to embody some critical potential. 
'68That is not 
168 Assessing the critical value of art works through notions of opposition, resistance and struggle continues 
to determine how contemporary practice is judged. Typical of this approach is Benjamin Buchloh's review 
of the 2001 Venice Biennale in which he writes: 
'Exhibition value - the condition of the secularized modernist work as fully emancipated from cult 
value and myth - has been replaced by spectacle value, a condition in which media control in 
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to say that all large scale works that employ new image making technologies are 
inherently critical but that artists engaging with new media or sites that are deemed to 
extend the alienating and pacifying affects of 'spectacle' can work through those means 
without simply conforming to the values of global capitalism. 
To reiterate, practices that adopt the vernacular of the market, that follow new mutations 
in capital and explore spaces of contact, engagement and interchange, also have the 
potential to embody new modes of critique. Perhaps more specifically, works such as 
Carsten Holler's giant slides in the Turbine Hall of the Tate Modern (Test Site, 2006) or 
Pierre Huyghe's acquisition of the copyright to Ann Lee, a Japanese manga character 
awaiting activation (Two Minutes Out of Time, 2000), function beyond questions of 
complicity on the one hand or resistance and struggle on the other. 169 While these works 
take their forms from the entertainment industry they embody difference. This, however, 
is not played out through strategies of opposition or distance but instead experienced as a 
complex system of differentiated affects, associations and relations. While a proper 
consideration of these examples demands a whole new line of research, it is important to 
note that the differentiated field of illusion that has been explored through the 
spectacularisation of social space extends to comprehending the critical potential of 
practices that transcribe the phantasmagoric and disorientating activities of consumer 
culture into the context of contemporary art. That is, artworks that are not simply 
concerned with 'removing us from the apparently invisible spell of hermetic closure that 
the languages of media technology, architecture and design have established in the 
service of spectacle and commodity production' 170 but those that demand that we remain 
everyday life is mimetically internalized and aggressively extended into those visual practices that 
had been previously defined as either exempt from or oppositional to mass cultural regimes, and 
that now relapse into the most intense solicitation of mythical experience. ' Benjamin H. D. 
Buchloh, Control, by Design, Artforum, September 2001, page 163. 
169 Daniel Birnbaum has argued that Carsten Holler extends Nicolas Bourriaud's notion of 'Relational 
Aesthetics' to an inner plurality: 'relational art can be about more than playing games with others. Plenty of 
people exist inside each one of us, people whom we do not yet know. Some we will probably never know. ' 
Here Birnbaum is concerned with returning the individual, disorientating and pleasurable experience of 
Holler's work to a notion of (inner) community. Daniel Birnbaum, Mortal Coils, Artforum, January 2007, 
p. 76. 
17' Benjamin H, D, Buchloh, Control, by Design, Artforum, September 2001, page 163. 
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actively engaged with the systems in play, require that we begin to consider new modes 
of immersion, entertainment and spectacle as possible forms of critique. 171 
De-transubstantiation is then one way of evaluating the critical status of illusion within a 
differentiated field of relations. When we begin to conceive of contemporary art practice 
as being firmly situated in a broad field of highly constructed experiences, affects and 
social environments, its critical status is no longer dependent on notions of distance, 
opposition and the fate of community (at the expense of spectacle) that continue to 
dominate critical discourse. Within this broader context the question of how art remains 
authentic or autonomous, or indeed concerns about how art is simply the same as the 
activities associated with everyday life, are superseded by the consequences and affects 
that art has on the spaces and activities that it transcribes, appropriates and mediates. 
Practice and Theory 
The focus of this research has been on the development of new artworks and their role in 
testing and facilitating different ways of understanding the critical status of illusion in 
social space. However, it will already be clear to the reader that the emphasis does not lie 
with other practices. Instead, the focus has remained with the affect that differentiated 
modes of illusion continues to have on a global condition. That is to say, this research is 
cross disciplinary in both its concerns and methodology and while it is firmly situated in 
the context of contemporary art practice, the intention has been to reach out to a wide 
range of references and sources, in particular new research around capitalism, economics,, 
experiential placemaking and urban planning. The absence of examples of other artworks 
is then a consequence of orientation, method and theoretical development. In other 
words, the aim has been (i) to conduct research that allows for dialogue between art 
practice, architectural theory, social theory and economics; (ii) explore how social space 
171 in the symposium, 'Rethinking Spectacle', Claire Bishop and Mark Godfrey examined whether the 
denigration of art as 'spectacle' masks an elitist resistance to populism, or if it contains a more serious 
critique of the global market and the role of art. The notion that spectacle embodies some possibility for 
critique was developed by Godfrey who argued that its 'means' could be turned on its 'ends'. Symposium: 
Rethinking Spectacle, Tate Modern, 31 s' March, 2007. 
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is constructed, cinematic and scripted; (iii) produce new artworks and curate exhibitions 
that test how lens based media is a lived facet of architectural space and; (iv) consider 
new approaches, both practical and theoretical, to engaging with the spectacular, 
experiential and disorientating affects of social space. Throughout this research the 
relationship between practice and theory has been key and while the written component 
and the development of new artworks have followed dedicated lines of enquiry, their 
points of interaction have enabled the project to be ambitious and far reaching in both its 
theoretical scope and practical experimentation. 
The field trips that underpin the research for this thesis have been instrumental in 
facilitating a productive relation between practice and theory. Primary research in Las 
Vegas, Los Angeles, New York and Venice has informed the line of argument pursued 
through the previous chapters and provided a testing ground for a number of videos. 
These locations have been a starting point for new art works, which have then fed back 
into and informed critical developments in the writing. This method of working has 
anchored this thesis to a number of sites and consequently allowed the research to move 
between theoretical and practical modes of enquiry in a productive and generative 
formation. In addition, videos such as Grand Canal 2005, Shaft 2004 and Reeperbahn 
(2002) have provided important empirical data about how sites are used, designed and 
experienced. Moreover, these works have explored the relation between differentiated 
modes of illusion through editing, layering and restaging the spaces analysed in the text. 
The consequence of this has led to the research findings stated earlier and the completion 
of a substantial body of work. 
The changes and developments in the practice have both informed and been informed by 
the theoretical research carried out for this thesis. This cross-fertilization is also reflected 
in the development of objects and projections (pp. 202-211). The move from working 
with lenses and mirrors as tools of mediation and affect (Camera Obscura, Blue Lens, 
Stereoscopic Orange), to working with projected images of highly constructed, cinematic 
and staged interiors (Barrel, Floor Projector and Box) has directly informed and 
supported a number of theoretical developments, in particular the move from Marx's 
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conceptual isation of the Camera Obscura as a figure of ideology to Benjamin's re- 
conceptual i sation of phantasmagoria as a critical tool of enquiry. As we saw in Chapter 
Two, Benjamin's conceptual development of phantasmagoria avoids the rational 
oppositions that I argued to characterise Marx's thought. Instead, the phantasmagoric 
illusions of the ideological were argued to be inescapable from any notion of an authentic 
natural world existing outside the mediating lens of ideology. Working through this 
development both theoretically and practically has led to a focused and sustained enquiry 
into the movements, flows and relations that exist in social space while simultaneously 
providing the scope for new research across a broad range of activities. 
The production of new videos has been key to the development of this research. The 
recording, editing and restaging of spaces of retail, leisure and entertainment has 
provided the means for understanding how social space is produced through a 
differentiated field of representations, affects and ideological systems. In the three videos 
that accompany this thesis (Grand Canal, Shaft and Reeperbahn), social space is filled 
with a broad and disorientating range of highly constructed experiences. Here we are 
required to move within a series of sites and experience the flows and ruptures that 
operate between the systems in play. The development and production of these videos has 
laid the ground for a better understanding of how spaces of retail, leisure and 
entertainment involve moments of difference, criticality and change and consequently has 
come to inform the theoretical development of the thesis as a whole. 
In addition to the individual works already discussed, the research findings have been 
tested through a continuing series of curated group exhibitions. Long-term curatorial 
projects such as Episode: the pleasure and persuasion of lens based media and One Way 
Street: experiencing ideology as affect, have involved site specific environments that 
fracture and disrupt any single or overarching reading of the works exhibited. 
172 In each 
'72 One Way Street, Sheppard Gallery, University of Nevada, Reno (Feb-March 07) and KX Gallery 
Hamburg (Sept 07). Co-curated project with Amanda Beech and Matthew Poole, including works by Pierre 
Bismuth, Mark Leckey and Roman Vasseur. Episode, Temporarycontemporary, (London, Dec/Jan 05). 
Leeds Met Gallery, (Leeds, April/June 06), South Florida Art Space (Miami, Sept/Oct 06). Co-curated 
project with Amanda Beech and Matthew Poole. Participating artists include, Julie Henry and Mike 
Marshall. 
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of the exhibitions, large cinematic screens have been positioned to divide the gallery into 
disorienting and forceful architectural environments. Placed within these structures, the 
individual works are made to compete for attention and are experienced as an ongoing 
series of fractured moments or episodes. This series of international exhibitions has 
provided a dynamic context for Grand Canal, Shaft and Reeperbahn and extended the 
scope of the research findings to a productive engagement with architectural space and its 
relation to lens based artworks. 
The movement between writing, making and curating and the cross pollination of 
practice and theory has expanded and developed what I understand practice to mean. My 
engagement with a broad and differentiated range of activities has led to the very 
interactions, interferences and relations that I have argued to constitute the critical status 
of illusion. Consequently, this thesis has provided a context for my practice by 
facilitating research into the generative relations between systems - both within the 
context of contemporary art and beyond. The outcome of this is not only evident in the 
theoretical findings and the production of new works; it is manifest within a new 
understanding of the conditions and relations that determine the critical status of practice. 
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Documentation 
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Practice 
While my practice is not 'explicitly' identified in the text, my work with video, 
installation and projection is 'implicit' within the writing and central to the project as a 
whole. The following images are intended as documentary evidence of this research. In 
addition to this documentation, Grand Canal, Shaft and Reeperbahn are included on 
DVD (placed in the pocket on the inside of the back cover). These videos were shown as 
part of an exhibition for my final examination. 
In my video works I have used editing techniques and fixed camera positions to explore 
how space engages with global networks and extends perception beyond the physical 
possibilities of a single site. By constructing spatial narratives in video and installation I 
have experimented with highly fabricated and fictionalised interpretations of space. With 
this work I have explored questions that are central to my thesis as a whole. Most 
notably, I have looked to the relation between local and global sites of contact, 
interchange and exchange; manifestations of global economy in space; and the critical 
possibilities of illusion and effect. The outcome of this research has formed the basis for a 
series of international exhibitions and continues to feed into and inform my written work. 
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Videos(2002-2006) 
190 
Grand Canal 
2005,2m[ns 30secs 
Grand Canal cuts between The Venetian Casino Hotel Resort (Las Vegas) and Venice 
(Italy) while at the same time focusing on the Gondola rides that ferry tourists around L-- 
the canals of each site. As the work progresses the relationship between the 'authentic' 
city and the 'themed reproduction' becomes increasingly blurred to the point where L- 
historic, cultural and geographical differences are overrun by highly constructed spa- 
tial narratives. 
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aft 
2004,4mins 30secs 
Shaft takes the viewer through a number of department stores in London and New York. 
In the video the lift doors are treated as an editing device. This effect allows for a 
seamless journey between sites so that the carefully designed interiors of each store are 
built into a single architecture. The individual interiors appear as follows: 
Tiffany's 2 nd Floor, 
Bloomingdales 3d Floor, 
Liberty's 3 rd Floor, 
Dickens and Jones Lower Ground, 
Debenharns 5 th Floor, 
John Lewis 3d Floor 
Bloomingdales Ground Floor, 
Bloomingdales 2d Floor, 
Liberty's Ground Floor, 
Liberty's 4 th Floor, 
Asprey's Ground Floor, 
Aprey's I st Floor, 
Bloomingdales Lower Ground. 
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Reeperbahn 
2003,4mins 
A tracking shot of the Reeperbahn (Hamburg) is back-projected onto a large glass shop 
front on the Caledonian Road (London). Included in the frame of Reeperbahn are cars 
and buses passing in front of the projected street in Germany; the flashing light of the 
mini-cab office directly adjacent to the shop; and the words 'Pleasure Garden' (which are 
reflected from the sign on the other side of the road). As the video progresses, these 
layers of representation compete for attention and interrupt any sense of a single 
narrative, journey or flow. 
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Reeperbahn, 2004 
199 
Richmond to Woolwich 
2002 
200 
A video of the train journey be- 
tween Richmond and Woolwich 
(the length of the North London 
Line) is back projected onto the 
window of the gallery. Throughout 
the video the position of the cam- 
era remains fixed. This position is 
determined by the building where 
the video is projected. As the train 
passes the back of the gallery. the 
view from the train and the view 
from the back of the house con- 
verge. 
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Objects and Projections (1995-2006) 
202 
Titles and Descriptions 
Barrel, 2003 (pp. 204-205). 
The green metal barrel has been converted into a projector. The projected image is the 
bottom comer of the barrel's red interior. 
Floor Projector, 2001 (p. 206). 
The large wooden box projects the floor beneath it. In this exhibition the projected 
floorboards took on the appearance of bricks. 
Box, 1998 (p. 207). 
The MDF box is simply constructed but carefully positioned. The inside of the box is 
projected onto the wall of the gallery. 
Economist, 1998 (p. 208). 
A mirror is placed outside the large foyer window. The reflection shows the Economist 
building towering above. 
Stereoscopic Orange, 1997 (p. 209). 
Two oranges are pinned to the wall. When the viewer looks at the oranges in the mirror - 
so that each eye can only see one side of the mirror - the effect is of seeing through the 
skin of the orange. 
Blue Lens, 1996 (p. 2 10). 
A blue Fresenel lens is inserted into the door. The blue frame is cast in resin. 
Camera Obscura, 1995 (p. 201). 
A series of lenses are positioned to project the image of the street (outside the window) 
onto the gallery wall. 
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Exhibitions and Publications 
Selected Exhibitions 1999-2007 
2007 One Way Street, Sheppard Gallery, University of Nevada, Reno (Jan-Feb 07). 
Co-curated project with Amanda Beech and Matthew Poole, including works by 
Pierre Bismuth, Mark Leckey and Roman Vasseur. 
2005-6 Episode, Temporarycontemporary, (London, Dec/Jan 05). Leeds Met Gallery, 
(Leeds, April/June 06), South Florida Art Space (Miami, Sept/Oct 06). Co- 
curated project with Amanda Beech and Matthew Poole. Participating artists 
include Amanda Beech, Mike Marshall and Julie Henry. 
2005-06 ALL FOR SHOW, UK Video Works Retrospective. 
Curated by Lee Campbell, Venues include: Studio 1.1, London, Caf& Gallery, 
London, Edgezones, World Arts Building, Miami, Southern Exposure, San 
Francisco, USA. Physics Room, Christchurch, New Zealand. Lump Gallery, 
Raleigh, North Carolina, USA. Soap factory, Minneapolis, USA. Mighty 
Screenland Theatre, Kansas City, USA. International film festival, Rotterdam, 
Gallerie Verticale, Montreal, Nexus, Philadelphia. 
Participating artists include: Beagles and Ramsay, Marion Coutts, Doug 
Fishbone, Angela Hicks, Elizabeth McAlpine. 
2005-06 13+, domoBaal Gallery, London and the Thai Film and Video Biennale, 
Bangkok. Participating artists include Ron Haselden, Jenny Perlin and Kim 
Noble. 
2004 Pilot: 1,, Limehouse Old Town Hall, London (nominated artist). 
Artists' & Curators' forum -5 day event in which 100 international curators, 
artists, collectors, and writers nominate one emerging artist to exhibit and be 
present at the event. 
2002 Predator, KX Gallery (Hamburg). 
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Co-curated project - Participating artist include Julie Henry, Seth/Talentire, and 
Italo Zuffi. 
2001 Rutger Hauer, Perry's Motors, London. 
Included works by Anne Tallentine, Julie Henry and Karin Ruggaber. 
2000 Perry's Motors, New Work (solo). 
2000 Without Touch, Margaret Street (Birmingham). Curated by Nayarn Kulkarni as 
part of the Wheatley Fellowship. 
1999 Asprey Jacques Gallery, New Work (solo). 
1999 '210-297, Arthur R Rose Gallery, London. Participating artists include Andrew 
Grassie, Matthew Higgs, David Musgrave, Elizabeth Price and Mark Titchner. 
Selected Publications (2000-2006) 
2006 'The Artists' Talk, Transmission: Speaking and Listening', co-authored with 
Sharon Kivland, Axis. - Contemporary Art Journal. 
2006 'Daily Encounters', Transmission. - Speaking and Listening, vol. 5, Sheffield: Site 
Gallery and Sheffield Hallam University. 
2004-06 Transmission: Speaking and Listening, (editor, vols 4-5), Sheffield: Site Gallery 
and Sheffield Hallam University. 
2006 'Transmission: Working from the Collection' (editor), Angelaki: Humanities 
Journal, London: Routledge. 
2006 'Becky Shaw', Commissioned by The Yorkshire Art Society. 
213 
2005 'De-transubstantiation', www. art-omma. org, Art and Text: Inscription, Online 
Contemporary Art Journal, issue 11. 
2005 'Art and Text: Inscription' (editor), www. art-omma. org, Issue 11, online 
contemporary art j ournal. 
2005 'Sharon Kivland', The Internationaler, Pilot Issue. 
2004 Spectacle and Disorientation in Retail Architecture, co-authored with Nayan 
Kulkami, London: Artwords Press. 
2000 'Without Touch', Phantoms ofReason, London: Darwin Press. 
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